SCHLEY'S TURN NOW

GOVERNMENT RESTS ITS CASE IN THE COURT OF INQUIRY.

Admiral Calls Cuban Pilot—Captain Cook Described the Campaign in Detail.

(Continued from First Page.)

he said, "was that we should proceed in the direction of Santiago, and if we found the sea such that we could coal, we would immediately institute the blockade, but if not practicable to do that, we would proceed to Gonaives Bay and coal there."

Captain Cook related in some detail the occurrences of May 26, 27 and 28, including the retrograde movement from a position south of Santiago toward Key West, and the return of the fleet to the vicinity of Santiago on the evening of May 28. This period covered also the meeting with the Harvard and the scout-boats St. Paul, Minneapolis and Yale. Refering to the retrograde movement, Captain Cook said he had not been consulted with reference to it, and, speaking of the visit on board the Brooklyn of Captain Sigsbee, of the St. Paul, he said that that officer had brought the Cuban pilot Nunez aboard. In reply to an inquiry from Commodore Schley as to whether he had information concerning the Spaniards, Nunez had replied that he had been up near the entrance of Santiago harbor and had seen nothing of the Spanish fleet. "I only," he said, "had an impression that he said he knew nothing of the Spanish fleet, but I recollect now, from conversation with him, that that is what he said."

Captain Cook also related the details of the orders to the Yale to take the collier Merrimac in tow because the collier was disabled. Coming to the incident of May 27, and the return movement to Santiago, Mr. Hanna asked:

Return Movement to Santiago.

"What took place to delay the westerly movement there?"

The witness replied: "It was the attempt to get the line to the Merrimac. We waited for the Yale to take the Merrimac in tow."

Captain Cook said that he and Admiral Schley watched the weather closely, and on the evening of May 27, the weather having moderated, witness said he remarked to Commodore Schley that they believed they could coal. The Commodore, the witness said, evidently thought so himself, and made signal for them to coal.

"You say you told the Commodore that you believed the Texas could coal?"

"Yes."

"That was when?"

"The weather overhead had been good, as I recollect it, for 24 hours. The sea was good and quite moderate, and I knew the Commodore wanted to get coal as soon as he could. I spoke to him about it at that time. I think that at that time he had given orders for the Texas and Marblehead to coal. He may have given these to me. At any rate, the signals were made. The Marblehead commenced coaling at once. Signal was then made to the Texas. That was the only ship we were particularly anxious about, and I presume they were watching the weather too, but they did not ask. The Texas was signalled to coal, and the answer came back that she would try. That is by wig-wag. They did try, and succeeded in coaling."

"Refering a moment to this conversation or report, whatever it was, what were the circumstances? Where were you when you had this conversation, and, as nearly as you can state it, what did you say to Commodore Schley about the coaling conditions?"

Conversation Was Informal.

"It was a perfectly informal conversation. We several times had talked about it, perhaps on deck and perhaps in his cabin. At this particular time to which I have reference, it was along towards evening. We found that the repairs to the collier were such that she could steam with her own power, so there was no difficulty about handling her. The sea was very much smoother, very moderate, and I simply said to him that the weather was such that I could coal, but he evidently had come to the same conclusion, because he had given the order."

"Was that order to coal the Texas given before or after that conversation?"

"I really cannot say. I would not like to say he was controlled by anything I said, because I know that his anxiety was greater than my own. He had the responsibility and I did not. The only solicitude was about the sponsons of the Texas, whether she would be able to lie alongside the Merrimac. The Merrimac was quiet and able to keep with such a sea as they had, and they commenced coaling. They signalled that they were getting coal on board and conditions changed at once."

"So that when the sea became smooth on the evening of the 27th ——."

"I did not say 'smooth.' I said the sea was better. There was always a long swell there."

"This matter of coaling ships at sea is not a very easy matter under any conditions, is it, Captain, so far as you know?"

"I think not. Our experience changed our opinions a good deal, but I must say that in coaling down there I never did see as bad sea as we had there. We never had anything like it afterward, according to my recollection, a sea that was so troublesome for a collier to go alongside."

"On what date?"

"The 25th. The 24th I do not think it was practicable to coal. It was a bad day. The next day and up to the 27th there was a bad sea. I think possibly if the Texas had attempted the trial a little before the 27th she could not have done so."

"What, if anything, did you say to the Commodore after he started toward Santiago?"

The Start for Santiago.

"He started as soon as he found the Texas had enough coal. My impression is that he said he should go to Santiago; that he found it practicable to coal from colliers, and there he should stay; if they got too short of coal, he would go to Gonaives Bay or try somewhere else."

"What did you say to him?"

"I think I said 'You decided wisely.' "

"Did you say 'I congratulate'?"

"I don't recollect. I may have or may have not. I think it was a subject of congratulation."

Captain Cook related the particulars of the meeting with the scout ships off Santiago, and told of Captain Cotton and Captain Sigsbee coming on board. Speaking of Captain Sigsbee's visit, he told of his bringing the pilot Nunez aboard, but Captain Cook said he had not at first been inspired with confidence in that individual, although he afterwards found he was a reliable man.

The witness then, in response to questions, detailed the retrograde movement of the flying squadron toward Key West, beginning May 26. He said his first information that such a movement was to be undertaken was when he received orders to move. He had, he said, informed Commodore Schley on the evening of the 27th that he thought the sea had become calm enough to coal, and had found that the Commodore had also reached the same conclusion.

Replying to questions concerning the blockade of Santiago, Captain Cook said that Commodore Schley's constant idea was that the vessels should be kept well supplied with coal and kept moving constantly, as his theory was that the Spanish fleet would come out of the harbor.

"Why was the circular blockade not adopted?" Mr. Hanna asked.

"There are many forms of blockade, and I have nothing but praise for the circular blockade," replied the witness, "but the idea was to get the Spaniards to come out and to have our ships moving and ready for action."

"What were your orders of battle from May 19 to June 1?"

"We did not have any. The fleet was always in condition for action."

"Did you call that a battle order?"

"It is possible to have an order for battle, if you know just what conditions you are going to meet. The idea with us was to be able to fight the Spanish fleet whenever we should meet it. I think that was understood by all. I so understood it."

"If the fleet had come out of the harbor previous to June 1, what would you have done?"

"We would have obeyed the orders of the commanding officer."

"Were the fighting ships always in order for battle?"

"I always supposed they were; the Brooklyn was always in excellent order."

Battle of July 3.

General interest was manifested about the battle of July 3, when Mr. Hanna began his inquiry. He asked:

"Were you on deck when the fleet came out of Santiago harbor on July 3, when they were first sighted?"

The reply was in the negative; Captain Cook had at that time been in the cabin.

"How did you first learn the fleet was coming out?"

"I heard the executive officer call out, 'Clear ship for action,' and as I had given directions to have the ship ready for inspection, I knew at once something was happening. I went on deck immediately."

"Had you had any intimation on the night before that the fleet was coming out?"

"No. I turned in that night about midnight, feeling rather the other way, all hope of their coming out having been given up."

"When you came on deck where were the Spanish vessels? What were they doing?"

"When I first arrived on the forecastle, there were two in sight. The third one was just inside the entrance, and the fourth appeared immediately afterwards."

"What did they do when they came out? Which way did they head?"

"We went to the westward. The entrance to us was about northeast by north. The fleet came out south, and turned as they left the entrance to four points southwest, so that they turned in our direction. When I first got on deck, the helm had been starboarded, heading a little to the northward. When I saw the fleet they were heading southward, and seemed to be coming straight for the interval between the Texas and the Brooklyn. I went in the conning tower and directed the helmsman. I told him what I wanted was to keep straight for the fleet. They wavered a little, sometimes they turned one way and then another. We shifted helm once or twice, but very little, indeed, and finally when we were getting up fairly close, say between 1500 and 2000 yards, it seemed to me clear that they wanted to pass between the Texas and the Brooklyn. The Texas was well on our starboard, and she was headed to the northward and westward. All ships were carrying out the instructions of the commander-in-chief, and that was to head in for the entrance. We were well to the westward and headed to the northeast. When I saw that, I ported the helm perhaps half way over. She was swinging starboard very rapidly. The Spanish fleet was coming straight for this interval. I stepped out of the tower on the port side to get a good look at this fleet, to see just what they were going to do as to our relative position, and I saw they evidently put helms hard aport, and were turning to westward. We were then turning very rapidly to starboard with port helm, and we had turned, I think, almost to the east. The Texas was well on our starboard side. I then gave the order 'Hard aport' to the helmsman, and ran through the opening between the cabin and conning tower on purpose to see our own fleet and our relative positions. Quicker than I could tell it, the Commodore called to me: 'Cook, hard aport,' or 'Is your helm hard aport?' I answered: 'The helm is hard aport, turning as rapidly as possible.' As I watched the Texas, the bow of the Brooklyn seemed first to point to her port bow. I never saw the starboard bow of the Texas, and, changing our bearing very rapidly, the bow of the Brooklyn passed along the port side of the Texas until there was a clear opening between us. We made a complete turn, a very quick turn, with helm hard aport until we came around and paralleled the fleet on the other side. As we paralleled the Spanish fleet, the Viscaya—"

Admiral Dewey—May I interrupt? How near did you pass to the Texas?

"I never thought of a collision. It never entered my head. I never for a moment had one idea of vicissitude in that respect. We passed, I judge, about 400 yards. I had handled the ship under all circumstances and got so I could judge pretty correctly, and my impression was that we were about the distance we sailed in squadron. But a collision I never thought of. She turned perfectly clear of the Texas, came around, and then we had the Viscaya on our starboard bow. About abeam was the Oquendo, and then the Colon. At the time, I thought it was the Teresa, but I soon discovered this vessel was dropping out and heading for the beach. That was about the hottest time of the action. It was a critical time. There was not any time for indiscretion, and I do not think there was any. I have always felt in my mind, in studying the positions, that the chances would have been for a disaster had we shifted helm at such a time. However, we got around and we had those three vessels. I looked and could see nothing but smoke astern, and the vessels seemed enveloped in this smoke. I could not understand it. I could not understand exactly how we got there. They were all three firing on the Brooklyn, when almost immediately, faster than I could tell it, I saw a large white bone in the water, and through this smoke I saw the bow of a vessel. I exclaimed at the time, 'What was that.' The navigator who was near me said it was the Massachusetts, or something to that effect. I saw she was away, and he then said it was the Oregon. I felt perfectly assured from that moment. She came up very rapidly. She was making more speed than we were at that time. She had all her boilers on—had shifted boilers that morning from forward to aft. She had steam and hot water on."

Position of the Oregon.

"Where was the Oregon with respect to the Brooklyn at that time?"

"I estimated 600 yards. She passed in between the Texas and the Iowa. She got in between that opening, came to the northward of the Texas, and came out about 800 yards from us—I mean a perpendicular course—and that would account for just what we made to the southward in turning. We made more than the tactical diameter, because we passed part of that distance with helm half aport."

"What is the tactical diameter of the Brooklyn?"

"About 650 yards."

"Was it easy to handle the ship under such circumstances?"

"I never have seen one equal to her."

"Was the starboard engine of the Brooklyn reversed during that turn."

"It was not. There was some question about that. The reason I feel positive of that is in recalling the circumstances. My impression is it may have been the Commodore or the navigator, at least one of the two, said something about backing the starboard engine. My reply was that I did not want to lose the speed of the ship; that she was turning all right and rapidly, and I wanted to keep the speed of the ship."

"At the time you saw the Oregon coming out of the smoke was she on your starboard?"

"Starboard quarter."

"And between you and the Spanish ships?"

"Never between us and the Spanish ships."

"Where were the Spanish ships at that time?"

"There never was anything between us and the Spanish ships. She was on our starboard quarter."

"Nearer in shore?"

"Yes."

"Referring back now to certain points in the story, as I did not care to interrupt you, you state you heard the Commodore say at one time, 'Hard aport.' That was after you had begun to make the turn and the helm was hard aport?"

"Yes, the helm was aport, but not hard aport. There was perfect understanding between the Commodore and myself."

"I will ask if you recollect clearly as to whether the helm was put hard aport by yourself first, or that you did it in obedience to an order from the Commodore?"

"I gave the order on my own responsibility. No question about that. It was not until after I heard the Commodore. He called to me as I have stated, simply to confirm himself in the idea that she was turning with a hard aport helm."

"At that time did you hear any conversation between the Commodore and the navigator?"

"I did not."

"Did you see any torpedo-boats?"

"I did not."

"Were you afraid of being rammed at the time the turn was made?"

"No. There was something said about it, but I did not give it a second thought from the fact that I knew they could not ram unless they got within my turning circle."

"Were you afraid of blanketing the fire of our fleet by turning one way or the other?"

"We might have done it by turning the other way."

"Had you turned with a starboard instead of a port helm would such action have advanced you so far as to bring you within the line of movement of the enemy's ships?"

"Provided that they had taken advantage of it; that is to say, if they had continued on their course southwest straight for us, and we had turned so as to bring them within our turning circle, it would have made ramming possible, certainly."

"How were they heading when this order hard aport was given?"

"They were heading southwest."

"Were they then headed so that, had you gone the other way, they would have discovered the movement?"

"Yes, I think they would. The chart distance given at the time was 1100 yards. I estimated 1500 yards, and so made it in my report. In the first place, we must have lost by shifting helm at such a time. Then, if we had turned the other way, we must have gone 500 yards. They would not have had much distance to run to get entirely within our turning circle. That is all conjecture."

Mr. Hanna—What was the conduct and bearing of Commodore Schley while under fire on such occasions that you had the opportunity of observing?

Schley a Brave Officer.

"I always regarded him as an entirely brave and patriotic officer, never in any other way."

At this point the court took its usual recess for luncheon. Continuing his statement after the noon recess, Captain Cook said he recalled a brief conversation between Lieutenant Hodgson and himself concerning the Texas while the Brooklyn was making its famous loop. He said on that occasion Hodgson had called this attention to the Texas, and that he had replied, saying he saw the vessel, which Hodgson had afterward told him had entirely reassured him. He had never himself used the expression, "damn the Texas," to Hodgson.

Mr. Hanna—At the time the turn of the Brooklyn was made, were you in such a position that you could observe whether or not the engines of the Texas were backed, or reversed?

"I think I ought to have seen it at the distance she was from us."

"Did you see any such?"

"I did not."

"In reference to Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson's conversation with the Commodore, you say you did not hear the conversation between them?"

"Not one word of it."

"Did Hodgson make any suggestions to you, or have any conversation with you during the battle?"

"Quite a number of times."

"Did he have that conversation, or the substance of it, with you?"

"The only thing I recollect clearly is that this Summer when I met him at Newport, he asked if I recalled it, and I recalled that at the time we were turning, after we had been turning some time, and after the helm was put hard aport, he came across to me and said: 'Captain, do you see the Texas?' She was the nearest ship at the time. I was looking directly at her and just about then we were pretty well clear of her. I said, 'Oh, yes,' and he told me that entirely reassured him, and he walked away."

"He did not make any suggestion to you or you to him respecting going in any nearer to be rammed; the danger from torpedo-boats, or anything of that kind?"

"No."

"Did you use any expression or language which could have been understood by him as meaning 'Damn the Texas?' "

"No; I had every reason to bless her, not to damn her."

"How was the turn of the Brooklyn written in the log?"

Erasure in the Log.

"So far as I know, with port helm. I never observed the erasure, which I suppose you are coming to, until it was shown to me here in Washington, and I did not understand it then. I could not recall anything in connection with it. It was the custom on board the Brooklyn for the smooth log, when it was written, to be read by the officers and signed by them, afterward by the navigator, when it was submitted to me. I sometimes had time to look at it, and sometimes did not. I do not believe I looked at it within three or four days after that battle. I may have looked at it, but the first real recollection I have of it was when my attention was called to the fact that the navigator wanted to make it more full and complete. I said: 'Write it up as you recollect it and submit it to me, but no changes are to be made under any circumstances, in the log as it stands now. It can be added to, but not any changes in the original log.' So he wrote this and I signed it. I have since read it, and do not know which is the best account."

"You refer now to the addendum?"

"Yes. At that time there was no question about the way the ship turned. I suppose I would have noticed it had it been done, but I probably did not see it until after the change was made. I certainly would have seen it before."

"Do you recall a visit of Mr. Sharp to the Brooklyn, and an interview at which the Commodore and yourself were present, about the direction in which the Brooklyn turned on that morning?"

"No. I may state I was not present at any such interview."

"If the court please, I should like to hand to the witness a letter, apparently signed by himself, and dated September 26, 1898, the letter which was referred to by Admiral Evans when he was giving his testimony, and which he desired to read at that time. An objection was made then, counsel suggesting that the proper course would be when Captain Cook went on the stand."

Captain Cook was handed the letter by Mr. Hanna to identify.

Admiral Dewey—Has the letter anything to do with any of these specifications?

Judge-Advocate—Not specifically.

Admiral Dewey—Then it better not be read.

Captain Cook—Mr. President, I would like to have it read, for this reason: It has been referred to and seems to convey the idea that there was an issue between Captain Evans and myself. I think as it is on the record that such a letter has passed, there should not be any doubt about the matter.

Admiral Dewey—I do not think it has anything to do with the case.

Captain Cook—It is my letter and my signature.

Admiral Dewey—Admiral Evans is not on trial; Captain Cook is not on trial.

Captain Cook said there was no issue between himself and Admiral Evans. The letter was not read.

The court asked a number of questions of Captain Cook, which, with the answers, were as follows:

Orders of the Flying Squadron.

"How did you become aware of the orders under which the flying squadron sailed May 19 to Cienfuegos?"

"Conversation with Commodore Schley."

"What general orders were issued by Commodore Schley regarding the blockade of Cienfuegos?"

"I cannot recall that there were any written orders. I think it was understood in consultation with the Captains in a general way."

"Was any effort made by boats of the flying squadron to find a landing place near Cienfuegos prior to the arrival of the Marblehead?"

"None that I know of."

"Did any conversation take place between you and Commodore Schley in regard to the obtaining of information from Captain McCalla when the Marblehead was en route to Cienfuegos?"

"None that I can recall."

"What reason did Commodore Schley give you for his belief that Cervera's squadron was in Cienfuegos?"

"In the first place, upon leaving Key West, he was quite enthusiastic at having been given the command of the south side of Cuba, and he said he expected to catch that fleet; that both he and Commander-in-Chief Sampson believed Cienfuegos was the objective point. I think I have already stated that he believed he would find them there. On Saturday night he heard, or some officers had reported to him, what sounded like salutes in the afternoon. It sounded as if they were having some kind of jubilee. When we arrived at Cienfuegos there were the signal lights that misled us all. We thought they had something to do with the Spanish squadron either coming or being there. And again, the arrival of the Adula and her strange action. I believed at that time they were there, and I thought this was a ruse to get some communication to them. This is all I can recall."

"Did the Brooklyn have a fleet night order book?"

"I am not able to answer that question. On the Brooklyn I received my instructions, of course, direct from the flag officer. I had my own night order book, and what orders I received I put in that."

"Did you examine the sailing directions for information regarding the possibility of coaling ship near Cape Cruz?"

"Yes."

"What orders were given by Commodore Schley to the ships of the flying squadron for their guidance in the event of Cervera's squadron arriving at the harbor of Cienfuegos, in the event of Cervera's squadron being sighted at sea, and in the event of its coming out of the harbor at Santiago?"

"I know of no written order that would cover the case, but in consultation with the commanding officers it was understood that at night time we would be in column and ready. During the daytime we had our assigned positions. That we should attack wherever we found them, and, I presume, be governed by circumstances."

Coaling at Cienfuegos.

"Had any vessel taken coal at Cienfuegos prior to the time when Commodore Schley discussed the coal supply with Commander McCalla?"

"I do not know. I think not."

"At what distance from the entrance of Cienfuegos did the large ships lie while blockading, both by day and by night?"

"From four to six miles, I should judge. Closer at night."

"Does the chart show that there is an anchorage at Cape Cruz where large ships would be protected from easterly and southerly winds while coaling?"

"My impression is it does not. That was my observation at the time."

"Do you know why the squadron was headed for a point 20 or 30 miles from the entrance to Santiago, instead of near the shore?"

"Because, as I understood at the time, if the weather conditions were such that we could not coal off Santiago, we should continue to Gonaives Bay, but upon arrival off Santiago, if the conditions were so that we could coal from the collier, we would go up off the entrance."

"Were you ordered by Commodore Schley to shape the course of the squadron for a point off Santiago May 24?"

"Yes."

"What was the direction of the prevailing wind from May 22 to June 1?"

"It was southeast and southwest, I wind. I think the wind on the 25th was northeast. It is all a matter of log. The fresh winds were from the northeast. The other winds from the southeast to southwest."

"Was the Brooklyn using full power during the fight of July 3?"

"No. We did not have full power until the end of the action, until just about when the Colon went ashore."

"Why not?"

"The order required us to keep steam for moving eight or nine knots, I think, with some of the engines uncoupled. We used the after engines. In the early part of the action we had steam enough to make 12 knots, and we kept on increasing the steam until we had all the steam we could use with the two engines. We continued to get steam, with the idea that if the Colon should go beyond the point we would lose time in coupling up all the engines. It would have taken 25 minutes to couple up. We had all the steam we could use in the after engines."

Orders During Battle of July 3.

"What orders were given by Commodore Schley to the fleet by signal or otherwise during the battle of July 3?"

"Quite a number of signals were made, but I only recollect a few of them. The first signal made was the formulated signal to close in. Afterward there were signals made. A great many wigwags were made to the Oregon. There is a record, I believe, in the logbook. I did not pay any attention to the signals during the action, except such as affected me."

Admiral Dewey—The witness has spoken of the order requiring them to keep steam up for moving with some of the engines uncoupled. Was that order by Commodore Schley?"

"It was the order of the Commander-in-Chief while lying on blockade."

"Did the Spanish ships head to the westward or southwest before the Brooklyn made the turn with port helm?"

"They did not."

"Was the helm of the Brooklyn steadied or eased at any time during the turn, after the order 'hard aport'?"

"No, not until she was around and parallel with the Spanish fleet."

"What ships would have had their fire blanketed had the Brooklyn turned with starboard helm?"

"It is possible it might have blanketed the fire of the Texas; it is possible it might have interfered with the movements of the Oregon, as they were both coming up in that direction in the space in which we turned. I will say that I never considered for one moment any other thing but turning that ship to starboard."

"How far were the vessels of the flying squadron off the entrance of the port of Santiago while on blockade duty, first by day and second by night?"

"The blockade was closer and closer all the time. The first night I should say that it was between five and six miles off and about seven miles off by day. They steamed in a circle five to six miles from the entrance and four to five miles each side, so as to cover the entrance."

Lieut.-Commander Fulham Called.

Lieutenant-Commander W. F. Fulham, who was the senior watch officer on the New Orleans during the Santiago campaign, was called next. He described the engagement with the Colon on May 31, and testified concerning the stadimeter, saying he found it was not reliable beyond 2000 yards.

Commander Fulham was then excused and Joseph Beale was called. He had served as an officer on the Harvard. He detailed the meeting of the Harvard with the flying squadron on May 27, when that vessel carried dispatches to Commodore Schley from Mole St. Nicholas. There were five of these dispatches—one from Admiral Sampson and four from Secretary Long. Mr. Beale also detailed the particulars of his proffer to go ashore and secure information concerning the situation. Mr. Beale also said he had translated into cipher Commodore Schley's response to the dispatch of May 26. He explained the verbal changes in this message, saying:

"In the first place, in regard to the verbal differences in putting the message in cipher, it often occurs that a certain word cannot be found in the code book. In that case it was my practice to get an equivalent word if I could possibly do so, and avoid the labor of spelling out a word letter by letter. For example, 'bad, boisterous weather.' If I could not find the word 'boisterous,' I would use 'bad,' so that it would appear bad weather. In the same way, it is sometimes possible to send a number of words as a phrase, or to find in the code book an equivalent phrase of very nearly the same wording and the same meaning. In that case I would use the phrase.

"As regards the difference in the amount of coal ordered to be at Key West, I have a very clear recollection of that. The number '10,000' was much easier and simpler to send than '9500,' and so I sent it as '10,000,' being that an excess of 500 tons would do no harm. In the same way, if 25 tons appeared in the translation of my cipher in place of 27, I would explain it in the same way. I believe also there is a difference about the Harvard's being ordered in the original to Port Royal instead of Kingston, Jamaica. Explaining this, I would say that Port Royal is the naval station a mile or two below Kingston, and in all probability the code book contained only the name of Kingston, and not that of Port Royal. Now, as regards the added sentence, I have a copy of that message in my daily journal. That copy does not contain the added sentence. I find further along in the journal a note referring to this message, which reads: 'Add very difficult to tow collier. Cannot get cables to hold.' From that I infer that after the typewritten sheet was prepared, an addition to this message was given to me."

Judge-Advocate—What, as shown by the notes in your journal, was the tenor of this message with regard to the obedience or disobedience or difficulty in obeying the orders of the department?

"I have here only the copy of the message given me to translate in cipher. I have not a copy of the translation at the Washington end. My copy reads: 'It is to be regretted that the department's order cannot be obeyed. Earnestly, we have all striven to that end. I am forced to return to Key West.' "

Mr. Beale was the last of the Government witnesses, and at 3:20 Edwardo Nunez, the Cuban pilot, was called as the first of Admiral Schley's witnesses.

First of Schley's Witnesses.

An interpreter was introduced, as Nunez cannot speak English. He said he had been a pilot for 21 years, in all the Southern Cuban ports. The interpreter used the word "guide" in interpreting his statement as above, and Admiral Dewey corrected him, saying the word should be "pilot."

Nunez said he first met Commodore Schley on May 26, having been taken to him by the St. Paul. The Commodore, he said, asked him if he knew of the presence of the Spanish fleet at Santiago. He replied that he doubted it, as he did not think the water was deep enough for vessels of such size. On June 1 he had gone on the Vixen to the Cuban coast with a message for General Calixto Garcia, which he had delivered to Colonel Cebereco. Commodore Schley had sent him on this mission, and he had been told then by Cebereco that the Spanish fleet was in the harbor. This information, Nunez said, he had carried to Admiral Sampson, under the direction of Commodore Schley. Captain Parker then read a copy of the letter which the pilot said he had carried from Commodore Schley to the Cubans, in which he suggested a code of signals similar to the code arranged by Captain McCalla at Cienfuegos.

On cross-examination, the witness said that Cebereco had given him the names of the Spanish vessels inside the harbor. He gave the names of those vessels, saying they were given to him at that time by Cebereco. The witness also said that prior to going ashore June 1 he had not seen the Colon. He had not seen the vessel, indeed, until July 3. He said that his reason for thinking the vessels could not get into Santiago was that such large vessels as those of the Spanish fleet had never before been seen there; he thought the harbor both too narrow and too shallow. He had expressed the opinion that unless they had "double machinery" (twin screws), they could not get in without the assistance of tugs.

Nunez was then excused, and the Judge-Advocate was about to call Commander Mason, when Admiral Dewey suggested that, as it was then 10 minutes of 4, the court should adjourn. Accordingly the court adjourned until 11 o'clock tomorrow.

BASEBALL TODAY.

Portland and Tacoma Nines Will Begin Their Match Series.

The Portland and Tacoma teams will clash again on the diamond this afternoon in the special series of match games for $200 a side. The rivalry of the two nines during the season has been so intense that Managers Grim and McCloskey decided to bring the teams together at the close of the regular season. The games will be for blood, and it is certain that no more lively or exciting games will be seen than these contests, in which the reputation of the players is at stake. Portland will have all the men playing the regular positions. Grim will be at third and Mahaffey at first, and the old-time team work of the home nine will be in evidence. Tacoma has the backing of a number of visitors from the Sound, and both sides will not lack for rooters. The games are for the benefit of the players, since the proceeds are divided between the men. This fact, if nothing else, should draw good crowds, since the players have worked hard and faithfully to please the public all through the regular season.

Races at Morris Park.

NEW YORK, Oct. 14.—Morris Park results:

Seven furlongs—Paul Clifford won, Carbuncle second, Himself third; time, 1:30.

Blue Girl stakes, five and a half furlongs—Luxcasta won, Octoroon second, Blanche Herman third; time 1:10½.

Yankee handicap, six and a half furlongs—Namtor won, Igniter second, Zelauket third; time, 1:22½.

One mile—Handicapper won, Lord Pepper second, Sadie S, third; time, 1:44¾.

One mile—Criterion won, Animosity second, Astor third; time 1:45.

Mile and a sixteenth—Ten Candles won, The Rhymer second, Hernando third; time, 1:48¾.

Races at Lexington.

LEXINGTON, Ky., Oct. 14.—Trotting summary:

2:06 class, pacing, $1500—Mazetto won three straight heats in 2:13¼, 2:10¾, 2:10½.

The Johnson Stakes, $2000—May Allen won the first, fourth and fifth.

Six furlongs—Burnie Bunton won, If You Dare second, Pigeon Post third; time, 1:20 4-5.

Five furlongs—LaCrima won, Pyrrho second, Admirante third; time, 1:06.

Seven furlongs—W. J. Deboe won, Rolling Boer second, Fancy Wood third; time, 1:35.

One mile—Haviland won, The Lady second, Bair third; time, 1:52.

Mile and a quarter—Frangible won, Strangest second, Valdez third; time, 2:21 1-5.

Race Course for Automobiles.

NEW YORK, Oct. 14.—The Automobile Racing Association of the State of New York has made arrangements for the construction on Long Island about 25 miles from New York of a race course for automobile tournaments. The plans call for three tracks, one for speeding, one for "rough riding," and one for coasting. This is said to be the first track of the kind in the country.

LEARN THE TRUTH

Regarding Drs. Copeland and Montgomery's Ability to Cure---Take Nothing on Faith ---Investigate for Yourself and Be Convinced.

To convince the public that we are working real cures upon real people, only one kind of evidence can be accepted, and that is testimony which comes from patients who may be interviewed, who are honest, who are grateful, who are sincere, who are anxious to help their fellow men.

Such testimony has been appearing regularly in these columns for the past 10 years. It is enduring proof that Doctors Copeland and Montgomery are really curing — not merely helping or relieving, not merely improving and benefiting alone, but curing disease.

Read in such cures a part of the record of their wonderful skill. They can cure disease. They are doing it every day. They are making the sick well. They are curing the cough that racks the chest with distress. They are soothing those cramping, shooting pains of body and limb. They are driving out poisons from the blood. They are stopping that nervous fear and trembling. They are restoring the sense of hearing to ears that have long been dead to the sense of sound.

STOMACH DISEASE 15 YEARS. HOPE ALMOST GONE.

Mrs. Hester Worley, Palestine, Or., a former resident of Canyonville, and well known throughout Southern Oregon: For 15 years I was an invalid from stomach trouble. I could eat nothing at all without experiencing great distress. Over half the time I lived on liquids, and there was scarcely a day in all these years that I did not

Vomit What I Ate.

I never could eat breakfast, but would have to leave the table after I took a few mouthfuls, and even this the stomach would reject. Instead of bloating, as most stomach sufferers do, there was a constant pressure backward and the

Stomach Felt Heavy

all the time. I could not lie down or rest at night. I was troubled with headache, dizziness and palpitation of the heart

Mrs. Hester Worley, Palestine, Or.

after eating. I was so bad at times that I would be down in bed for weeks, the attacks sometimes lasting as long as three months.

I doctored continually, but got only a little temporary relief. I had given up all hope of being cured, but seeing the statement of Mr. E. M. Foudray, whose case seemed exactly like mine, induced me to try the Copeland treatment, and I believe if I had not consulted these doctors I

Would Not Be Alive Now.

But I am glad to say that I improved almost from the first, and now feel and look better than I have in years. I am able to eat food that I never dared to touch before, and feel well in every way.

All my friends know how sick I was and feel greatly surprised over my recovery, which, after the years I have suffered, seems like a miracle.

FEARED HE WAS BEYOND THE REACH OF MEDICAL SKILL

Mr. Peter Peterson, Columbia, Wash., was a sufferer for over a year from a grave form of bronchial disease, which was rapidly developing into incurable consumption, when he decided to take the Copeland treatment. Today he is rejoicing in his complete restoration to health, and expresses his gratitude and his appreciation of the skill that has been the means of effecting so remarkable a cure. He said:

"My Cough Was Terrible,

racking my system day and night, and giving me not a moment's peace. I had awful pains through my chest and under my shoulder-blades, with fevers and night sweats, and raised great quantities of frothy phlegm and mucus. My flesh wasted away and my strength failed so that I was unable to continue in my occupation of carpet-fitting, and I was forced to believe that I

Was Dying of Consumption.

I was confirmed in this belief by the fact that I had taken all the 'Cure-Alls' advertised for the cure of bronchial and lung diseases, without obtaining the slightest benefit.

A Friend in Need.

"A friend had repeatedly urged me to consult the Copeland Physicians, and at last I did so, although I feared that my disease was beyond the reach of medical skill. In this I was most happily mistaken, for I am now perfectly well once more."

THEY CURE TO STAY CURED.

Mrs. M. Douthit, postoffice address, Portland: "Last year I took a course of treatment at the Copeland Institute for catarrh, complicated with deafness and a chronic discharge from the ears. The ears were dry and scaly, and itched so they nearly set me crazy. I could not hear the clock tick or follow conversation, and there was a constant buzzing and roaring. At the end of my course I heard as well as I ever did, and my ears were entirely healed. Money could not repay me for the enjoyment I have had out of life since my cure."

Mr. John Walters, West Portland: "From my own individual experience I can say that the Copeland treatment does cure catarrh and deafness, and cures them to stay cured. After an attack of grip several years ago I suffered severely with catarrh. My head was stopped up, there was a watery discharge from the nose, and I lost my sense of smell. The ears were affected, and I feared I would be totally deaf. I could not hear at all with the left ear, and the hearing in the right one was very dull. I was nearly distracted by a ringing and throbbing in the ears, which prevented sleep at night. If any thing, I am better today than I was a year ago, when I quit my treatment."

HOME TREATMENT

If you cannot visit the office, mark the following list of symptoms, mail them to Dr. Copeland and he will give you a full and complete diagnosis of your case free of charge:

"Is your nose stopped up?"
"Do you sleep with mouth wide open?"
"Is there pain in front of head?"
"Is your throat dry or sore?"
"Have you a bad taste mornings?"
"Do you cough?"
"Do you cough worse at night?"
"Is your tongue coated?"
"Is your appetite failing?"
"Is there pain after eating?"
"Are you light-headed?"
"When you get up suddenly are you dizzy?"
"Do you have hot flashes?"
"Do you have liver marks?"
"Do your kidneys trouble you?"
"Do you have pain in back or under shoulder-blades?"
"Do you wake up tired and out of sorts?"
"Is your strength failing?"

OUR SPECIALTIES.

Deafness, Catarrh of the Head, Nose, Throat, Bronchial Tubes, Lungs and Stomach, Disease of the Liver and Kidneys, Blood and Skin Diseases.

CONSULTATION FREE.
Dr. Copeland's Book Free to All.

The Copeland Medical Institute
The Dekum, Third and Washington

W. H. COPELAND, M. D.
J. H. MONTGOMERY, M. D.

OFFICE HOURS—From 9 A. M to 12 M.; from 1 to 5 P. M.
EVENINGS—Tuesdays and Fridays.
SUNDAY—From 10 A. M. to 12 M.

CHRISTIAN CONVENTION.

Government of Belgium Denounced by a Missionary.

MINNEAPOLIS, Oct. 14.—The annual convention of the Christian Foreign Missionary Society opened today in the Exposition Auditorium, with President McLean in the chair. The attendance was unusually large. The principal address of the morning session was delivered by M. E. Farris, a young man who spent the last few years in missionary work in the Congo Free State.

Mr. Farris was very severe in his denunciation of the Belgium Government, which administers affairs in the Congo, alleging that the government was corrupt from top to bottom. He had seen natives shot for failing to turn in their per capita tax on rubber, even when they lived in districts which produced none of that commodity. Furthermore, government officials did everything in their power, unofficially, to hinder the missionaries in their work.

The treasurer's report showed receipts during the year amounting to $171,888, a decrease compared with the collections of a year ago. President McLean said that Mark Twain was directly responsible for the falling off. The afternoon session was devoted to the reports of various committees, addresses and the election of officers for the ensuing year. The following officers were elected:

President, A. McLain, Cincinnati; first vice-president, W. S. Dickinson, Cincinnati; recording secretary, George A. Miller, Covington, Ky.; treasurer, S. M. Cooper, Cincinnati; corresponding secretary, S. M. Rains, Cincinnati; auditor, Russell Errett, Cincinnati; medical examiner, Dr. P. T. Kilgour, Cincinnati.

The evening session closed with addresses, scriptural readings and song service.

Horseshoers' Association.

BALTIMORE, Oct. 14.—The 10th annual convention of the Master Horseshoers' National Protective Association began here today, and will continue for a week. About 125 delegates, representing almost every state in the Union, are here.

Railway Telegraphers.

ST. LOUIS, Oct. 14.—The 13th annual convention of the Order of Railway Telegraphers met here at 11 o'clock today, with President M. M. Dolph in the chair. Over 100 delegates were present, every division of the order being represented. The convention will continue several days, and its sessions will be held behind closed doors. Much business of importance to the order will come before the convention, including amendments to the constitution.

National Congregational Council.

PORTLAND, Me., Oct. 14.—The National Congregational Council today adopted a letter of sympathy to be sent to Mrs. McKinley, and a resolution of confidence in President Roosevelt. An address by Professor Moore, of Andover, started a discussion which resulted in bringing up the famous Andover controversy, it hinging on his statement that the claims of the seminaries upon the churches were not being fully met. The vice-chairman first made reference to it, and then Dr. Waterman, of Terre Haute, spoke of the old-line theology, saying the people "demanded as much honesty in a seminary as they did in a peanut stand." Dr. Smith, of Minneapolis, said that, so far as he could see, there was no trouble with the theology taught in the seminaries except that it was too hollow and external. The students did not seem to have any earnestness. Finally the controversy was brought to a close for the time by the time limit set by the moderator.

Bankers Meet Wednesday.

NEW YORK, Oct. 14.—A large number of bankers have departed for Milwaukee to attend the 27th annual convention of the American B