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TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION. The Argus will be furnished at Three Dollars per annum, if paid in advance.

The Oregon Argus.

-A Weekly Newspaper, devoted to the Interests of the Laboring Classes, and advocating the side of Truth in every issue.-

Vol. VIII.

OREGON CITY, OREGON, DECEMBER 27, 1862.

No. 37.

RATES OF ADVERTISING: One square (twelve lines, or less, breviter measure) one insertion..... \$1 00

THE EPISCOPAL CONVENTION.—After a protracted discussion, the Triennial Episcopal Convention, sitting in New York, has adopted the resolutions on the rebellion reported by the committee of nine.

Resolved, By the House of Clerical and Lay Deputies of this stated Triennial Convention, that assembling, as we have been called to do, at a period of great national trouble and deplorable civil convulsion, it is meet and proper that we should call to mind, distinctly and publicly, that the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States hath ever held and taught, in the language of one of its articles of religion, that it is the duty of all men who are professors of the Gospel to pay respectful obedience to the civil authority, regularly and legitimately constituted; and that accordingly incorporated into its Liturgy, as a prayer for the President of the United States and all in civil authority, and as a prayer for the Congress of the United States and all orders of their session, and hath bound all orders of its ministry to the faithful and constant observance, in letter and in spirit, of those and all other parts of its proscribed ritual.

Resolved, That we cannot be wholly blind to the course which has been pursued, in their ecclesiastical as well as in their civil relations, since this Convention last met in perfect harmony and love, by great numbers of the ministers and members of this Church, within certain States of our Union which have arrayed themselves in open and armed resistance to the regularly constituted Government of our country; and that while, in a spirit of Christian forbearance, we refrain from employing toward them terms of condemnation or reproach, and would rather bow in humiliation before our common Father in Heaven for the sins which have brought His judgment on our land, we yet feel bound to declare our solemn sense of the deep and grievous wrong which they will have inflicted on the great Christian community which this Convention represents, as well as on the country within which it has been so happily and harmoniously established, should they persevere in striving to rend asunder those civil and religious bonds which have so long held us together in peace, unity, and concord.

Resolved, That while, as individuals and as citizens, we acknowledge our whole duty in sustaining and defending our country in the great struggle in which it is engaged, we are only at liberty, as Deputies to this Council of a church which hath ever renounced all political association and action, to pledge to the National Government—as we now do—the earnest and devout prayers of us all that its efforts may be so guided by wisdom and replenished with strength, that they may be crowned with speedy and complete success, to the glory of God and the restoration of our beloved Union.

Resolved, That if, in the judgment of the Bishops, any other forms of occasional prayer than those already set forth shall seem desirable and appropriate—whether for our Convention, our church, or our country, for our rulers or our defenders, or for the sick and wounded and dying of our army and navy and volunteers—we shall gladly receive them and fervently use them.

Resolved, That a certified copy of the foregoing report and resolutions be transmitted to the House of Bishops, in evidence of the views and feelings of this body in reference to the afflictive condition of our church and of our country.

GENERAL ORDER BY THE PRESIDENT.—The following general order has been issued respecting the observance of the Sabbath day in the Army and Navy:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, 1 Nov. 16, 1862.

The President, Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, desires and enjoins the orderly observance of the Sabbath day by the officers and men in the military and naval service.

The importance, for man and beast, of the prescribed weekly rest, the sacred rights of Christian soldiers and Christian people, and a due regard for the Divine will, demand that steadily labor in the army and navy be reduced to the measure of a strict necessity.

The discipline and character of the National forces should not suffer, nor the cause they defend be imperiled by the profanation of the day and name of the Most High. At this time of public distress, adopting the words of Washington in 1776—"Men find enough to do in the service of God and their country, without abandoning themselves to vice and immorality."

The first general order issued by the Father of his Country, after the Declaration of Independence, indicates the spirit in which our institutions were founded and should ever be defended.

The General hopes and trusts that every officer and man will endeavor to act as becomes a Christian soldier, defending the dearest rights and liberties of his country.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

O. A. Brownson, the renowned Catholic, and a strong Douglas democrat, has been elected to Congress from New Jersey as a war democrat. Before the election he said: "I am for the vigorous prosecution of the war, and the use of every means to achieve success. I like the President's Proclamation, and if I have any fault to find, it is because it is not strong enough and its action is delayed too long. If I could, I would liberate every slave in State or Territory and proclaim them free from this day forever. I believe in the abolition of slavery as a war measure."

EMANCIPATION.—Ed. Argus: If you please, may I tell your readers what I think of the new policy to be pursued toward slavery. Mr. Lincoln says he shall feel compelled, as a war measure, to wipe out the peculiar institution all through rebellion, after the first of next January.—After we have lost two or three hundred thousand men skrimishing round the rebel thicket, it really seems as if we might invent something to save a million or so more who would be required to die at the hands of cursed rebels, in order to save the Union.

The facts of the war are so well known that I need not refer to the various experiments we have tried—how bitterly we were disappointed that Scott and his great "Anconada" proved to be useless clap-trap—and that our faith and patience have been so miserably abused by McClellan, who "ran his Fabian" policy so far in the ground that he never could get it out in time to do anything with it, nor to strike at the enemy without our getting the worst of the blow. Mac, with his "splendid strategic movements," which are found to be another humbug, is properly laid by with the old lumber, and what experiment is to be tried now? Among other patent arrangements for putting down the rebellion,—and keeping it down, which is no less important—the Yankees have all along claimed that a good liberal dose of the original "Freedom Preserver, and Union Restorer," composed of the genuine principles of the Declaration of Independence, mixed with equal parts of Common Justice, and administered to "the man and brother" in the South, would do more to put down rebellion than anything else we could try. The President has finally decided to try the Yankee invention, and on next New Year's Day will give the first dose. Rebels in the South have gone into horrible convulsions about it—and traitors in the North are doing the very best they can to aid the South, in her extremity, by opposing the use of this Yankee purgative. I am for the medicine. It don't cost us anything, and after all that has happened, we need look to cheapness. Not so much the expense in dollars, as in the blood of our sons and brothers. Slavery laid plans for years to bring on the rebellion—Slavery began and has carried on the war, whereby (as some say) two or three hundred thousand freemen have had their lives crushed out of them—and now, when Slavery, after all this, is brought up for trial before a jury of its country, or before a congress of the nation, who says that more than justice is done if Slavery is sentenced to "die the death." It is said by some who claim to be Union men, but who have strange ways of showing it lately, that the Proclamation is a bit of hardheaded plesantry—a sort of sugar-coated bread pill, to be administered simply to gratify the whims of a set of one-idea men, who have no particular fault except in over-estimating black men, intellectually and politically.

It is said this is a paper proclamation, and consequently worthless. Here we must say we can't see the point of the argument. It has always been our impression that Magna Charta was a paper document, and it is really surprising that Anglo-Saxons should look back with so much gratitude to a paper proclamation, regarding it as the beginning of English liberty, and the first great blow at tyranny, when it amounted to nothing, being only a "paper proclamation." The Declaration of Independence, too, was another of these "paper proclamations"; and yet, somehow, the American People love to quote it—love to remember that its grand truths, which if put in practice would abolish kingship, and make the world one magnificent republic—were the utterance of an American statesman. The Bible is another "paper proclamation." But enough of this.

Rebels in arms hate the new policy like poison. Here is an argument why we should rather like it. Traitors in the North invariably raise their voices against this policy, and here is good reason why we should regard it favorably. Those who profess to be Union men, and yet oppose the Proclamation, are found most opposed to the fiscal policy of the Government, and most desirous to depreciate National Credit—in short, they seek occasion to find fault and to criticize, which of all other means will most impair unity of intention and action, by fostering opposition political parties in the North, which should be a unit until the great work of restoring National Supremacy is accomplished. The President has declared, and no sensible, honest man who has watched his course can doubt that in what he does he does it because he believes it will help to restore the Union; and what he declines to do, it is because he does not believe it will save the Union cause. President Lincoln has felt the burden of his responsibility, which is heavier by far than has fallen on the shoulders of any of our Presidents before, and his course has been marked by a degree of caution and moderation highly commendable. It was absolutely necessary that he should stand by the people, and the people by him, or in such a tremendous contest success could never be reached. It is no less imperatively necessary that President and People work cordially together at this time, than at any former time, and assuredly we need all the help we can get. If three or four million men, women, and children in the South can be wholly alienated from the rebellion, and made practical, efficient workers for the Union, by simply giving them a dose of the Declaration of Independence, I say give it to them. And if the aristocratic rebels in Dixie won't have the Stars to shine in undimmed and undivided lustre, let them take the stripes.

UNION.

ORRIN C. KERR'S LAST.—The following bit of satire has an edge that is sharp enough to cut to the quick the politicians, who are continually drawing invidious distinctions about the patriotism of any one class of citizens; and the satire is no less bitter, that it is rounded off with a touch of the pathetic: It is the "Union as it was" that we want, my boy, and those who have other articles to sell are hereby accused of being accused abolitionists. I was talking the other day to a venerable Congressman from Maryland, who had just arrived to protest against disturbance of mail facilities between Baltimore and the capital of the Southern Confederacy, and says he: "I have several friends who are Confederates, and they inform me that they are perfectly willing to return to the Union as it was, in case they should fail in their present enterprise. If I thought," says the Congressman, "that I should have a lottery ticket in his vest pocket, if I thought this war was being waged for the purpose of injuring the Southern Confederacy, rather than restore the Union as it was, I should at once demand more mileage of the Government, and repeatedly inquire what had become of all the Wide-Awakes."

As he uttered the last horrible threat my boy, I was impressed with a sense of something darkly Democratic. Too many of the Wide-Awakes of the last campaign are indeed fast asleep now, when their country needs them. I saw one of them slumbering near Culpepper Court House last week. He was sleeping with his right arm twisted in the spokes of a disabled cannon wheel, and a small purple mark was on his right temple. But he was not alone in his forgetful slumber, my boy, for near him and rigidly grasping his disengaged hand, was a Democrat, slumbering, too!

The slight, I remember, rendered me so honestly indignant, that I could not help pointing it out to the chaplain. The chaplain looked a moment at the Fusion Ticket before me. "They sleep for the flag," says he, softly, "and may its stars shed pleasant dreams upon their loyal souls forever."

SYMPATHY WITH THE NORTH.—On the 2d of November a public meeting was held in London to express sympathy with our Government in its war against the rebellion. J. A. Nicolay presided, and addresses were delivered by Washington Wilks, Malleson, Hurst, Beal, and others. The Chairman said: To suppose that the South was fighting about a question of tariffs was most absurd. (Cheers.) He considered that the South had most wantonly and wickedly rebelled, and that its object was to keep the slaves in bondage. He did not wish to make any sort of attack on Gladstone, but he could not help saying that the speech he had recently delivered at Newcastle had been extremely rash and unfortunate. (Hear.) They could not regard his utterances simply as his own individual opinion; he might almost be said to have committed the Government. His speech had been regarded as a sort of semi-ministerial manifesto, and it had been calculated to do a vast deal of mischief. It had been calculated to encourage the South in its resistance to the North, and thus to prolong the war.

Calthrop said he was about to depart for America, but he could not leave this country without giving his testimony in favor of the North. In an eloquent speech he contended that the liberty for which the South was fighting was the liberty of extending slavery. P. A. Taylor wrote from Aubrey House: Now is the time to show that England has been weak, not wicked, in her Southern sympathies; and that as soon as the North is ostensibly as well as actually committed to emancipation, she leaves Southernism to those who fear democracy and do not hate slavery.

THE PRESIDENT AND EMANCIPATION.—A dispatch dated at Washington, November 23d, says: In the course of a general conversation yesterday, touching the recent elections, Lincoln, as we learn directly from one of the gentlemen present, said, in effect, that the result of the elections had in no way modified his views regarding the wisdom of emancipating all the slaves within the rebel lines on the 1st of January; that he had issued the proclamation of September 22d after long and thoughtful deliberation, and that he should stand by it—seeing no reason why he should not do so. Lincoln introduced this topic himself.

—The New York Tablet thinks there are not less than two hundred thousand men in the Union armies to-day of Irish birth or lineage.

Gen. McClellan. The following just estimate of Gen. McClellan's military abilities is copied from the N. Y. Independent of Sept. 4th, shortly after the retreat from the Peninsula, and the General's assignment to the command of the fortifications around Washington. The reasons why he was so long continued in command of the army, after his incapacity became apparent, are also succinctly stated. After saying that McClellan had at last found his true place, the writer says: By his nature he is fitted for defensive war, and unfitted for offensive. He is essentially an Engineer rather than a General. He foresees danger, but not success. He fears, but seldom hopes. He is constitutionally a cautious man, active in his perceptive faculties, and slow in his reflective. He comes to new things with an overmastering caution which makes it impossible for him to be energetic or enterprising. We believe him to be a sincere patriot; a conscientious officer; an admirable engineer; and a very poor general. He is said to have shown talent in the organization of the army. The history of that matter is not yet known. He is said to have been an admirable disciplinarian. But, the condition of the army when it came from that valley of the shadow of death, the Peninsula, would cast much doubt upon that.

We suspect that at last, when feelings and prejudices shall have settled, and the interior history of the campaign shall be written, it will be found that he was a man of plain good sense, without remarkable gifts, of no peculiar military genius, thoroughly educated in military science, and well versed in engineering; slow of thought, and not fertile in expedient; but, above all, a man tied up by a constitutional caecity, which magnified all dangers, leading him to extraordinary hesitation in the presence of little things for fear they might turn out large things; to vast preparations, which, when made, he distrusted in proportion as the danger drew near, lest, by some yet unsuspected omission, he should be found wanting. Such a man is well calculated to defend a fort or a city, but not to move an army with celerity, to take risks—without which there can be no war—to strike boldly, to think quickly, to act instantly upon thought and decision. But this caution which disqualifies him from movement, fits him to stand and to receive attack.

That McClellan ought to have cleared Virginia months before he thought of moving, is now generally conceded. When at length, under the President's goad, he moved, he should have gone by way of Manassas and Central Virginia upon Richmond. The best evidence of that is the eight months on the Peninsula, its abandonment, and the present position of McClellan's late army. The enemy knew the General's weakness. They played upon his fears. They magnified their numbers. They acted the part of defiant courage.—With only forty thousand men at Manassas, they held in check more than two hundred thousand, by playing on their commander's morbid caution.

At every step of his progress, after leaving Washington, the Government, that was disatisfied with his plan of campaign, but weakly yielded to it, had fresh occasion for distrust and alarm. He feared everything but the squandering of time.—Of that he seemed to have a supply which no prodigality could waste. He dug as if he had been sent to mine the Peninsula. He took his inspiration from the mole, and not from the eagle. When he stretched his lines along the Chickahominy, the enemy became but a huge ox, that with dull strength and slow foot pulled the campaign by sheer brute force, unhelped by brains or genius, except from the minor generals. One and another opportunity came, a third, and a fourth, on which we would not say a Frederick, a Bonaparte, a Wellington, but even a Raglan or a Simpson, would have struck through and seized Richmond; but McClellan saw no way that had not a lion in it. Besides, it is understood that he went to the Peninsula hoping with a great army to overcome rebellion, and end the campaign with little bloodshed. He intended to catch the levitation by converting the army into a procession of Hospitals, and ending in battles as murders as the world has ever known. And when the last trumpet shall bring forth the dead, between fifty and a hundred thousand men will rise from the swamps of the Chickahominy and the fields of the Peninsula, witnesses to the cruelty of a conservative campaign!

We believe Gen. McClellan both aimed to do his duty, and exerted every talent that God had given him to that end. But he was inadequate to the situation. The task required a man of large ability, of military genius, and especially of Courage to take risks and win by straight-out fighting.

When McClellan was appointed to his high position, it was the best thing the Government could do. All men were untried, and he promised more brilliantly than any. But we have reason to blame the Government for continuing him in his position after confidence was shaken in his ability, and especially for doing it for the reasons they did.

It is no secret that President Lincoln has been wont to speak for many months past in terms of severe condemnation of Gen. McClellan. Again and again he has not hidden his conviction of McClellan's incompetency for his position. He did not approve the campaign. He did not approve the execution of it. He was severely discontented with the condition of affairs upon the great retreat. Why did he not remove him? McClellan was a Democrat. The President feared the effect of such an act upon the Democratic party. Does any one, informed of the secret history of affairs, doubt whether the President would have placed another at the head of the army, had McClellan been an anti-slavery man, before a step was taken toward Yorktown? Had it been Fremont, he would have been put down in an hour! The President's scarcely disguised idea of policy is, that the anti-slavery party of the North will bear to be snubbed; it is made up of men such of deep moral feeling, so earnest, so patriotic, so self-sacrificing, that they will not abandon the Administration, however unjustly they may be treated. But the Democrats are impatient and intractable. They will not patiently bear being crossed. And so the President recalls Fremont on the very eve of a battle in Missouri, which would have delivered the West almost a year earlier than, following in Fremont's steps, it was afterwards done. Again, after Fremont had with matchless celerity chased Jackson out of the Shenandoah Valley, (the only man that yet has proved a match in strategy, and quickness and skill in handling men, with Jackson,) he was, at the clamor of discontented Democrats and army officers, relieved of command. But McClellan was continued, through a series of blunders, of torpidities, of ruinous mismanagements, that will give to military history one of its saddest and guiltiest chapters, because, being the intended duffer hero of the Democratic party, the President feared to transfer him.

Gen. Hooker on the Field. CAMP NEAR WARRENTON, NOV. 15, 1862. Gen. Hooker still applies himself indefatigably to the work devolving upon him. He takes no respite. Obtaining a thorough knowledge of the men he has to deal with, and getting them in proper condition for entering upon the new and vigorous campaign awaiting them, are the objects of his unwearying toil. He had a duty to do, and he went at it with ardor and assiduity. But one of his temperaments could hardly act otherwise. Coming into the field again, and that a new one, after his weeks of respite, he has rushed into hard work as though he was still not inviolated, and had the strength of Samson to fall back upon. It is to be hoped he will not overtax his physical strength.

There are those who say that Gen. Hooker has been disappointed. He is said to have had higher aspirations than his present command—to have looked to filling the place now occupied by Gen. Burnside. I have it from the best authority that these aspirations are untrue. Gen. Hooker has ambition; but it is an ambition which is satisfied with serving his country in any position assigned him. His country is his first thought—himself secondary. Confident of his own abilities; he is not the man to shrink from responsibilities; and, should his wise and brave acts in the coming conflicts elect him to a higher position, he would take it—that is, did he think by thus doing he could do better service to the cause—and he would not take it otherwise. Those who know the man well say this of him.—And it is such men that are needed—men of unselfish patriotism and earnest purpose.

Such men the army has confidence in, above those whom factional politicians and misjudging friends of influence have placed in high commands. Now that I am upon Gen. Hooker, I will draw a pen and ink sketch of the man. He looks the soldier—tall, compactly built, sinewy strength in his muscles, a natural vigor of frame, showing great capacity of endurance, and every lineament of his countenance bespeaking firmness, manly faith in his own powers, and heroic daring. He is about fifty years of age, but looks much younger. His face has the fullness and ruddiness of healthful manhood, and his hair, although grey, carries a conviction of maturity of powers and not declining strength. His head is singularly formed; the top, where the moral forces of the brain are centered, remaining one of the busts of Sir Walter Scott, and the lower part of the forehead, short, curly hair, and merry twinkle of the eye, suggestive of prints of Thomas Moore. The chin and mouth give token of inflexibility of will and self-reliance. Unassuming in manners, plain in dress, and frank, cordial and social with those about him, he wins the esteem and love of all coming in contact with him. When excited he talks very rapidly; it is then his eyes flash fire, and his opinions of men and measures are offered with fearlessness. His bearing and heroism in battle—where I have not as yet had opportunity of seeing him—are matters of familiar record. He has a fine executive mind, a man of rapid condensation of thought and details. He is a thoroughly practical man. He acts for a purpose; and, once assured that he is right, he will accomplish that purpose if its accomplishment lies in the scope of human possibility. And yet, while bold, he is cautious. He will not rashly and needlessly expose his men.—N. Y. Times.

Communication by electric telegraph has taken place between London and Turin, in Siberia, a distance of 4,039 miles. It is anticipated that an extension of the wires will be made to Nikolai-ovski, on the Pacific, by the end of this year, and that telegraphic communication with New York, by way of Siberia and California, will be established by the end of next year.

A Louisiana planter, and one who was a member of the convention that took that State out of the Union, lately said he could not understand this war, unless it was that God had decreed the end of slavery, and was using the damned abolitionists to carry out his purpose. He said if he knew that was the case, he would never again raise his hand to assist the rebellion.

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Such men the army has confidence in, above those whom factional politicians and misjudging friends of influence have placed in high commands. Now that I am upon Gen. Hooker, I will draw a pen and ink sketch of the man. He looks the soldier—tall, compactly built, sinewy strength in his muscles, a natural vigor of frame, showing great capacity of endurance, and every lineament of his countenance bespeaking firmness, manly faith in his own powers, and heroic daring. He is about fifty years of age, but looks much younger. His face has the fullness and ruddiness of healthful manhood, and his hair, although grey, carries a conviction of maturity of powers and not declining strength. His head is singularly formed; the top, where the moral forces of the brain are centered, remaining one of the busts of Sir Walter Scott, and the lower part of the forehead, short, curly hair, and merry twinkle of the eye, suggestive of prints of Thomas Moore. The chin and mouth give token of inflexibility of will and self-reliance. Unassuming in manners, plain in dress, and frank, cordial and social with those about him, he wins the esteem and love of all coming in contact with him. When excited he talks very rapidly; it is then his eyes flash fire, and his opinions of men and measures are offered with fearlessness. His bearing and heroism in battle—where I have not as yet had opportunity of seeing him—are matters of familiar record. He has a fine executive mind, a man of rapid condensation of thought and details. He is a thoroughly practical man. He acts for a purpose; and, once assured that he is right, he will accomplish that purpose if its accomplishment lies in the scope of human possibility. And yet, while bold, he is cautious. He will not rashly and needlessly expose his men.—N. Y. Times.

Communication by electric telegraph has taken place between London and Turin, in Siberia, a distance of 4,039 miles. It is anticipated that an extension of the wires will be made to Nikolai-ovski, on the Pacific, by the end of this year, and that telegraphic communication with New York, by way of Siberia and California, will be established by the end of next year.

A Louisiana planter, and one who was a member of the convention that took that State out of the Union, lately said he could not understand this war, unless it was that God had decreed the end of slavery, and was using the damned abolitionists to carry out his purpose. He said if he knew that was the case, he would never again raise his hand to assist the rebellion.

Gen. McClellan. The following just estimate of Gen. McClellan's military abilities is copied from the N. Y. Independent of Sept. 4th, shortly after the retreat from the Peninsula, and the General's assignment to the command of the fortifications around Washington. The reasons why he was so long continued in command of the army, after his incapacity became apparent, are also succinctly stated. After saying that McClellan had at last found his true place, the writer says: By his nature he is fitted for defensive war, and unfitted for offensive. He is essentially an Engineer rather than a General. He foresees danger, but not success. He fears, but seldom hopes. He is constitutionally a cautious man, active in his perceptive faculties, and slow in his reflective. He comes to new things with an overmastering caution which makes it impossible for him to be energetic or enterprising. We believe him to be a sincere patriot; a conscientious officer; an admirable engineer; and a very poor general. He is said to have shown talent in the organization of the army. The history of that matter is not yet known. He is said to have been an admirable disciplinarian. But, the condition of the army when it came from that valley of the shadow of death, the Peninsula, would cast much doubt upon that.

We suspect that at last, when feelings and prejudices shall have settled, and the interior history of the campaign shall be written, it will be found that he was a man of plain good sense, without remarkable gifts, of no peculiar military genius, thoroughly educated in military science, and well versed in engineering; slow of thought, and not fertile in expedient; but, above all, a man tied up by a constitutional caecity, which magnified all dangers, leading him to extraordinary hesitation in the presence of little things for fear they might turn out large things; to vast preparations, which, when made, he distrusted in proportion as the danger drew near, lest, by some yet unsuspected omission, he should be found wanting. Such a man is well calculated to defend a fort or a city, but not to move an army with celerity, to take risks—without which there can be no war—to strike boldly, to think quickly, to act instantly upon thought and decision. But this caution which disqualifies him from movement, fits him to stand and to receive attack.

That McClellan ought to have cleared Virginia months before he thought of moving, is now generally conceded. When at length, under the President's goad, he moved, he should have gone by way of Manassas and Central Virginia upon Richmond. The best evidence of that is the eight months on the Peninsula, its abandonment, and the present position of McClellan's late army. The enemy knew the General's weakness. They played upon his fears. They magnified their numbers. They acted the part of defiant courage.—With only forty thousand men at Manassas, they held in check more than two hundred thousand, by playing on their commander's morbid caution.

At every step of his progress, after leaving Washington, the Government, that was disatisfied with his plan of campaign, but weakly yielded to it, had fresh occasion for distrust and alarm. He feared everything but the squandering of time.—Of that he seemed to have a supply which no prodigality could waste. He dug as if he had been sent to mine the Peninsula. He took his inspiration from the mole, and not from the eagle. When he stretched his lines along the Chickahominy, the enemy became but a huge ox, that with dull strength and slow foot pulled the campaign by sheer brute force, unhelped by brains or genius, except from the minor generals. One and another opportunity came, a third, and a fourth, on which we would not say a Frederick, a Bonaparte, a Wellington, but even a Raglan or a Simpson, would have struck through and seized Richmond; but McClellan saw no way that had not a lion in it. Besides, it is understood that he went to the Peninsula hoping with a great army to overcome rebellion, and end the campaign with little bloodshed. He intended to catch the levitation by converting the army into a procession of Hospitals, and ending in battles as murders as the world has ever known. And when the last trumpet shall bring forth the dead, between fifty and a hundred thousand men will rise from the swamps of the Chickahominy and the fields of the Peninsula, witnesses to the cruelty of a conservative campaign!

We believe Gen. McClellan both aimed to do his duty, and exerted every talent that God had given him to that end. But he was inadequate to the situation. The task required a man of large ability, of military genius, and especially of Courage to take risks and win by straight-out fighting.

When McClellan was appointed to his high position, it was the best thing the Government could do. All men were untried, and he promised more brilliantly than any. But we have reason to blame the Government for continuing him in his position after confidence was shaken in his ability, and especially for doing it for the reasons they did.

It is no secret that President Lincoln has been wont to speak for many months past in terms of severe condemnation of Gen. McClellan. Again and again he has not hidden his conviction of McClellan's incompetency for his position. He did not approve the campaign. He did not approve the execution of it. He was severely discontented with the condition of affairs upon the great retreat. Why did he not remove him? McClellan was a Democrat. The President feared the effect of such an act upon the Democratic party. Does any one, informed of the secret history of affairs, doubt whether the President would have placed another at the head of the army, had McClellan been an anti-slavery man, before a step was taken toward Yorktown? Had it been Fremont, he would have been put down in an hour! The President's scarcely disguised idea of policy is, that the anti-slavery party of the North will bear to be snubbed; it is made up of men such of deep moral feeling, so earnest, so patriotic, so self-sacrificing, that they will not abandon the Administration, however unjustly they may be treated. But the Democrats are impatient and intractable. They will not patiently bear being crossed. And so the President recalls Fremont on the very eve of a battle in Missouri, which would have delivered the West almost a year earlier than, following in Fremont's steps, it was afterwards done. Again, after Fremont had with matchless celerity chased Jackson out of the Shenandoah Valley, (the only man that yet has proved a match in strategy, and quickness and skill in handling men, with Jackson,) he was, at the clamor of discontented Democrats and army officers, relieved of command. But McClellan was continued, through a series of blunders, of torpidities, of ruinous mismanagements, that will give to military history one of its saddest and guiltiest chapters, because, being the intended duffer hero of the Democratic party, the President feared to transfer him.

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