

NOMINATION FOR THE PULITZER PRIZE FEB. 18.

status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

On Dec. 21, the following direction was given to the commander of our forces in the Philippines:

"The military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that, in accordance to the sovereignty of Spain, in reverting the former political relations of the inhabitants and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exercised for the securing of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the continuation of all their private rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employment, and in their personal and religious rights."

Went a Commission.

In order to facilitate the most humane, prompt and effective extension of authority throughout these islands, and to secure, with the least possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and property to the inhabitants, I appointed in January, 1899, a commission consisting of Jacob Gould Schurman of New York, Admiral George Dewey, U. S. N.; Charles Lewis of Indiana, Professor Dean C. Worcester of Michigan, and Major General Elihu S. Otis, U. S. A. Their instructions contained the following:

"In the performance of this duty the commissioners are enjoined to meet at the earliest possible day in the city of Manila, and to announce by public proclamation their presence and the mission entrusted to them, carefully setting forth that, while the military government already proclaimed is to be maintained and continued as long as necessary may require, efforts will be made to alleviate the burden of taxation, to establish industrial and commercial prosperity, and to provide for the safety of persons and of property by such means as may be found conducive to their ends."

Given Careful Instructions.

"The commissioners will endeavor, with no interference with the military authority of the United States now in control of the Philippines, to ascertain what amelioration is the condition of the inhabitants and what improvements in public order may be practicable, and for this purpose they will study attentively the existing social and political state of the various populations, particularly as regards the forms of local government, the administration of justice, the collection of customs and other taxes, the means of transportation, and the need of public improvements. They will report . . . the results of their observations and reflections, and will recommend such executive action as may from time to time seem to them wise and useful."

Avoided Harsh Measures.

"It is my desire that in all their relations with the inhabitants of the islands the commissioners exercise due respect for all the ideals, customs and institutions of the tribes which compose the population, emphasizing upon all occasions the just and beneficent intentions of the government of the United States."

"It is also my wish and expectation that the commissioners may be received in a manner due to the honored and authorized representatives of the American Republic, only commensurate on account of their knowledge, skill and integrity as bearers of the good will, the protection and the richest blessings of a liberating rather than a conquering nation."

On the 6th of February, 1899, the treaty was ratified by the Senate of the United States, and the Congress immediately appropriated \$20,000,000 to carry out its provisions. The ratifications were exchanged by the United States and Spain on the 11th of April, 1899.

As early as April, 1899, the Philippine commission, of which Dr. Schurman was president, endeavored to bring about peace in the islands by repeated conferences with leading Tagalogs representing the so-called insurgent government, to the end that some general plan of government might be offered them which they would accept.

Pleased the Natives.

No great was the satisfaction of the insurgent commissioners with the form of government proposed by the American commissioners that the latter submitted the proposed scheme to me for approval, and my action thereon is shown by the cable message following:

May 5, 1899, Schurman, Manila: Yours received. You are authorized to propose that, under the military power of the President, pending action of Congress, government of the Philippine Islands shall consist of a governor general appointed by the President, cabinet appointed by the governor general, a general advisory council elected by the people, the qualifications of electors to be carefully considered and determined, and the governor general to have absolute veto. Judiciary strong and independent, principal judges appointed by the President. The cabinet and judges to be chosen from natives or Americans, or both, having regard to fitness.

"The President earnestly desires the cessation of bloodshed and that the people of the Philippine Islands at an early date shall have the largest measure of local self-government consistent with peace and good order."

Signs of Treachery.

In the latter part of May another group of representatives came from the insurgent leader. The whole matter was fully discussed with them and promise of acceptance seemed near at hand. They assured our commissioners they would return after consulting with their leader, but they never did.

As a result of the views expressed by the first Tagalog representative favorable to the plan of the commission, it appears that he was, by military order of the insurgent leader, stripped of his shoulder straps, dismissed from the army and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment.

The views of the commission are best set forth in their own words:

"Deploable as war is, the one in which we are now engaged was unavoidable by us. We were attacked by a bold, adventurous

and enthusiastic army. No alternative was left to us except ignominious retreat."

Had to Remain.

"It is not to be conceived of that any American would have sanctioned the surrender of Manila to the insurgents. Our obligations to other nations and to the friendly Filipinos to ourselves and our flag demanded that force should be met with force. Whatever the future of the Philippines may be, there is no course open to us now except the prosecution of the war until the insurgents are reduced to submission."

"The commission is of the opinion that there has been no time since the destruction of the Spanish squadron by Admiral Dewey when it was possible to withdraw our forces from the islands either with honor to ourselves or with safety to the inhabitants."

After the most thorough study of the people of the archipelago the commission reported, among other things:

"Their lack of education and political experience, combined with their racial and linguistic diversities, disqualify them, in spite of their mental gifts and domestic virtues, to undertake the task of governing the archipelago at the present time. The most that can be expected of them is to co-operate with the Americans in the administration of general affairs, from Manila as a center, and to undertake, subject to American control or guidance (as may be found necessary) the administration of provincial and municipal affairs."

Would Invite Anarchy.

"Should our power by any facility be withdrawn, the commission believes that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excite, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers, and the eventual division of the islands among them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing and united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable."

"Thus the welfare of the Philippines coincides with the dictates of national honor in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We cannot from any point of view escape the responsibilities of government which our sovereignty entails, and the commission is strongly persuaded that the performance of our national duty will prove the greatest blessing to the people of the Philippine Islands."

Believing that nothing further could be accomplished in pursuance of their mission until the rebellion was suppressed, and desiring to place before the Congress the result of their observations, I requested the commission to return to the United States. Their most intelligent and comprehensive report, was submitted to Congress.

Duties of the Commission.

In March, 1899, believing that the insurrection was practically ended and earnestly desiring to promote the establishment of a stable government to the archipelago, I appointed the following civil commission: William H. Taft of Ohio, Professor Dean C. Worcester of Michigan, Luke I. Wright of Tennessee, Henry C. Ide of Vermont, and Bernard Moses of California. My instructions to them contained the following:

"You (the Secretary of War) will instruct the commission . . . to devote their attention to the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments, in which the natives of the islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty."

Awaits the Report.

"Whenever the commission is of the opinion that the condition of affairs in the islands is such that the central administration may safely be transferred from military to civil control they will report that conclusion to you (the Secretary of War), with their personal recommendations as to the form of central government to be established for the purpose of taking over the control."

"Beginning with the 1st day of September, 1899, the authority to exercise, subject to my approval through the Secretary of War, that part of the power of government in the Philippine Islands which is of a legislative nature is to be transferred from the military governor of the islands to this commission, to be thereafter exercised by them in the place and stead of the military governor, and such rules and regulations as you (the Secretary of War) shall prescribe, until the establishment of the civil central government for the islands contemplated in the last foregoing paragraph, or until Congress shall otherwise provide."

Legislative Authority.

"Exercise of this legislative authority will include the making of rules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties and imposts, the appropriation and expenditure of the public funds of the islands; the establishment of an educational system throughout the islands; the establishment of a system of courts and establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of municipal and departmental governments, and all other matters of a civil nature of which the military government is competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character. The commission will also have power during the same period to appoint to office such officers under the judicial, educational and civil service systems and in the municipal and departmental governments as shall be provided."

Rules for the Interior.

Until Congress shall take action I directed that:

"Upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines must be imposed these inviolable rules: That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any civil case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition for the redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."

Extending Education.

"It will be the duty of the commission to promote and extend, and, as they deem proper, to improve the system of education already inaugurated by the military authorities. In doing this they should regard as of first importance the extension of a system

of primary education which shall be free to all, and which shall tend to fit the people for the duties of citizenship and for the ordinary avocations of a civilized community."

"Special attention should be at once given to affording full opportunity to all the people of the islands to acquire the use of the English language."

"Upon all officers and employees of the United States, both civil and military, should be impressed a sense of the duty to observe and merely the material losses of the island and social rights of the people of the islands, and to treat them with the same courtesy and respect for their personal dignity which the people of the United States are accustomed to require from each other."

All Pledges Kept.

"The articles of capitulation of the City of Manila on the 13th of August, 1898, contain, with these words: 'This city, its inhabitants, its churches, and religious worship, its educational establishments and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.' I believe that this pledge has been faithfully kept. As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the government of the United States to give protection for property and life, civil and religious freedom, and firm and unswerving guidance in the paths of peace and prosperity to all the people of the Philippine Islands. I charge this commission to labor for the full performance of this obligation, which is the sacred duty and conscience of their country, in the firm hope that through their labors all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands may come to look upon the United States as a friend and ally, and that the people of the islands may be able to govern themselves under the sovereignty and the protection of the people of the United States."

Amnesty Proclaimed.

That all might share in the regeneration of the islands and participate in their government, I directed Gen. MacArthur, the military governor of the islands, to issue a proclamation of amnesty, which contained among other statements the following:

"Manila, P. I., June 21, 1899.—By direction of the President of the United States, I hereby declare that the United States will grant complete immunity for the past and absolute liberty of action for the future, to all persons who are now, or at any time after Feb. 10, 1899, have taken up arms in insurrection against the United States in either a military or civil capacity, and who shall, within a period of ninety days from the date thereof, formally renounce all connection with such insurrection and subscribe to a declaration of their loyalty to the United States."

Striking Phrases from President McKinley's Letter.

It will be noted that the (Democratic) demand is for the immediate restoration of the Government of the islands to the people. If another issue is paramount, this is immediate. It will admit of no delay and will suffer no postponement.

We accept the issue and again invite the sound money forces to join in winning another and we hope a permanent victory for an honest financial system which will continue inviolable the public faith.

It is our purpose to establish in the Philippines a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants, and to prepare them for self-government, and to give them self-government when they are ready for it, and as rapidly as they are ready for it.

There has been no time since the destruction of the enemy's fleet when we could or should have left the Philippine archipelago. After the treaty of peace was ratified no power but Congress could surrender our sovereignty or alienate a foot of the territory thus acquired.

Every effort has been directed to their (Philippine) peace and prosperity, their advancement and well-being, not for our aggrandizement or for pride of might, but for trade or commerce, not for exploitation, but for humanity and civilization.

The American question is between duty and desertion, for the republic against both anarchy and imperialism.

Honest co-operation of capital is necessary to meet new business conditions, and extend our rapidly increasing foreign trade, but conspiracies and combinations intended to restrict business, create monopolies and control prices should be effectively restrained.

For labor a short day is better than a short dollar.

Unless something unforeseen occurs to reduce our revenues or increase our expenditures, the Congress at its next session should reduce taxation very materially.

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Civil Service to Rule.

Nobody who will avail himself of the facts will longer hold that there was any alliance between our soldiers and the insurgents or that any group of individuals were to be trusted. Long before their leader had reached Manila they had resolved, if the commander of the American army would permit them to return to the islands, that they would later turn upon us, which they did murderously and without the shadow of cause or justification.

There may be those without the means of full information who believe that we were in alliance with the insurgents and that we assured them that they should have independence. To such let me repeat the facts: On July 25, 1898, Admiral Dewey was instructed by me to make no alliance with any party or faction in the Philippines that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future, and he replied under date of June 4, 1898:

"Have acted according to spirit of department's instructions from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron has defended the defenses of Manila at a moment, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession."

Denies Any Compact.

In the report of the first Philippine commission, submitted on Nov. 2, 1899, Admiral Dewey said:

"No alliance of any kind was entered into with Aguinaldo nor was any promise of independence made to him at any time."

General Merritt arrived in the Philippines on July 25, 1898, and a dispatch from Admiral Dewey to the government at Washington said:

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Filipino Took No Part.

On Aug. 13 Manila was captured, and of this and subsequent events the Philippine commission says:

"When the City of Manila was taken, Aug. 13, the Filipino took no part in the attack, but came following in with a view to looting the city and were only prevented from doing so by our forces preventing them from entering. Aguinaldo claims that he had the right to occupy the city. He demanded of General Merritt the palace of Malacanang for himself and the cessation of all the churches of Manila, and that part of the city which was under Spanish rule, should be given up, and, above all, that he should be given the arms of the Spanish prisoners. All these demands were refused."

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Generals Merritt, Greene and Anderson, who were in command at the beginning of our occupation and until the surrender of Manila, state that there was no alliance with the insurgents, and no promise of independence. On Aug. 17, 1898, General Merritt was instructed that there must be no joint occupation of Manila with the insurgents. General Anderson, under date of

Feb. 10, 1899, says that he was present at the interview between Admiral Dewey and the insurgent leader, and that in this interview Admiral Dewey made no promises whatever. He adds:

"The Aguinaldo asked me if my government was going to recognize his government. I answered that I was there simply in a military capacity; that I could not acknowledge his government, because I had no authority to do so."

Easy to Find Fault.

Would not our adversaries have sent Dewey's fleet to Manila to capture and destroy the Spanish sea power there, or, dispatching it there, would they have withdrawn it after the destruction of the Spanish fleet; and if the latter, whether would they have directed to sail? Where could it have gone? What port in the Orient was opened to it?

Do our adversaries condemn the expedition under the command of General Merritt to strengthen Dewey in the distant ocean and assist in our triumph over Spain, with which nation we were at war? Was it not our highest duty to strike Spain in every manner possible, and the war might be successfully concluded at the earliest practicable moment?

Asks for Honest Opinion.

And was it not our duty to protect the lives and property of those who came within our control by the fortress of war? Could we have come away at any time between May 1, 1898, and the conclusion of peace without a stain upon our good name? Could we have come away without dishonor at any time after the ratification of the peace treaty by the Senate of the United States?

There has been no time since the destruction of the enemy's fleet when we could or should have left the Philippine archipelago. After the treaty of peace was ratified no power but Congress could surrender our sovereignty or alienate a foot of the territory thus acquired. The Congress has not the means to do so, and the Senate has no authority to do either, if he had been so inclined, which he was not.

So long as the sovereignty remains in us it is the duty of the executive to uphold that sovereignty, and if it is attacked to suppress its assailants. Would our political adversaries do less?

Began by Insurgents.

It has been asserted that there would have been no fighting in the Philippines if Congress had declared its purpose to give independence to the Tagalogs. The insurgents did not wait for the action of Congress. They assumed the offensive, they opened fire on our army.

Their unprovoked assault upon our soldiers at a time when the Senate was deliberating upon the treaty shows that no action on our part except surrender and abandonment would have prevented the fighting. It is a gross misstatement to say that the responsibility rests for the shedding of American blood.

With all the exaggerated phrasemaking of this electoral contest, we are in danger of being diverted from the real question. We are in agreement with all of those who supported the war with Spain, and also with those who counseled the ratification of the treaty of peace. Upon these two great essential steps there can be no issue, and out of these came all of our responsibilities. If others would wish the obligations imposed by the war and the treaty, we must accept them, and here the issue is made.

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Would not our adversaries have sent Dewey's fleet to Manila to capture and destroy the Spanish sea power there, or, dispatching it there, would they have withdrawn it after the destruction of the Spanish fleet; and if the latter, whether would they have directed to sail? Where could it have gone? What port in the Orient was opened to it?

Do our adversaries condemn the expedition under the command of General Merritt to strengthen Dewey in the distant ocean and assist in our triumph over Spain, with which nation we were at war? Was it not our highest duty to strike Spain in every manner possible, and the war might be successfully concluded at the earliest practicable moment?

Asks for Honest Opinion.

And was it not our duty to protect the lives and property of those who came within our control by the fortress of war? Could we have come away at any time between May 1, 1898, and the conclusion of peace without a stain upon our good name? Could we have come away without dishonor at any time after the ratification of the peace treaty by the Senate of the United States?

There has been no time since the destruction of the enemy's fleet when we could or should have left the Philippine archipelago. After the treaty of peace was ratified no power but Congress could surrender our sovereignty or alienate a foot of the territory thus acquired. The Congress has not the means to do so, and the Senate has no authority to do either, if he had been so inclined, which he was not.

So long as the sovereignty remains in us it is the duty of the executive to uphold that sovereignty, and if it is attacked to suppress its assailants. Would our political adversaries do less?

Began by Insurgents.

It has been asserted that there would have been no fighting in the Philippines if Congress had declared its purpose to give independence to the Tagalogs. The insurgents did not wait for the action of Congress. They assumed the offensive, they opened fire on our army.

Their unprovoked assault upon our soldiers at a time when the Senate was deliberating upon the treaty shows that no action on our part except surrender and abandonment would have prevented the fighting. It is a gross misstatement to say that the responsibility rests for the shedding of American blood.

With all the exaggerated phrasemaking of this electoral contest, we are in danger of being diverted from the real question. We are in agreement with all of those who supported the war with Spain, and also with those who counseled the ratification of the treaty of peace. Upon these two great essential steps there can be no issue, and out of these came all of our responsibilities. If others would wish the obligations imposed by the war and the treaty, we must accept them, and here the issue is made.

It is our purpose to establish in the Philippines a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants, and to prepare them for self-government, and to give them self-government when they are ready for it, and as rapidly as they are ready for it.

There has been no time since the destruction of the enemy's fleet when we could or should have left