Oregon Gity Goarier.
A. W. CHENEY, Pnbllaher.
OREGON CITY OREGON
il
To the Senate and House of Representa
tives: It gives me pleasure to extend
greeting to the 55th congress assembled
In regular session at the seat of govern
ment, with many of whose senators and
representatives I have been associated
tn the legislative service. The meeting oc
curs under felicitous conditions, Justify
ing sincere congratulation and calling for
our grateful acknowledgment to a be
neficent providence which has so signally
blessed and prospered us as a nation.
I'eace and"good will with all the nations
of the earth continue unbroken.
A matter of genuine satisfaction is tne
growing feeling of fraternal regard and
unification of all sections of our country,
the Incompleteness of which has too long
delayed realization of the highest blessings
of the Union. The spirit or patriotism is
universal and is ever increasing In fervor.
The public questions which now most en
gross us are lifted far above either par
tisanship, prejudice or former sectional
differences. They affect every part of
our common country alike and permit of
no division on ancient lines. Questions of
foreign policy, of revenue, the soundness
of the currency, he inviolability of na
tional obligations, the Improvement of the
fpubllo service, appeal to the Individual con
science of every earnest citizen, to what
ever party he belongs, or In whatever sec
tion of the country he may reside.
The extra session of this congress which
dosed during July last, enacted Important
legislation, and, while its full effects have
not been realized, what It has already ac
complished assures us of its timeliness and
wisdom. To test Its permanent value
further time will be required, and the peo
ple, satisfied with its operation and re
sults thus far, are In no mind to withhold
from It a fair trial.
THE CURRENCY QUESTION.
eeessltr of Patting Oar Finances
Upon a. Sound Hnsl.
Tariff legislation having been settled by
the extra session of congress, the question
next pressing for consideration is that of
tho currency. The work of putting our
finances upon a sound basis, dltlicult as It
nay seem, will appear when we recall
the financial operation of the government
since 186. On the 30th day of June of
that year, we had outstanding demand
liabilities In the sum of (728,868,447 41. On
the 1st day of July, 1879, these liabilities
tad been reduced to $443,889,495 88. Of our
. taterest-bearing obligations, the figures
re even more striking. On July 1, 1KB6,
the principal of the Interest-bearing debt
of the government was (2,332,331,208. On
the 1st day of July, 1893, this sum had
been reduced to (585,037,100, or an aggre
gate reduction of (1,747,294,108. The inter,
st-bearlng debt of the United States on
the 1st day of December, 1897, was (847,
MM20. The government money now out
standing (December 1) consists of (346,
01,016 of United States notes; (107,793,280
f treasury notes Issued by authority of
the act of 1890; (384,963,504 of silver certlll
cates and (61,280,761 of standard sliver
dollars,
v. With the great resources of the govern
ment and with the time-honored example
f the past before us, we should not hesi
tate to enter upon a currency revision
which will make our demand obligations
Ism nnprnua tn thi mv.rnniMt anil re
lieve our financial laws tiom ambiguity
and doubt-
The brief review of what was accom
plished from the close of the war until
1(91 makes unreasonable and groundless
hit dlntruMt cither of our financial abll-
"ity or soundness; while the situation from
1191 to 1897 must admonish congress of the
immediate necessity for so legislating as
to make the return of the conditions then
revelling Impossible.
There are many pinna proposed as a
remedy for the evil. Before we can 11 nd
the true remedy we must appreciate the
seal evil. It Is not that our currency of
very kind Is not good, for every dollar
f It Is good; good because the govern
ance's pledge Is out to keep It bo, and
that pledge will not be broken. How
aver, the guaranty of our purpose to keep
the pledge will be best shown by advanc
ing toward 'la fulfillment.
Kvll of the Present System.
The evil of the present system Is found
In the great coat to the government ot
maintaining the parity ot our different
farms of money; Unit Is, keeping all of
them at par with gold. We surely cannot
to longer heedless ot the burden this Im
poses upon the people, given under (airly
prosperous conditions, while the past tour
years have demonstrated that It Is not
only an expensive charge upon the gov
ernment, but a dangerous menace to the
national credit.
It la manifest that we must devise some
plan to protect the government against
bond issues for repeated redemptions. We
must either curtail the opportunity for
speculation, made easy by the multiplied
redemptions of our demand obligations, or
Increase the gold reserve for their re
demption. We have (IHKI.UOO.OOO of currency
which the government, by solemn enact
ment, has undertaken to keep at par with
gold. Nobody la obliged to redeem In
geld but the government. The banks are
ot required to redeem In gold. The gov
ernment Is obliged to keep equal with
gold all Its outstanding currency and coin
obligations, while Its receipts are not re
quired to be paid In gold. They are paid
tn every kind of money but gold, and the
nly means by which the government oiin,
with certainly, get gold la by borrowing.
It ran get II In no other way when It most
needs it. The government without any
Bled gold revenue la pledged to maintain
gold redemption, which it haa atradily and
faithfully done, and which, under the au
thority now given, It will continue to do.
The law which requires the government,
after having redeemed Ita notea, to pay
them out again as current funds demands
constant replenishment of the gold re
oerve. This Is especially so In times of
business panic and when the revenue! are
Insufficient to meet the expenses of the
government. At such times the govern
snent haa no other way to supply its def
icit and maintain redemption but through
the Increase of Its bonded debt, as during
the administration of my predecessor,
when (X2.315.4UO of 4'i per rent bonds
were Issued and sold and the proceeds
used to pay the expenses of the govern
snent In excess of the revenuea and sustain
the gold reserve. While It la true that
the greater part of the proceeds of these
bonds wt.-e used to supply deficient rev,
eiuea, a considerable portion was required
ts maintain the gold reserve.
Replenishing the Gold Reserve.
With our revenuea equal to our expensea,
there would be no deficit requiring the Is
suance ot bonds. Hut If the gold reserve
falls below (ltW.000,000, how will It be re
plenished except by selling more bonds?
Is triors any ether way practicable under
slating law? The aerloua question then
Is, JJhall we continue the policy that has
been pursued In the paat that la, when the
geld reaerve reaches the point of danger,
Issue more bonds and supply the needed
geld or shall we provide other means
prevent taess recurring drains upon the
gold reserve? If no further legislation
is had and the policy of selling bonds is
to be continued, then congress should give
tfie secretary of the treasury authority to
sell bonds at long or short periods, bearing
a less rate of interest than is now author
ized by law. X earnestly recommend, as
soon as the receipts of the government
are quite sufficient to pay all the expenses
of the government, that when any of the
United States notes are presented for re
demption in gold and areredeeemed In gold,
such notes shall be kept and only paid out
In exchange for gold. This is an obvious
duty. If the holderof the United Statesnote
prefers gold from thegovernment, he should
not receive back from the government
a United States aote without paying gold
In exchange for It. 'The reason for this Is
made all the more apparerft when the gov
ernment issues an interest-bearing debt
to provide gold for the redemption of
United States notes a nonlnterest-bearing
debt. Surely It should not pay them out
again except on demand and for gold. If
they are put out in any other way they
may return again to be followed by an
other bond issue to redeem them another
Interest-bearing debt to redeem a nonlnterest-bearing
debt.
In my view, It is of the utmost Import
ance that the government should be re
lieved from the business of providing for
all the gold required for exchange or ex
port. This responsibility is alone borne
by the government without any of the
usual and necessary banking powers to
help Itself. The banks do not feel the
strain of the gold redemption.. The
whole strain rests upon the government,
and the size of the gold reserve In the
treasury has come to be, with or with
out reason, tho signal of danger or of se
curity. This ought to be stopped.
If we are to have an era of prosperity
In the country with sufficient receipts for
the expenses of the government, ' we may
feel no Immediate embarrassment from
our present currency; but the danger still
exists, and will be ever present, menacing
us as long as the existing system con
tinues. And, besides, It Is in times of
adequate revenues and business tran
quillity that the government should pre
pare for the worst. We cannot avoid,
without serious consequences, the wise
consideration and prompt solution of this
question.
Plan of Secretary Gage,
The secretary of the treasury hap out
lined a plan in great letall lor tile pur
pose of removing threatened recurrence
of a de-pleted gold reserve and sa ving us
from future embarrassment on that ac
count. To thlB plun I Invite your care
ful consideration. I concur with the sec
retary of the treasury In his recommenda
tion that national banks be allowed to
Issue notes to the face value of the
bonds which they deposited for circula
tion, and that the tax on circulating
notes, secured by the deposit of such
bonds, be reduced to one-half of one per
cent per annum. I also join him In
recommending that authority be given for
the establishment of national banks with
a minimum capital of (25.000. This will
enable the smaller villages and agricul
tural regions of the country to be sup
plied with currency to meet their de
mands. I recommend that the Issue of
national bank notes be restricted to the
denomination of (10 and upwards. If the
suggestions I have herein made shall
have the approval of congress, then I
would recommend that national banks be
required to redeem their notes In gold.
CI HA AND SPAIN.
Attltnde of the Administration In
the Present Rebellion.
The most Important problem with which
this country is now called upon to deal,
that pertaining to its foreign rela
tions, concerns Its duty toward Spain and
the Cuban Insurrection. Problems and
conditions more or less In common with
those now existing have confronted this
government at various times in the past.
The story of Cuba for many years has
been one of unrest; growing discontent;
an effort toward the larger enjoyment of
liberty and self-control; of organized re
sistance to the mother country; or oppres
sion and warfare and of Ineffectual set
tlement to be followed by renewed re
volt. For no enduring period since the
enfranchisement of the continental pos
sessions of Spain In the Western conti
nent has the condition of Cuba or the
policy of Spnln toward Cuba not caused
concern to the United States.
The prospect from time to time that
the weakness of Spain's hold upon the
island and the political vicissitudes and
embarrassments of the home government
might lend to the transfer of Cuba to a
continental power called forth, between
1S23 and 1860, various emphatic declara
tions of the United States to permit no
disturbance of Cuba's connection with
Spain unless In the direction of Independ
ence or acquisition by the United Stutes
through purchuse, nor has there been any
change of this declnred policy since upon
the part of this government.
The revolution which began In 1868
lasted for 10 years, despite the strenuous
efforts of the successive penlnsulnr gov
ernments to suppress It. Then, as now,
the -government of tho United States tes
tified Its grave concern and offered Its aid
to put an end to bloodshed In Cuba. The
overtures made by Oenernl Grant were
refused, and the war dragged on, entail
ing great loss of life and treasure, and
Increased Injury to American Interests,
besides throwing enhanced burdens of
neutrality upon this government. In 1S78,
peace was brought about by the truce
of Znnjon, obtained by negotiations be
tween the Spanish commander, Martinez
de Campos, and the Insurgent leaders,
Civilised Code of War Disregarded,
The present Insurrection broke out in
February, 1895. It Is not my purpose, at
this time, to recall Its remarkable Increase
or to characterize Its tenacious resistance
against the enormous forces massed
agiiiimt It by Spain. The revolt and the
efforts to subdue It carried destruction to
every quarter of the Island, developing
wide proportions and defying the efforts
ot Spuln for lta suppression. The civilized
code of war has been disregarded, no
less so by the Spaniards than by the
Cubans. The existing conditions cannot
but fill this government and the Ameri
can people with the gravest npprehen
alon. There Is no desire on the part of
our people to profit by the misfortunes
of Spain. We have only the desire to
see the Cubans prosperous and contented,
enjoying that measure of self-control
which la the Inalienable right ot man,
protected In their right to reap the bene
fit of the exhaustless treasures of their
country.
The offer made by my predecessor, In
April, 1896, tendering the friendly offices
of this government, failed, and media
tion on our part wns not accepted. In
brief, the answer read; Thero la no ef
fectual way to pacify Cuba, unless It be
glna with the actual submission of the
rebels to the mother country. Then only
can Spain act In the promised direction
of Imr own motion and after tier own
plum.
Concentration la Extermination.
The cruel policy of concentration waa
Initialed February 16, m. The produc
tive districts controlled by the Spanish
armies were depopulated and the agri
cultural Inhabitants were herded In and
about the garrison towns, their landa laid
waste and their dwelllnga destroyed. Thla
policy the late cabinet of Spain Justified
aa a necessary measure of war and aa a
meana of cutting oft aupplles from the
Inaurgenta.
It haa utterly failed aa a war measure.
It was not olvlllied warfare. It waa ex
termination. -
Agalnat thla abuse of the rights of war
I have felt cenetralned, on repeated oc
casions, to enter the Arm and earneat pro
teat of this government. There waa much
of public .condemnation of the treatment
of American eltlieni by alleged Illegal ar
rests and long Imprisonment awaiting
trial of pending protracted Judlelal pro
cedures. I felt it my first duty to make
Instant demand for the release or speedy
trial of all American citizens under ar
rest. Before the change of the Spanish
cabinet, In October, 22 prisoners, citizens
of the United States, had been given
their freedom.
For the relief of our own citizens suf
fering because of the conflict, the aid of
congress was sought In a special mes
sage, and under the appropriation of April
4, 1897, effective aid has been given to
American citizens in Cuba, and many of
them, at their own request, have been
returned to the United States.
Instructions to Minister Woodford.
The Instructions given to our new min
ister to Spain, before his departure for
his post, directed him to Impress upon
that, government the sincere Wish of the
United States to lend its aid toward end
ing the war In Cuba, by reaching a peace
ful and lasting result. Just and honor
able alike to Spain and the Cuban people.
These Instructions recited the character
and duration of the contest, the wide
spread losses It entails, the burdens and
restraint It Imposes upon us, with con
stant disturbance of national Interests
and the Injury resulting from an Indefinite
continuance of this state of things. It
was stated that at this Juncture our gov
ernment was constrained to seriously In
quire If the time was not ripe when Spain,
of her own volition, moved by her own In
terests and every Bentlment of humanity,
should put a stop to this destructive war
and make proposals of settlement honor
able to herself and Just to her Cuban
colony. It was urged that, as a neigh
boring nation with large interests In'
Cuba, we could be required to wait only
a reasonable time for the mother coun
try to establish its authority and restore
peace and order within the borders of the
Island; that we could not contemplate an
indefinite period for the accomplishment
of these results.
No solution was proposed to which the
slightest idea of humiliation to Spain
could attach. All that was asked or ex
pected was that some safe way might be
speedily provided and permanent peace
restored. It so chanced that the consid
eration of this offer, addressed to the
Spanish administration, which had de
clined the tenders of my predecessor and
which for more than two years had poured
more treasure Into Cuba In the fruitless
effort to suppress the revolt, fell to oth
ers. Between the departure of General
Woodford, the new envoy, and his arrival
In Spain, the statesman who had shaped
the policy of his country fell by the hand
of an assassin, and although the cabinet
of the late premier still held office and re
ceived from our envoy the proposals he
bore, that cabinet gave place, within a
few days thereafter, to a new administra
tion under the leadership of Sagasta.
Spain's Friendly Reply.
The reply to our note was received on
the 23d day of October. It is in the direc
tion of a better understanding. It appre
ciates the friendly proposals of this gov
ernment. It admits that our country Is
deeply affected by the war In Cuba and
that our desires for peace are just. It de
clares that the present Spanish govern
ment Is bound by every consideration to a
change of policy that should satisfy the
United States and pacify Cuba within a
reasonable time. To this end, Spain has
decided to put into effect the political re
forms heretofore advocated by the pres
ent premier, without halting for any con
sideration in the path which, in Its judg
ment, leads to peace.
The military operations, It Is said, will
continue, but will be humane and con
ducted with all regard for private rights,
being accompanied by political action
leading to the autonomy of Cuiba, while
guarding Spanish sovereignty. This, it Is
claimed, will result In Investing Cuba with
a distinct personality, the Island to be
governed by an executive and by a local
council or chamber, reserving to Spain
the control of the foreign relations, Ihe
army and navy and the Judicial adminis
trations. To accomplish this, the present govern
ment proposes to modify existing legis
lation by decree, leaving the Spanish
cortes, with the aid of Cuban senators
and deputies, to solve the economic prob
lems and properly distribute the existing
debt
'Give Spain a Chance.
In the absence of a declaration of the
measures that this government proposes
to take In carrying out Its proffer of good
olllces, It suggests that Spain be left free
to conduct military operations and grant
political reforms, while the United States,
for Its part, shall enforce its neutral obli
gations, and cut oft the assistance which,
It Is asserted, the insurgents receive from
this country. The supposition of an in
definite prolongation of the war Is de
nied. It Is asserted that the Western
provinces are already well-nigh re-'
claimed; that the planting of cane and
tobacco therein has been resumed, and
that by force of arms and new and ample
reforms very early and complete pacifi
cation Is hoped for.
The Immediate amelioration of existing
conditions under the new administration
of Cuban affairs Is predicted, and there
withal the disturbance and all occasion
for any change ot attitude on the part of
the United States.
Discussion of the question of Interna
tional duties and responsibilities of the
United States as Spain understands them,
Is presented with an apparent disposition
to charge us with failure In this regard.
This charge Is without any basis In fact.
It could not have been made if Spain had
been cognizant of the constant effort this
government has made, at the cost of mil
lions and by the employment ot the ad
ministrative machinery at the national
command, to perform Its full duty accord
ing to the law of nations. That It has
successfully prevented the departure of a
single military expedition or armed vessel
from our shores In violation of our laws
would seem to be a sufficient answer.
Hut on this aspect of the Spanish note It
Is not necessary to speak furlher now.
Finn In the conviction of a wholly per
formed obligation, due response to this
charge has been made In diplomatic is
sues. Throughout all the.se horrors and
dangers" o our own peace, this govern
ment has never In any way abrogated its
sovereign prerogative of reserving to It
self the determination of Its policy and
course, according to Its own high Bens of
right and In consonance with the dearest
Interests and convictions of our own peo
ple, should the prolongation of the strife
so demand.
Of the untried measures there remain
only;
"Recognition of the Insurgents as bellig
erents; recognition of the Independence of
Cuba; neutral Intervention to end the war
by Imposing a rational compromise be
tween the contestants, and Intervention
In favor of one or the other paily."
Not a Question ot Annexation.
I speak not of forcible annexation, for
that cannot be thought of. That, by our
code of morality, would be criminal ag
gression. Recognition of the belligerency
of the Cuban Insurgents has often been
canvassed sa a possible If not Inevitable
step, both In regard to the previous 10
years' struggle and during the present
war. I am not unmindful that the two
houses ot congress, In the spring of 1896,
expressed the opinion, by concurrent reso
lution, that a condition of public war ex
isted requiring or justifying the recogni
tion of a state of belligerency In Cuba,
and during the extra session the senate
voted a Joint resolution of like Import,
which, however, was not brought to a
vote In the house. In the presence of
these significant expressions of the senti
ment of the legislative branch. It behooves
the executive aoberly to consider the con
ditions under which so important a
sa ensure must need rest far Jusuftuation,
It Is to be seriously considered whether
the Cuban Insurrection possesses, beyond
dispute, the attributes of statehood which
alone oan demand the recognition of bel-J
ligerency In Its favor. Possession short
of the essential Qualifications of sover-
f eignty by the Insurgents, and the conduct
of the war by them according to the rec
ognized code of war, are no less Important
factors toward the determination of the
problem of belligerency than are the in
fluences and consequences of the struggle
upon the Internal policy of the recogniz
ing nation. The utterances of President
Grant In his memorable message of 1S75
are signally relevant to the present situa
tion in Cuba, and It may be wholesome
now to recall them". At that time a
serious conflict had for seven years wasted
the neighboring island. During all those
years an utter disregard of the laws of
civilized warfare and of the just demands
of humanity, which called forth expres
sions of condemnation from the nations ,
of Christendom, continued unabated.
Desolation and ruin pervaded that pro
ductive region, enormously affecting the
commerce of all commercial nations, but
that of the United States more than any
other, by reason of proximity and larger
trade and intercourse.
General Grant's Words.
At that juncture General Grant uttered
these words, which now, as then, sum up
the elements of the problem:
"A recognition of the independence of
Cuba being In my opinion impracticable
and indefensible,, the question which next
presents itself Is that Of the recognition
of belligerent rights in the parties to the
contest. In a former message to congress
I had occasion to consider this question
and reached the conclusion that the con
flict in Cuba, dreadful nnd devastating as
were its incidents, did not rise to the
fearful dignity of war. It is pos
sible that the acts of foreign powers and
even acts of Spain herself of this very
nature might be pointed to In defense of
such recognition. But now. as in its
past history, the United States should
carefully avoid the false lights winch
might lead It Into the mazes of doubt
ful law and of questionable propriety
and adhere to the rule which has been
its guide, of doing only that which is
right and honest and o good report.
"The question of according or of with
holding rights of belligerency must be
judged In every case in view of the par
ticular attending facts. Unless justified
by necessity, it is always, and Justly, re
garded as an unfriendly act and as a
gratuitous demonstration of moral sup
port to the rebellion. It Is necessary and
it is required when the interests and
rights of unother government, or its peo
ple, are so far affected by pending civil
conflict as to require a definition of Its
relations to the parties thereto. But this
conflict must be one which will be recog
nized in the sense of International law as
war.
"Belligerency, too, is a fact. The mere
existence of contending armed bodies and
their occasional conflicts do not consti
tute war In the sense referred to. Apply
ing to the existing condition of affairs in
Cuba the tests recognized by publicists
and writers on International law, and
which have been observed by nations of
dignity, honesty and cower when free
rfrom sensitive or selfish and unworthy
motives, I fall to find In the Insurrection
the existence of such a substantial polit
ical organization, real, palpable and mani
fest to the world, as having the forrhs
and capable of organization, the functions
of ordinary government toward Its own
people and to other states, with courts
for the administration of justice, with a
local habitation, possessing such organiza
tion of force, such material; Buch occupa
tion of territory as to take the contest,
out of the category of a mere rebellious
insurrection, or occasional skirmishes, and
place It on the terrible footing of war,
to which a recognition or belligerency
would aim to elevate It.
"The contest, moreover, Is solely on
land; the Insurrection has not possessed
Itself of a single seaport whence It may
Bend forth lis flag, nor has It any means
of communication wl'h foreign powers,
except through the military lines of its
adversaries. No apprehension of any of
these sudden and difficult complications
which a war upon the ocean Is apt to pre
cipitate upon the vessels, both commer
cial and naval, and upon the consular
officers of other powers, calls for the
definition of their relations to the parties
to the contest. Considered as a question
of expediency, I regard the accordance of
belligerent rights still to tie as unwise
and premature as I regard It to be, at
present, Indefensible as a measure of
right.
"Such recognition entails upon the coun
try according the rights difficult and com
plicated duties, and requires the exaction
from the contending parties of the strict
observance of tlulr rights and obliga
tions. It confers the right of search up
on the high seas by vessels of both par
ties; It would subject the carrying of arms
and munitions of war. which now may be
transported freely und without Interrup
tion In vessels of the United States, to
detention and possible seizure; it would
give rise to countless vexatious questions;
It would relieve the present government of
responsibility for acts done by the Insur
gents, and would Invest Spain with the
right to exercise the supervision recog
nized by our treaty of 1795 over our com
merce on the high seas, a very large
part of which, in its traffic between the
Atlantic and the Gulf states and between
all of them and the states on the Pacific,
passes through the waters which wash
the shores of Cuba. The exercise of this
supervision could scarce full to lead, If
not to abuses, certainly to collisions, per
ilous to the peaceful relations of the two
states. There can be little doubt as to
what result such supervision would be
fore long draw this nation. It would
be unworthy of the Unltd States to In
augurate the possibility of such result by
a measure of questionable right or ex
pediency, or by any Indiscretion."
Not a Time for Recognition.
Turning to the practical aspects of a
recognition of belligerency and reviewing
Its Inconveniences and possible danger,
further pertinent considerations appear.
In the code of nations, there Is no sucn
thing as a nuked recognition of belliger
ency unnccompunied by the assumption
of national neutrality. Such recognition
without neutrality will not confer upon
either party to a domestic conflict a status
not therefore actually possessed, or af
fect the relation of cither party to other
atates. The act of recognition usually
takes the form of a solem proclamation
of neutrality which recites the de facto
condition of belligerency as Its motive. It
announces a domestic law of neutrality
In the declaring state. It assumes the In
ternational obligation of a neutral in the
presence of a publlo state of war. It
warns all citizens and others within the
Jurisdiction of the claimant that they vio
late those rigorous obligations at their
own peril and cannot expect lo be shield
ed from the consequence. The right of
visit and search and seizure of vessels
and cargoes and contraband of war un
der admiralty law must under Interna
tional law be admitted as a legitimate
consequence of a proclamation of belliger
ency. While according equal belligerent
rights, defined by public law, to each par
ty tn our porta, disfavor would be Impos
sible to both, which, while nominally
equal, would weigh heavily In behalf of
Spain herself. Possessing a navy and
claiming the ports of Cuba, her maritime
rights could be asserted, not only for
the military Investment of the Island,
but up to the margin of our own terri
torial waters, and a condition of thlnga
would exist tor which the Cubans could not
hop to create a parallel; while aid from
within our domain would be even mora
Impossible than now, with the additional
obligation of International neutrality
which we would perforce assume.
Th enforcement of this enlarged and
onerous code of neutrality would only be !
lnnuential within our own jurisdiction
of land and sea and applicable by our
own instrumentalities. It could impart
to the United States no jurisdiction be
tween Spain and the insurgents. It would
give the United Statea no right of inter
vention to enforce the conduct of the
strife within the paramount authority of
Spain according to the international code
of war. , .
For these reasons, I regard the recog
nition of the belligerency of the Cuban
insurgents as now unwise and therefore
inadmissible. Should that step hereafter I
be deemed wise, as a measure of right
and duty, the executive will take It.
Intervention upon humane grounds has
been frequently suggested, and It has not
failed to receive my most anxious and
earnest consideration. But should such
a step be now taken when It is apparent
that a hopeful change has supervened in
the policy of Spain toward Cuba?
Pledges of the New' Government.
A new government has taken office In
the mother country. It Is pledged In ad
vance to the declaration that all the ef-,,
fort in the world cannot suffice to main
tain peace in Cuba by the bayonet; that
vague promises of reform after subjuga
tion afford no solution of the Insular
problem; that with a substitution of com
manders must come a change of the past
system' of warfare for one In harmony
with a new policy which shall no longer
aim to drive the Cubans "to the horrible
alternative of taking to the thicket or
succumbing In misery;" that reforms must
be Instituted In accordance with the needs
and clrcumstunces of the time, and that
these reforms, while designed to give full
autonomy to the colony and to create a
virtual entity and self-controlled admin
istration, shall yet conserve and affirm f
the. sovereignty of Spain by a Just 'distri
bution of powers and burdens upon a
basis of mutual interest untainted by
methods of seltlsh expediency.
The first acts of the new government
He In these honorable paths. The policy
of cruel rapine and extermination, that
so long shocked the universal sentiment
of humanity, has been reversed. Under
tho new mrtitary commander, a broad
clemency is proffered. Measures have al
ready been set on foot to relieve the hor
rors of starvation. The power of the
Spanish amnios, it is asserted, 1s to be
used, not to spread ruin and desolation,
but to protect the resumption of peaceful
agricultural pursuits and productive In
dustries. That past methods were futile
to force a peace by sub'jugatlon, Is free
ly admitted, and ruin without concilia
tion must Inevitably fail to win for Spain
the fidelity of a discontented dependency.
The Reforms for Ciiho.
Decrees in application of the foreshad
owed reforms have already , been pro
mulgated. The full text of these decrees
has not been received, but, as furnished In
a telegraphic summary from our minister,
the reforms are:
All civil and electoral rights of penin
sular Spaniards are, by virtue of the exist
ing constitutional assembly, forthwith
extended to colonial Spaniards. A scheme
of autonomy has been proclaimed by de
cree to become effective upon ratification
by the cortes. It creates a Cuban parlia
ment, which, with the insular executive,
can consider and vote upon all subjects
affecting local order and Interests, pos
sessing unlimited powers save as to mat
ters of state, war and the navy, as to
which the governor-general acts by his
own authority as the delegate of the cen
tral government. This parliament re
ceives the oath of the governor-general
to preserve faithfully the liberties and
privileges of the colony, and to It the
colonial secretaries are responsible, it has
the right to propose to the central gov
ernment, through the governor-general,
modifications of a charter and to Invite
new projects of law or executive meas
ures In the Interest of the colony. Be
sides Its local powers, It Is competent
first, to regulate electoral registration and
procedure and prescribe the qualifications
of electors and the manner of exercising
suffrage; second, to organize courts of
justice with native judges from members
of the local bur; third, to frame the In
sular budget, both ns to expenditures and
revenues to meet the Cuban share of the
national budget, which latter will be voted
by the national cortes with the assist
ance of Cuban senators and deputies;
fourth, to Initiate or take part In the ne
gotiations of the national government
for commercial treaties which may affect
Cuban Interests; fifth, to accept or re
ject commercial treutles which the nation
al government may have concluded with
out the participation of the Cuban govern
ment; sixth, to frame the colonial tariff,
acting In accord with the peninsular gov
ernment in scheduling articles of mutual
commerce between the mother country
and the colonies. Before Introducing or
voting upon a bill the Cuban government i
or tne chumbers will lay the project be
fore the central government and hear Its
opinion thereon; all the correspondence
1n such regard being made public. Fi
nally, all conflicts of jurisdiction arising
between the different municipal, provin
cial and Insular assemblies, or between
the latter and the lnsulur executive pow
er, and which, from their nature, may
not be referable to the central govern
ment for decision, Bhall be submitted to
the courts.
Result Will Soon Re Known.
That the government of Sngasta has en
tered upon a course from which recession
with honor Is Impossible, can hardly be j
questioned; that In tne few weeks It haa
existed It has made earnest of the sin
cerity of Its professions is undeniable. I
shall not Impugn Its sincerity.- nor should
Impotlence be suffered to embarrass It
in the tusk It has undertaken. It Is hon
estly due to Spain and to our friendly
relations with Spnln that she should be
given a reasonable chance to realize her
expectations and to prove the asserted ef
ficiency of the new order of things to
which she stands Irrevocably committed.
She has recalled the commander whose
brutal orders Inflamed the American m nd
and shocked the civilized world. She haa
modified the horrible order of concentra
tion and has undertaken the care of the
helpless, and permits those who desire to
resume the cultivation of (heir fields to
do so and assures them of the protection
of the Spanish government In their lawful
occupations. She has just released the
Competitor prisoners, heretofore sen
tenced to death, and who have been the
subject of repeated diplomatic corre
spondence during both this and the pre
ceding administration. Not aslngle
American citizen Is now under arrest or In
confinement In Cuba of whom this gov
ernment has any knowledge.
The near future will demonstrate wheth
er the Indispensable condition of a right
eous peace, just alike to the Cubans and
to Spain, as well as equitable to all our
interests, so Intimately Involved In the
welfare of Cuba, la to be attained. If not.
the exigency of further and other action
by the United 8tutea will remain to be
taken. When that time comes, that ac
tion will be determined In the line of In
disputable right and duty. It will be
faced without misgiving or hesitancy. In
the light of the obligation this government
owes to Itself, to the people who have con
fided to It the protection of their Interest!
and honor, and to humanity.
Will Intervene When Necessary.
Sura ot the right, keeping free from all
offense ourselves, actuated atinly by up
right and patrlotio conslderationa. moved
neither, by passion nor aelflshnesa, the
government will continue lta watchful
care over the rights and property ot
American cltlsena and will abate none of
Its efforts to bring about by peaceful
agenclea a peace which shall be honorable
and enduring. It It ehall hereafter be a
duty Imposed by our obligations to our
selves, to civilisation and humanity ts
intervene with force. It ahall be without
fault ob our part, and only because tn
necessity for such action win be so cleat
as to command the support and approval
of tho civilized world.
ANNEXATION OP HAWAII.
Urges the' Senate to Accomplish th
Union.
By a special message dated the 16th day "
of June last, I laid before the senate of
the United States a treaty, signed that day
by the plenipotentiaries of the United
States and of the republic of Hawaii, hav
ing for its purpose the incorporation of
the Hawaiian islands as an integral part
of the United States and under its sov
ereignty. The senate having removed
the injunction of secrecy, although th
treaty is still pending before that body,
the subject may be properly referred to
in this message, as the necessary action
of congress Is required o determine by
legislation many details of the eventual
union, should the fact of annexation b
accomplished, as I believe it should be.
While consistently disavowing from a
very early period any aggressive policy
of absorption in regard to the Hawaiian
group, a long series of discussion through
three-quarters of a century has pro
claimed the vital Interest of the United
States In the independent life of th
islands and their Intimate commercial de
pendency upon this country. At the sam
time It has been repeatedly asserted that
In no event could the entity of Hawaiian
statehood cease by the passage of the Is
lands under the domination or Influence ol
another power than the United States.
Under these circumstances the logic of
events required that annexation, befor
offered but declined, should, in the ripe
ness of time, come about as the natural
result of strengthening the ties that bind
us to those islands and be released by th
free will of the Hawaiian stale.
That treaty was unanimously ratified
without amendment by the senate and
president of the republic of Hawaii on th
10th of September last, and only awalta
the favorable action of the American sen
ate to effect the complete absorption of th
islands into the domains of the United
States. What the conditions of such a
union shall be, the political relation thereof
to the United States, the character of th
local administration, the quality, and de
gree of the elective franchise ot the In
habitants, the extension of the federal
laws to the territory' or the enactment o
special laws to fit the peculiar conditio
thereof, the regulation and needs of labor
therein, the treaty has wisely relegated to
congress.
If the treaty Is confirmed, as every con.
sideration of dignity and honor requires,
the wisdom of congress will see to It that,"
avoiding abrupt assimilation of element
perhaps hardly yet fitted to share In th
highest franchises of citizenship, and hav
ing due regard to the geographical con
ditions, the just provisions for self-rul
in local matters with the largest political
liberties as an Integral part of our nation
will be accorded to the Hawallans.
No less la due to a people who after
nearly five years of demonstrated capacity
to fulfill the obligations of self-govern.
Ing statehood, come of their free will to
merge their destinies in our body polltio.
The Dispute With Japan.
The questions which have arisen between
Japan and Hawaii by reason of the treat
ment of Japanese laborers emigrating to
the islands under the Hawalian-Japanes
convention of 1888, are In a satisfactory
stage of settlement by negotiation. This
government haa not been invited t medi
ate, and on the other hand has sought no
Intervention In that matter further than
to evince Its kindliest disposition toward
such a speedy and direct adjustment be
tween the two sovereign states In Interest
as shall comport with equity and honor.
It Is gratifying to learn that the appre
hensions at first displayed on the part of
Japan lest the cessation of Hawaii's na
tional life through annexation might lm
pair her privileges, to which Japan prop
erly laid claim, have given place to un
righteousness in the government and sin
cerity of its purpose to deal with all pos
sible ulterior questions In the broadest
spirit of friendliness.
CEXTRAL AMERICAN STATES,
Representation of Our Government
In the Greater Republic.
As to the representative of this govern
ment to Nlcurugua, Salvador and Costa
Rica, I have concluded that Mr. William
L. Merry, confirmed as minister of th
United Statea to the states of Nicaragua,
Salvador and Cdsta Rica, Bhall proceed
to San Jose, Costa Rica, and there tempo
rarily establish the headquarters of th
United States to those three states. 1
took this action for what I regarded as th
paramount Interests of this country. It
was developed, upon an Investigation by
the secretary of state, that the government
of Nicaragua, while not unwilling to re
ceive Mr. Merry in his diplomatic capao
lty, was unable to do so on account of th
compact concluded June 20, 1895, whereby
that republic and those of Salvador 'and
Honduras, forming what is known as th
Greater Republic of Central America, had
surrendered to the representative dlel
thereof their right to receive and send
diplomatic agents. The diet was not will
ing to accept him because he was not ac
credited to that body. I could not ao
credlt him to that body because the appro
priation law of congress did not permit.
Mr. Baker, the present minister at Man.
agua, has been directed to present his
letters of recall.
Mr. Godfrey Hunter has likewise beea
accredited to the gavernmenta of Gaut
mala and Honduras, the same as hla pred
ecessor. Guatemala Is not a member el
the Greater Republlo of Central America,
but Honduras Is. Should this latter gov
ernment decline to receive him, he has
been Instructed to report (,hls fact to hi
government and await Its further Instruc
tions. The Mcnrairna Canal.
A subject of large Importance to oof
country and Increasing appreciation on th
part of the people Is the completion of th
great highway of trade between the At
lantio and Pacific known aa tho Nicara
gua canal. Ita value to American com
merce la universally admitted. The com
mission appointed under date of July 21
last "to continue the aurveya and exam
inations authorized by the act approved
March 2, 1885, tn regard to th proper
route, feasibility and cost of construc
tion of the Nicaragua canal, with a view
of making complete plans tor the entire
work of construction of auch canal," I
now employed in the undertaking. In th
future I shall take occasion to tranimll
to congress the report of thla cominisaion,
making at the same time auch further
suggestions as may then seem advisable.
THE BIMETALLIC COMMISSION,
Failure of the MUalon of the Special
Silver Envoys.
Under the provisions of the act of con
gress approved March 3, 1897, for the pro
motion of an International agreement re
specting blmetnllsm, I appointed, a
April 14, 1S97, Hon. Edward O. Wolcott,
of Colorado; Hon. Adlal E. Stevenson, ol
Illinois, and Hon. Charles J. Payne,
of Massachusetts, as special envoys to
represent the United States. They have
been diligent In their effort to secure th
concurrence and co-operation of Euro
pean countries In the International set
tlement of th queatton, but up to this
time have not been able to secure an
agreement contemplated by their mission.
Th gratifying action of our great sis
ter republic of Franc In joining this
country In th attempt to bring about th
agreement between th principal com
mercial nations of Europe, whereby
fixed and relative value between gold and
allver shall be secured, furnishes assur
ance that w are not alone among th
larger nations of th world In realising: