“ TRUTH BEARS THE TORCH IN THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH.” — Lucretius
VOL. 3.
The Hymns of Old.
SILVERTON, OREGON, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1899.
Social animals are impelled part
ly by the wish to aid the members of
BY J . E. H .
their community in a general man
ner, but more commonly to perform
T s a r s , lover of m v soul, O, let me certain definite actions.
Man is
to th y bosom fly,
In sp ires ten th o u san d e v e ry d a y , • impelled by the same general wish
X
a lth o u g h it is a lie.
to aid his fellows; but has few or
In sp ires ten th o u san d to sleep in faith , i
w hile w ork a ro u n d neglected lies; no special instincts. He differs al
In sp ires ten th o u sa n d frig h te n ed souls so from the lower animals in the
to h u n t for m ansio ns in th e skies.
power of expressing his desires by
B u ddha, B rah m a, M ahom et, S m ith , in
spire ten th o u sa n d ju st th e s a m e ; : words, which thus become a guide
T hen why should we still p ray and sing to aid required and bestowed. The
a Je su s C h ris ti’s holy(?) n am e?
0 , w aste n o t m u sic’s sacred love on fool motive to give aid is likewise much
ish a n c ie n t h e a th e n m y th .
modify d in man; it no longer con
A re n o t our m inds too precious goods to
sists solely of a blind instinctive
tra m p le u n d e r foot like th is?
impulse, but is much influerced by
Com e, ye sin n e rs, poor an d needy, weak
the praise or blame of his fellows.
an d w ounded, sick and sore,
G ive u p your god-and-devil w o rsh ip ; O, The appreciation and the bestowal
give it u p forever m ore.
Com e to tr u th and love an d w isdom ; of praise and blame both rest on
com e to know ledge and be free.
sympathy; and this emotion is one
0 , le t th e to rch of reason guide you
of the most important elements of
n e a re r to h u m a n ity .
the social instincts. Sympathy,
though gained as an instinct, is al
Natural Origin of Morality.
so much strengthened by exercise
As all men desire their
BY CHARLES DARW IN, M .A .,L L .D .,F.R .S. or habit.
own happiness, praise or blame are
à
moral being is one who is bestowed on action and motives ac
capable of reflecting on his cording as they lead to this end;
*
past actions and their mo and as happiness is an essential
tives—of approving of some and part of the general good, the great
disapproving of others; and the fact est-happiness principle indirectly
that man is the one being who cer serves as a nearly safe standard of
tainly deserves this designation is right and wrong. As the reason
the greatest of all distinctions be ing powers advance and experience
tween him and the lower animals. is gained the remoter effects of cer
The moral sense follows, firstly, tain lines of conduct on the charac
from the enduring and ever-present ter of the individual and on the
nature of the social instincts; sec general good are perceived; and
ondly, from man’3 appreciation of then the self-regarding virtues come
the approbation and disapprobation withir. the scope of public opinion
of his fellows; and, thirdly, from and receive praise and their op
the high activity of his mental fac posites blame. But with the less
ulties, with past impressions ex civilized nations reason often errs,
tremely vivid; and in these latter and many bad customs and base
respects he differs from the lower superstitions come within the same
animals. Owing to this condition scope and are then esteemed as
of mind, man cannot avoid looking high virtues and their breach as
both backward and forward and heavy crimes.
The moral faculties are generally
comparing past impressions. Hence
after some temporary desire or pas and justly esteemed as of higher
sion has mastered his social in value than the intellectual powers.
stincts, he reflects and compares But we should remember that the
the now weakened impression of activity of the mind in vividly re
such past impulses with the ever calling past impressions is one of
present social instincts; and he the fnndamental though secondary
then feels that dissatisfaction which bases of conscience. This affords
all unsatisfied instincts leave be the strongest argument for educat
hind them,and he therefore resolves ing and stimulating in all possible
to act differently for the future — ways the intellectual faculties of
and this is conscience. Any in every human being. No doubt a
stinct permanently stronger and man with a torpid mind, if his so
more durable than another gives cial affections and sympathies are
rise to a feeling which we express well developed, would be led to
by saying it ought to be obeyed. good actions, and may have a fair
A pointer dog if able to reflect on ly sensitive conscience. But what
his past conduct would say to him ever renders the imagination more
self, I ought (as indeed we say of vivid and strengthens the habit of
him) to have pointed at that bare, recalling and comparing past im
and not have yielded to the passing pressions will make the conscience
more sensitive, and may even some
temptation of hunting it.
what compensate for weak social
affections and sympathies.
The moral nature of man has
reached its present standard partly
through the advancement of his
reasoning powers and consequently
of a just public opinion, but espe
cially from his sympathies having
been rendered more tender and
widely diffused through the effects
of habit, example, instruction and
reflection. It is not improbable
that after long practice virtuous
tendencies may be inherited. Ul
timately man does not accept the
praise or blame of his fellow's as
his sole guide, though few escape
this influence, but his habitual con
victions, controlled by reason, af
ford him the safest rule. Neverthe
less, the first foundation or origin
of the moral sense lies in the social
instincts, including sympathy; and
these instincts no doubt were pri
marily gained, as in the case of the
lower animals, through natural
selection.—[Descent of Man.
Unknowable—Another Name for
Unreal.
BY W. H. MAPLE.
can not comprehend lim
itless space, but he is cog
nizant of it—he knows that
it is. He can not comprehend in
finity, but mathematics brings it to
light as surely as it does the exist
ence of a thousand pebbles. He
can not comprehend endless suc
cession, but he can find it to be a
fact. He cannot know all things,
but he can know some things and
know that he knows them, and
know also that it is possible for
him to know other and still other
things, being limited only by op
portunity. And it is impossible for
him to set a limit to his own power
to know by any independent vo
lition of his own, as it is impossible
for him to know any one thing by
reason of any such volitionary
power. He knows what is reflected
by his mental faculties and he can
not know anything else; and hence
he can not know that a reality not
known is unknowable.
It is common with theological
writers of an advanced type to
speak of the “how” and the “why”
of natural things. They say that
science has the “how” to deal with,
and religion the “why”—that sci
ence has for its object the explana
tion of the immediate causes of
phenomena but that it is left,
largely at least, to supernatural
revelations to account for the pur
an
NO. 42.
pose of things. They insist, by
inference, that nothing exists ex
cept bv reason of a pre-existing
purpose of something else.
Now it seems much more rational
to admit the existence of things,
absolutely, unqualifiedly.
Existence itself is before purpose,
and requires no apology for its be
ing. Hence there can not have
been purposes before a being (a
something).
Things are, and with the excep
tion of some of the works of man
and of other finite intelligences, if
such exist, there is no reason why
for their being.
The writer’s position is, there
fore, that the “how,” the modus op-
erandi of things being knowable
without limitation, and there being
no “why” for natural things (with
the above exception), there is no
fact in nature but what the intel
lect of man is competent (the op
portunity being given) to know.
If it is claimed that simple exist
ence, or being, is a fact and an un
knowable fact, it is perhaps a suf
ficient reply to say that substance
or essence, however conceived of, is
known by its properties—its char
acteristics, and that simple being,
in the sense of substance without
character, is probably not a fact.
This seems so, for how better can
we arrive at the idea of complete
nonentity than by eliminating
from matter all its known proper
ties? It is most evident that to
take from matter the one quality of
extension is to destroy it; and to
take from force the idea of influ
ence exerted is to annihilate force;
so that it must be illogical to speak
of a supposed thing that is reduced
to nonentity in the very effort to
conceive of it, as an actuality.
The mind is adapted to know
realities, and realities have proper
ties making them objects of knowl
edge—making them knowable; and
hence a thing supposed to be a real
ity, but found to have no knowable
nature, is necessarily discarded by
the mind (if the mind is not under
duress) as a false conception and
as not existing at all as a verity.
The “unknowable” is possibly
only another name for unreal.
Knowledge is of, or concerning
nature’s methods, and nature’s
methods are all knowable.
To go further than this, and to
say that back ol and anterior to na
ture there existed a finitude of pur
poses in the mind of an infinite
personal intelligence, is without rea
son and without results. It is
simply an attempted explanation
for what needs no explanation, in
that it resolves itself into seeking a
reason for existence—an excuse for
being, when being must necessarily
be (and is, even in this attempt to
account for being) accepted as a
first tiuth.—[No “Beginning.”