



"TRUTH BEARS THE TORCH IN THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH."—*Lucretius.*

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The Hymns of Old.

BY J. E. H.

"**J**ESUS, lover of my soul, O, let me
to thy bosom fly,
Inspires ten thousand every day,
although it is a lie.
Inspires ten thousand to sleep in faith,
while work around neglected lies;
Inspires ten thousand frightened souls
to hunt for mansions in the skies.
Buddha, Brahma, Mahomet, Smith, in-
spire ten thousand just the same;
Then why should we still pray and sing
a Jesus Christi's holy (?) name?
O, waste not music's sacred love on fool-
ish ancient heathen myth.
Are not our minds too precious goods to
trample under foot like this?
Come, ye sinners, poor and needy, weak
and wounded, sick and sore,
Give up your god-and-devil worship; O,
give it up forever more.
Come to truth and love and wisdom;
come to knowledge and be free.
O, let the torch of reason guide you
nearer to humanity.

Natural Origin of Morality.

BY CHARLES DARWIN, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S.

AMORAL being is one who is capable of reflecting on his past actions and their motives—of approving of some and disapproving of others; and the fact that man is the one being who certainly deserves this designation is the greatest of all distinctions between him and the lower animals. The moral sense follows, firstly, from the enduring and ever-present nature of the social instincts; secondly, from man's appreciation of the approbation and disapprobation of his fellows; and, thirdly, from the high activity of his mental faculties, with past impressions extremely vivid; and in these latter respects he differs from the lower animals. Owing to this condition of mind, man cannot avoid looking both backward and forward and comparing past impressions. Hence after some temporary desire or passion has mastered his social instincts, he reflects and compares the now weakened impression of such past impulses with the ever-present social instincts; and he then feels that dissatisfaction which all unsatisfied instincts leave behind them, and he therefore resolves to act differently for the future—and this is conscience. Any instinct permanently stronger and more durable than another gives rise to a feeling which we express by saying it ought to be obeyed. A pointer dog if able to reflect on his past conduct would say to himself, I ought (as indeed we say of him) to have pointed at that hare, and not have yielded to the passing temptation of hunting it.

Social animals are impelled partly by the wish to aid the members of their community in a general manner, but more commonly to perform certain definite actions. Man is impelled by the same general wish to aid his fellows; but has few or no special instincts. He differs also from the lower animals in the power of expressing his desires by words, which thus become a guide to aid required and bestowed. The motive to give aid is likewise much modified in man; it no longer consists solely of a blind instinctive impulse, but is much influenced by the praise or blame of his fellows. The appreciation and the bestowal of praise and blame both rest on sympathy; and this emotion is one of the most important elements of the social instincts. Sympathy, though gained as an instinct, is also much strengthened by exercise or habit. As all men desire their own happiness, praise or blame are bestowed on action and motives according as they lead to this end; and as happiness is an essential part of the general good, the greatest-happiness principle indirectly serves as a nearly safe standard of right and wrong. As the reasoning powers advance and experience is gained the remoter effects of certain lines of conduct on the character of the individual and on the general good are perceived; and then the self-regarding virtues come within the scope of public opinion and receive praise and their opposites blame. But with the less civilized nations reason often errs, and many bad customs and base superstitions come within the same scope and are then esteemed as high virtues and their breach as heavy crimes.

The moral faculties are generally and justly esteemed as of higher value than the intellectual powers. But we should remember that the activity of the mind in vividly recalling past impressions is one of the fundamental though secondary bases of conscience. This affords the strongest argument for educating and stimulating in all possible ways the intellectual faculties of every human being. No doubt a man with a torpid mind, if his social affections and sympathies are well developed, would be led to good actions, and may have a fairly sensitive conscience. But whatever renders the imagination more vivid and strengthens the habit of recalling and comparing past impressions will make the conscience more sensitive, and may even some-

what compensate for weak social affections and sympathies.

The moral nature of man has reached its present standard partly through the advancement of his reasoning powers and consequently of a just public opinion, but especially from his sympathies having been rendered more tender and widely diffused through the effects of habit, example, instruction and reflection. It is not improbable that after long practice virtuous tendencies may be inherited. Ultimately man does not accept the praise or blame of his fellows as his sole guide, though few escape this influence, but his habitual convictions, controlled by reason, afford him the safest rule. Nevertheless, the first foundation or origin of the moral sense lies in the social instincts, including sympathy; and these instincts no doubt were primarily gained, as in the case of the lower animals, through natural selection.—[Descent of Man.

Unknowable—Another Name for Unreal.

BY W. H. MAPLE.

MAN can not comprehend limitless space, but he is cognizant of it—he knows that it is. He can not comprehend infinity, but mathematics brings it to light as surely as it does the existence of a thousand pebbles. He can not comprehend endless succession, but he can find it to be a fact. He cannot know all things, but he can know some things and know that he knows them, and know also that it is possible for him to know other and still other things, being limited only by opportunity. And it is impossible for him to set a limit to his own power to know by any independent volition of his own, as it is impossible for him to know any one thing by reason of any such volitionary power. He knows what is reflected by his mental faculties and he can not know anything else; and hence he can not know that a reality not known is unknowable.

It is common with theological writers of an advanced type to speak of the "how" and the "why" of natural things. They say that science has the "how" to deal with, and religion the "why"—that science has for its object the explanation of the immediate causes of phenomena but that it is left, largely at least, to supernatural revelations to account for the pur-

pose of things. They insist, by inference, that nothing exists except by reason of a pre-existing purpose of something else.

Now it seems much more rational to admit the existence of things, absolutely, unqualifiedly.

Existence itself is before purpose, and requires no apology for its being. Hence there can not have been purposes before a being (a something).

Things are, and with the exception of some of the works of man and of other finite intelligences, if such exist, there is no reason why for their being.

The writer's position is, therefore, that the "how," the modus operandi of things being knowable without limitation, and there being no "why" for natural things (with the above exception), there is no fact in nature but what the intellect of man is competent (the opportunity being given) to know.

If it is claimed that simple existence, or being, is a fact and an unknowable fact, it is perhaps a sufficient reply to say that substance or essence, however conceived of, is known by its properties—its characteristics, and that simple being, in the sense of substance without character, is probably not a fact. This seems so, for how better can we arrive at the idea of complete nonentity than by eliminating from matter all its known properties? It is most evident that to take from matter the one quality of extension is to destroy it; and to take from force the idea of influence exerted is to annihilate force; so that it must be illogical to speak of a supposed thing that is reduced to nonentity in the very effort to conceive of it, as an actuality.

The mind is adapted to know realities, and realities have properties making them objects of knowledge—making them knowable; and hence a thing supposed to be a reality, but found to have no knowable nature, is necessarily discarded by the mind (if the mind is not under duress) as a false conception and as not existing at all as a verity.

The "unknowable" is possibly only another name for unreal.

Knowledge is of, or concerning nature's methods, and nature's methods are all knowable.

To go further than this, and to say that back of and anterior to nature there existed a finitude of purposes in the mind of an infinite personal intelligence, is without reason and without results. It is simply an attempted explanation for what needs no explanation, in that it resolves itself into seeking a reason for existence—an excuse for being, when being must necessarily be (and is, even in this attempt to account for being) accepted as a first truth.—[No "Beginning."