

HOW TO MAKE 1 WHITE FLAG OUT OF 5 U.S. NATIONAL FLAGS

The white stripes of 2 U.S. Flags (C & B) can replace the red stripes and the canton of Flag A and still leave half a white stripe for further use. As every Flag has two sides — obverse and reverse — 2 more Flags are required for the other side, making 5 Flags necessary altogether

PRINCIPLE

while in their 17 victories they suffered 50,900. In the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the total for French casualties in their victories was 36,700 as against 25,700 in their defeats. More impressive is a comparison of casualties in the Napoleonic Wars. Although Napoleon won most of his battles, he paid more for them as far as casualties are concerned than his enemies, losing on average twice the number of men than the armies he defeated.

Once bereft of morality and justice, the victor is vulnerable to all sorts of calamities like corruption, the disillusionment of its young generation, a rapid growth of cultural hypocrisy and so on. Then comes the burden of too many responsibilities. The victor has to take care of his own country as well as that of his opponent. If the burden of ruling one country alone is so heavy as to cause many governments to collapse, the burden of ruling two countries, one of them shattered after a defeat, is not too difficult to imagine. The victor has to take care of his opponent's economic situation, of his police, his army, his industry, his education, his foreign affairs, his transport, his everything. The victor can never say, "Sorry, I have troubles of my own." He is the victor, and victory means responsibility. Victors have no choice but to rule and govern. This opens a vast range of possibilities and opportunities for the vanquished. Horace proved a keen sense of observation when he stated that, "when Greece had been enslaved (by the Romans) she made a slave of her conqueror and introduced the arts into Latium, which was still rough."

The problems of governing a vanquished enemy are complicated since they depend to a great extent on future confrontations and on future enemies. "Throughout the history of war," says Major General J. F. C. Fuller, "it is noticeable how frequently enemies and friends change sides in rotation. Therefore, once you have knocked your enemy out, it is wise to set him on his feet again, because the chances are that you will need his assistance in the next conflict." As the White Flag Principle is not designed to assist the victor, we will not go further into this. We will only point out the difficulties that confront the victors in dealing with their vanquished enemies. The most difficult economic, administrative and sociological

tasks and problems have to be carried out and solved by the victor under unfavorable conditions, while the vanquished are free to fend for themselves.

A typical example of how happy life under foreign rule can be, is shown by the description of Arab life under Crusaders' occupation in the 12th century by Ibn Jubayr:

"We left Tibnin by a road flanked throughout its length by Moslems who lived in great prosperity under the Franks — may Allah preserve us from similar temptation! The conditions imposed on them are the surrender of half their crops at the time of harvest and the payment of a poll-tax of 1dinar 7quirats, as well as a light tax on fruit trees. The Moslems are masters in their own dwellings and order their affairs as they think best. Such is the constitution of the farms and big villages that they inhabit in the Frankish territory. Many Moslems in their hearts wish to settle there when they see the condition of their brethren in districts under Moslem government, for the state of these latter is the very opposite of comfortable. It is unfortunate for the Moslems that, in countries governed by their co-religionists, they have always to complain of the injustices of their rulers, whereas they have nothing but praise for the conduct of the Franks, on whose justice they can always rely."

The balance of corpses was upset once Napoleon started losing, however. In the battle of Leipzig in 1813, when Napoleon was routed, he suffered 50,000 casualties as against 75,000 of his opponents, 7,000 against 9,000 in the battle of Paris (1814) and 4,000 against 7,000 in the battle of Toulouse (1814).

In the battle of Port Arthur in 1905, which opened the bloody wars of the 20th century, the victorious Japanese sustained 71,000 casualties as against the 60,000 of the Russians. At the battle of Verdun in the First World War, the Germans launched a "large scale offensive which began in February 1916. It was marked at first by distinct success, but ultimately resulted in an Allied victory with huge German losses" (*New American Encyclopedia*, 1963). What were these German losses? The same source, but in another entry, gives the losses of the German army as 427,000 against 535,000 of the victorious French. Taking the result of the whole war into account — not just the result of one isolated battle — we find that the total losses in the First World War (1914-1918) were 4,779,900 for the Allies (United States, Britain, France and Italy, plus conscripts from African and Asian colonies), and 2,650,000 for the vanquished Central Powers (Germany and Austria).

Similar results are obtained when we add up losses in the Second World War. These are approximately 14,500,000 for the defeated Axis (Germany, Italy and Japan), and 36,236,276 for the victorious Allies (primarily the U.S., Britain and Russia).

It is not difficult to explain why the vanquished suffer less than the victor. A military disaster may be one of two kinds: a defeat or a surrender. In the case of surrender there is no reason for the vanquished to suffer, since soldiers who surrender are protected by international law and by custom. Soldiers who flee from the battlefield in defeat also have no reason to suffer since they are usually faster than the victors who are pursuing them. Fugitives flee faster because they are less burdened with equipment. They have no booty; even their weapons are often thrown away. The pursuers, on the other hand, have to hold onto their spoils and to their weapons. These heavy burdens make them slower in pursuit. (There is a possibility, however, that the vanquished may be utterly liquidated. This happens only in a certain strategical configuration. If the vanquished do not wish for their troops to be liquidated they can avoid such configurations.)

Victors not only suffer greater casualties on average than the vanquished; they are also more deeply humiliated and degraded. In the 19th century most European generals who were repeatedly defeated by Napoleon managed to remain politically and militarily active and were always able to draft new armies for new wars, but for Napoleon himself, the supreme victor, one defeat was sufficient to send him to Elba, and another (Waterloo in 1815) to end his military and political career in Saint Helena. Generals who lose are often promoted to higher rank. After his defeat by Frederick the Great in 1757, Prince deSoubise was promoted Marshal of France. Victorious generals are often dismissed and degraded, as happened to Belisarius, or in more recent times, to Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding after the Battle of Britain, or to General Douglas MacArthur after his victories in Korea.

A more important question has still to be asked: Is defeat superior to victory not only in war (which is only one kind of human conflict) but in conflicts in general? This is a serious question that was only partly answered in our explanation of the unparadoxical nature of the term "power of submitting." However, the more general aspects of the subject are outside the scope of this discussion.

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WAR PROFITS SHOULD BE TAXED

BY ROBERT LANDAUER

Congress did it in World War 1.
And in World War 2.
Again in the Korean War.
Why not now?

The United States is at war in Iraq, in Afghanistan and globally against terrorism. President Bush confirms the ventures' seriousness by asking Congress for an extra \$87 billion of military- and reconstruction-related funding plus \$41.3 billion for the Department of Homeland Security.

Daily counts of our casualties tell us that the costs are not only economic. The expense will rise because, the President says, U.S. resolve is firm, and we won't quit until the job is done.

It is deeply puzzling in this context why the President asks the nation to sacrifice for the war while allowing so many to profit unduly from it.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed precisely this issue in 1940:

"We are engaged in a great national effort to build up our national defenses to meet any and every potential attack....It is our duty to see that the burden is equitably distributed according to the ability to pay so that a few do not gain from the sacrifices of the many. I therefore recommend to the Congress that the enactment of a steeply graduated excess-profits tax, to be applied to all individuals and all corporate organizations without discrimination."

A long, troubling list of companies, including the firm that Dick Cheney led before resigning to become Bush's Vice Presidential running mate, have been awarded immense no-bid contracts to perform war-related services.

The campaign in Iraq is a two-wave offensive, say some antiwar groups. In their view, first comes the military, then come the corporations. This opinion is harsh, but it contains kernels of truth.

So it is valid to ask — as young Americans are killed and wounded — whether favored businesses should be able to profit limitlessly from the increased spending that wars force government to undertake and the larger debts that taxpayers must support in higher taxes or in reduced services.

Opponents of controls say, not without merit, that the chance to earn large profits is a huge motivator of innovation and entrepreneurship. These have set the United States apart from military and commercial rivals. So why ration or dilute the fuel that drives the national economic engines?

In other U.S. wars, though, a national consensus developed that it is obscene to profiteer—to prosper outrageously, scandalously — on the patriotic sacrifice of others. Cartoonists' caricatures of this type of corporate Croesus changed remarkably little in the century between the Civil War and the Korean War. He was portrayed as a homburg hatted, boutonniere vested, gold pocketwatch flaunting, cane waving, cigar chomping, porcine plutocrat — a self-dealing gouger.

His profits, it was realized, come out of taxpayer's pockets. In three of our nation's 20th century wars, Congress and Presidents agreed that the national emergency did not justify allowing the gougers to pick and strip the public pocket. (We also had a windfall profits tax on oil companies during the early 1980s gasoline shortage.)


Excess profits taxes were enacted. Precedents in the United States and overseas show that the special tax could be applied to the profits that greatly exceed a firm's peacetime earnings or it could be applied to all profits higher than a politically set earnings rate.

During World War 2, the excess profits tax raised about 23% of U.S. government revenue; by the end of World 1, it raised 59% of government revenue.

It is particularly appropriate now — with the Declaration of Independence Road Show visiting the Oregon Historical Society in Portland (in September) — to reflect on a declaration that followed soon after. The U.S. Constitution's Article I, Section 8 states that, "The Congress shall have Power... To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years."

An excess-profits-tax bill should be introduced to the House of Representatives and acted on without delay. No war-related contract should be awarded or extended without provisions indicating that the deal will be subject to any excess-profits ceilings that Congress enacts.

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