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equivalent to gaining the object of policy. But as most of the thinking about war has been by the military profession, there has been a very natural tendency to lose sight of the basic national object, and to identify it with the military aim."

It was natural for the exponent of the indirect approach to recommend an indirect victory. But it was a victory nevertheless. A different opinion altogether, challenging victory itself, was put forward by Professor Anatol Rapoport:

"The victorious wars of Napoleon, the German victories of 1864, 1866 and 1870, and the triumph of Japan over China (1895) and Russia (1905), were only episodes presaging the eventual defeat of France, Germany and Japan. If, then, we extend Clausewitz's dictum that only the outcome of the final war counts in the career of a war-waging state, we must conclude on the basis of historical experience that military prowess is more likely to lead to defeat than to victory."

Rapoport knows more about victory than the most distinguished generals. However, he does not draw any conclusions. He does not make the necessary step of relating victory — as he understands it — to the real aim of war. This missing link in the otherwise logical chain of thought has been provided not by historians, soldiers or politicians, but by persons of letters. "Misery me," cried Bilbo Baggins (*The Hobbit* by J.R.R. Tolkien). "I have heard songs of many battles, and I always understood that defeat may be glorious."

Another writer, Joseph Heller, says it more explicitly (*Catch 22*):

"You put so much stock in winning wars... The real trick lies in losing wars, in knowing which wars can be lost. Italy has been losing wars for centuries, and just see how splendidly we've done nonetheless. France wins wars and is in a continual state of crisis. Germany loses and prospers... Italy won a war in Ethiopia and promptly stumbled into serious trouble. Victory gave us such insane delusions of grandeur that we helped start a world war we hadn't a chance of winning. But now that we are losing again, everything has taken a turn for the better, and we will certainly come up on top again if we succeed in being defeated."

Some have been suspicious of the alleged positive effects of victory. Others have been aware of the superiority of defeat. Nobody, however, has tried to put into practice this unconventional but more realistic approach. When we watch the huge professional armies with their incredible firepower, with their scientists, with their electronic computers and with the synthetic rationalism of their Herman Kahns, this neglect seems almost unbelievable.


If we agree that a military disaster may produce a better postwar situation than victory, then there should be a science of military disasters as there is a science of military victories. Such a science must comprise a theory and practice. The practice should provide the armies with handbooks and textbooks for the Accomplishment of defeats and surrenders. The fact that the big powers of today are powerful enough to make absurd any effort by lesser powers to overcome them in the traditional way makes an alternative to victory the more urgent.

Let us take, for example, a political conflict: the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in 1968. The discrepancy in power between the two forces was so great that the Czechs had to revert to the only stratagem left to them — namely that of surrender. The Czechs were almost experts in the art of submission. They sabotaged the war machine of the Austro-Hungarian empire in the First World War by similar methods; as a result, they won an independent state of Czechoslovakia. While others rebelled, killed and were killed, the Czechs won independence by conforming to every rule and law no matter how stupid and ridiculous. Readers interested in details should read *The Good Soldier Schweik*, by Jaroslav Hasek. Though written as literary fiction, it is a practical (and classic) manual of how to produce military disasters.

The outcome of the Czechs surrendering to the Russian invasion of 1968 was that they were made a better offer than were the Hungarians after their bloody revolt of 1956. Moreover, the Soviet Union with all its might, with all its A & H bombs and with all its intercontinental missiles, had to withdraw its forces with almost no shots fired. Emil Zatopek, the famous Czech sportsman, was quoted in the British press as saying, "The Russians came crashing in here stupidly, with none of the gentle movement of sportsmen. They came with all their armaments and their might, but were defeated by our children with nothing but flags on their chests and the power of their words to unite our people."


Even if the superiority of defeat over victory is accepted, people could still argue that once we grasp the idea, a handbook for defeat is unnecessary because it is easy to lose a war, and that all one has to do in order to be defeated is to handle the war in an inefficient manner. It is easy to show that this is an impractical approach. If "inefficient manner" means the handling of a war not in the way it is taught in the military academies, then we will be surprised to learn how many wars have been won in this way. Colonel Alfred H. Burne, in a textbook for winning wars that is much in use in military institutions around the world, admits that some generals have won battles in spite of transgressing or by ignoring one or more of these "principles of war, while other generals appear to have observed them and yet have suffered defeat." No one can lose a war by handling it inefficiently any more than one can win by handling it efficiently. This is so not because there are no rules in warfare, but because

"And of course, there is no Soviet Union anymore. The Czech state divided in two and prospers, brand new members of the European Union."



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SURRENDER WITH THE HANDS UP

Hands-up surrender does not involve the use of artifacts as does that of White Flag. Artifacts are, in fact, an obstacle to this mode of surrender, which demands the unhindered use of both hands. After the soldier has thrown away his weapons, he stands at ease or walks slowly toward the enemy with both his hands raised in the air with the palms flat open facing the enemy. (No closed fists are allowed in hands-up surrender since they may conceal weapons.) In a proper hands-up posture the arms are bent in a trident-like position, forming two right angles: one at the elbow (between the upper and the forearm) and the other at the armpit (between the upper arm and the trunk). When the enemy is within 15 to 12 feet, the soldier halts and lifts his arms still higher, until the elbows are level with the top of the head. In this position the climax of surrender is reached. Every movement or emotion must be frozen for a minute or two. If nothing happens in this interval, the surrender can be regarded as successfully accomplished.

WHITE FLAG

of two elements in war that cannot be predicted: chance and friction. Friction and chance make perfection in fighting impossible. Wars have been won despite imperfections and even despite grave mistakes. This was recognized long ago by the ancient Greeks. "Many badly planned enterprises," says Thucydides in the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, "have had the luck to be successful because the enemy had shown an even smaller degree of intelligence."

Even if war could — theoretically speaking — be handled properly, there is still a need for a manual like *The White Flag Principle*, for the following reasons:

Let us assume for a moment that by handling a war inefficiently it is possible to lose it. This may have a chance of success if the enemy is stronger than or equal to one's power. If one's enemy is much weaker than oneself, merely pursuing the war in an inefficient manner will not bring about the desired results. The Russians fought the Finns in 1939 in a most inefficient manner and still were unable to lose the war. It may also happen that the enemy, though stronger, had decided to lose. In this case, too, not to handle the war in an "efficient manner" will only achieve victory.

Mere desire to win has never guaranteed victory; so also a desire to lose is not enough to guarantee defeat. For example: it is difficult, almost impossible, to be defeated if one's economy is flourishing. Countries with a strong economy tend to win rather than lose. The same can also be said about a strong and united society or a well-balanced and clever foreign policy. To pave the way for military disaster, one may have to ruin one's own economy, disunite a united society and carry out a bad foreign policy. All of this must be an integral part of *The White Flag Principle*. Even when the war has been eventually lost, some problems still remain unsolved; for example, how to march into captivity, and how to face charges as war criminals — a thing quite likely to happen to the vanquished.

At this point in my introduction to the idea of defeat as the best outcome of a war, a brief explanation must be given for the use of a paradoxical term: the power of submitting.

Though the expression "power of submitting" may sound as if it is contradicting itself, this is not so. It is true though that submission, surrender, defeat, debacle and the like, result from lack of power, or more precisely, from lack of sufficient power. This applies only to situations in which both the opponents fight for victory, each opposing power with power. However, as in judo, it is possible to oppose power with weakness — that is, to use the enemy's strength to put him out of balance. In this sense, the use of a phrase like "power of submitting" is meaningful.

When there is a war between two sides and one of them gives himself up, the victor takes full possession of the loser.

Since justice, pity, sympathy and love always go to the underdog, the victor has, morally at least, lost. He might even be considered the aggressor (if he was not considered so before). The most evil warmonger has sympathy on his side the moment he loses the battle. Justice is a good argument in war and is used by the belligerent as a sort of weapon. However, the moment the battle is over, it is useless to the victor. He looks ridiculous indeed if he tries to add justice and morals to his power. Israel lost a great deal of world sympathy after its formidable victory over the Arabs in 1967, and its moralistic justifications since then for the occupation of Arab territory have sounded ridiculous and self-serving.

The fate of conquered people should be compared with the fate of free people, and especially of free people belonging to powerful and victorious regimes. In *The Secret History*, Procopius describes the fate of the free citizens of Byzantium under their most glorious leader Justinian the Great:

"Without hesitation he (Justinian) issued orders for the seizure of towns, the burning of cities, and the enslavement of entire nations, for no reason at all. So that if one chose to add up all the calamities which have befallen the Romans from the beginning and to weigh them against those for which Justinian was responsible, I feel sure that he would find that a great slaughter of human beings was brought about by this one than took place in all the preceding centuries. As for other people's money, he seized it by stealth without the slightest hesitation; for he did not even think it necessary to put forward any excuse or pretense of justification before taking possession of things to which he had no claim. Yet when he secured the money, he was quite prepared to show his contempt for it by reckless prodigality or to throw it to potential enemies without the slightest need. In short, he kept no money himself and allowed no one else in the world to keep any, as if he were not overcome by avarice. Thus he cheerfully banished wealth from Roman soil and became the creator of nationwide poverty."

Even from a purely military point of view the vanquished are better off than the victors. Guerrilla warfare for example, the only kind of warfare that can challenge the mightiest army, can only be used by the vanquished. It is impossible for a victor to employ guerrilla warfare. This is the most ironical consequence of victory. By being victorious the winner is prevented from using the only kind of warfare that is more powerful than his own. The vanquished are immune not only from guerrilla warfare but also from nuclear weapons. They cannot even be threatened by them. An enemy can be threatened with nuclear weapons as long as he is fighting, but the moment he surrenders or has been defeated he cannot be threatened by anything. Hydrogen bombs and intercontinental missiles become as useless as Stone Age clubs.

There is also the false impression that the vanquished suffer more casualties than the victors. Though this may be true of ancient battles, it is not necessarily true today. In the battle of Chattanooga in 1863, the defeated Confederate general Braxton Bragg had only 3,000 casualties as against 5,815 casualties of the victorious Union army of U. S. Grant. In the five years of the U.S. Civil War, the victorious North had 334,624 killed and dead from wounds or disease, as against 192,345 of the vanquished South. French casualties in their seven defeats in the Great Turkish War of 1683-1699 are summed up as being only 43,000,



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