

felt that to say no to the President right now would mean hot water for them in their districts. They did not want to take the time to explain to their constituents why the President was wrong, why we do not need a first strike weapon, why a country like ours which does not have as its doctrine a surprise nuclear attack needs no first strike weapon. The only country which needs a first strike weapon is an aggressor country that would attempt a sneak attack with strategic nuclear weapons.

If we are not a first strike country, if we are not a sneak attack country, then all we need is survivable retaliatory weapons. If we can get through a message to the mind of the Soviet leader that should he ever try a first strike against us, we have survivable retaliatory weapons that would ride out the attack and would reduce his society to smithereens, that would deter the Soviet leader from attacking in the first place. That is deterrence. But if we develop first strike weapons, what does that say to the Soviet leader? It says, "The United States must be planning a preemptive surprise attack." Then what does he do? He invests in first strike weapons himself. When tensions rise, when a crisis occurs, when a crisis atmosphere gets greater, it is Soviet doctrine to preempt — to use their first strike weapons before we use ours against them. That is the collapse of deterrence. It is a guarantee that all that we are trying to avoid will in fact occur. Why is it that the hardliners, the doctrinaire ideologues in the Pentagon like Weinberger and in the White House like the President of the United States fail to understand that is absolutely beyond me.

It is my job and I hope the job of informed voters and citizens to put pressure on our representatives and senators to stand up to this kind of thinking. Senator Packwood of Oregon caved in to it. Any Oregonian who feels as I do that voting for the MX is a mistake for the reasons I just stated ought to demand to Senator Packwood that when the vote comes up again on the MX, the decisive vote this summer, that he not cave in to the President.

KBS: What kind of access do members of Congress have to Pentagon offense or defense strategy plans? Is that discussed or presented in hearings?

AUCOIN: Sadly, it is not. I am on the defense appropriations committee so I spend more time hearing war fighting plans than I care to think about, but for the average members of Congress who sit on the banking committee, the agriculture committee, the commerce committee, all they can really judge is by the arguments made either by the administration or by those of us on the committee who argue a different case.

I think we've got to appreciate the difficulty those people have. A lot of them consciously want to do the right thing. They don't want to make a mistake when it comes to these life and death questions. There is a natural tendency to believe the administration rather than the Congressional critics of the administration. I think we all understand that. These are handicaps that people like me have in fighting the fight against first strike technology. But the more that people understand about the dangers the better my allies and I will be in stopping the White House in what seems to be its pell mell race towards first strike technology.

KBS: What do you think the perception is of security and what that means among the members of Congress?

AUCOIN: To too great an extent it is a comparison between the United States and the Soviet Union to the point of almost comic proportions. If they have one thousand tanks we have

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got to have one thousand tanks. If they have two hundred thousand men under arms in Europe, we've got to have two hundred thousand men under arms in Europe. If they have one thousand canteens, we've got to have one thousand canteens. Pistol for pistol, helmet for helmet, tank for tank, truck for truck, jeep for jeep. It is monkey see, monkey do. That might be fine, though it is incredibly wasteful when you deal with conventional equipment because their needs are altogether different from ours. We do not have a China border to defend, for instance, and they do. But though it is wasteful with conventional arms and equipment, it is lethal when you are dealing with strategic nuclear arms.

The argument for the MX seems to be that the Soviets have increasing accuracy in their missiles and that they may be able to hit some of our silos and take them out with a surprise attack. Therefore, we should develop land-based missiles that have pinpoint accuracy and can take out their silos. Monkey see, monkey do. No one thinks through the more important questions. The first is that accuracy of that kind is only useful for an aggressor. For a country that is not an aggressor, if it has enough accuracy to destroy the industrial base of its opponent and everything else that makes the society function, it has enough accuracy. To have accuracy that would in addition destroy silos has no value whatsoever. By the time we absorbed a sneak attack the silos we would hit with our pinpoint accurate MX missiles in retaliation would be empty silos because their missiles would already have been used. So what does it gain us to develop pinpoint accuracy? We are not an aggressor, sneak attack nation. The other thing that the whole monkey see, monkey do argument misses, of course, is the danger of building up pinpoint-accurate weapons. It tells the Soviet leaders that maybe we are planning an attack on them. That is the worst sort of message to send the Soviets, paranoid as they are. Their doctrine calls for preemption, to take a preemptive step.

Another thing that this whole kind of thinking misses is that only one-third of the strategic nuclear arsenal that we have is based on land in silos. Two-thirds are either on bombers or in submarines. So if the Soviets ever were crazy enough to use pinpoint accurate weapons to blow up one-third of our arsenal, we would have two-thirds of our arsenal left to retaliate. Now, you never know when the act of a madman might occur, but as long as there is a rational person on the other side such an event is not going to happen. So this whole monkey see, monkey do thing is perposterous. Yet you hear on the floor of the House as we did on the MX debate, "They've got these kind of missiles, so we've got to have these kind of missiles." Well, to that I respond, "What kind of canteens do they have? And what is the number. Does that mean we have the same number of canteens and do they have to be exactly the same? It has just about as much meaning in terms of security and defense.

KBS: So it is not an analysis of the implications of what kinds of missiles we are deploying or of how we negotiate in the first place?

AUCOIN: It is no analysis at all. It is observation and a spasm response, minus any form of analytical thinking.

KBS: Why is there no analysis? Is there an avenue for analysis to be presented or is there none at all?

AUCOIN: There is an avenue, which is debate on the floor and in the committees that have expertise. But we are not a technocracy. We are a democracy, and some members who serve on committees that do not delve into these questions all of the time are called on maybe two or three times a year to make a gut-wrenching decision of this kind. If they have not given it a lot of thought, if their constituents are not extremely well informed to put pressure on them in town meetings or in all the other ways people petition their congressmen, then that member will probably respond with the best of intentions on a basis that seems very sound — If the Russians have this then we have to have that. At a certain level when you are rushed as every member of Congress is, it seems like analysis. But it is not analysis at all. It is an uninformed, un-analytical response.

KBS: From what you are saying the history of SALT I and SALT II and the rules of negotiation and diplomacy had very little to do with the discussion. What percentage would you estimate voted for the MX because it was politically convenient versus those who thought it was the right thing to do?

AUCOIN: It is difficult to read the motives of members of Congress. I think there is a portion that knew better but decided to protect their ends politically. They voted for the MX because they did not want the grief of explaining to their constituents why it is not a good weapon. But we are dealing with life and death weapons. We are dealing with the fate of the planet, of the possibility of both sides acquiring first strike nuclear technology. I think that is an occasion, a circumstance if there ever was one, when members of Congress must take political risks and do what is right.

KBS: Did you have anything to bargain with for your side besides conscience, morals and ideas?


AUCOIN: No. Not a thing other than the intrinsic merit of the argument itself, the merit of our position. The President, on the other hand, had the power of the Presidency, his political popularity as President, the ability to assign ships to certain members' home ports which would mean jobs in construction and maintenance in their districts. I hate to say that there was pork barreling going on, but there was and we lost votes because of it. But I want to say that when you consider all of what I have mentioned — The timing of the thing, the fact that arms talks had just begun; the kinds of arguments the President was able to make; his popularity and mandate from the last election; the pork barrel — We came within six votes of winning with not a single thing on our side except for the fact that the MX is a bad weapon. That means that three people would have given us a victory. It was that close. That means to me that in June or July when we have the next vote — the most decisive vote on this issue, the approval of another forty-eight MX missiles — that we have an excellent chance of winning. Why? Because the arms negotiations will not just have begun. We can consider this weapon outside the false bubble of arms control bargaining chips and concentrate instead on the military merit, the security merit, of the weapon itself. And it has no merit.

KBS: What do you think constituents could do to give you more weight?


AUCOIN: It is up to citizens to show their representatives that the only way they will be safe politically and avoid losing the next elec-

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