

Hatfield says SALT expands arms race

Editor's note: The following statement by U.S. Senator Mark Hatfield represents his response to a recent Eugene Register-Guard editorial discussing his concern over phase 2 of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Believing the senator's remarks represented a perceptive critique of a complex subject, the Emerald obtained permission to reprint them here.

In a recent editorial you noted my objections to the proposed SALT II treaty on the grounds that it did little to control the burgeoning nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. You expressed some sympathy with that view, but concluded that the alternative to SALT II is "no treaty at all" and an unlimited arms race. I wanted to make certain you understand my thinking on this matter.

First, it's essential to understand the quantum growth that has occurred in the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union since the Strategic Arms Limitation talks began a decade ago.

In 1972, when the SALT I treaty was signed, the United States had 4,600 strategic nuclear warheads and the Soviets had some 2,100. Today, both sides have doubled the size of their destructive power. The U.S. has 9,000 hydrogen bombs aimed at Soviet targets; the Soviets have increased their number to 4,000. This does not include tens of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. The United States alone now has explosive power equal to more than 615,000 bombs the size of the one that decimated Hiroshima in a matter of seconds. The

Soviet Union has an arsenal of similar destructive power.

Recent polls show that a vast majority of Americans want to reduce the size of these arsenals. They believe that the SALT II treaty may accomplish that purpose. But the reality is far more ominous. By 1985 (end of SALT II), the U.S. warheads are again projected to increase to some 10,154, plus from between 2,000 and 2,600 cruise missiles. The number of Soviet warheads is expected to increase in the same time to 8,124. Moreover, not just the number of warheads, but the size of each individual bomb is expected to be increased.

The combined destructive power of this explosion in modern weaponry is staggering: perhaps the equivalent of 2 million Hiroshima bombs by 1985. The more than generous warhead limits under the SALT II accord not only allows for this growth in the arms race, but compels the increase on both sides by giving official sanction in the "limitation" of the SALT process.

But as serious as this growth in the number of warheads is major technological advances in weaponry which are altering the nuclear strategic doctrine. Advances are being made by both sides, but those envisioned by U.S. planners in the years ahead are particularly dramatic.

The MX missile, carrying eight to ten warheads of 250 kilotons each to within 600 feet of their target; the air-launched cruise missile, carrying a 200 kiloton warhead to within 100 feet of its target; the advance strategic air-launched missile, a supersonic version of the cruise missile; the Trident II submarine-launched missile, with a range of 6,200 miles, each with a payload of fifteen 150

kiloton warheads, and accuracy to within 600 feet, three times more accurate than the present Poseidon missile; continuing development of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles, which can be launched from virtually any platform and will thus by extremely hard to verify in the years ahead; terminally guided, maneuvering re-entry vehicles (MARV) which would have bull's-eye accuracy; and advances in Soviet submarine tracking and destroying capabilities along with further development of space-war technology.

These advances in nuclear weapons technology are a result of a new, highly dangerous dimension of strategic policy known as "counterforce." The foundation of this policy is that, above and beyond "mutual assured destruction," we need the capacity to fight and win limited nuclear wars. Rather than to increase U.S. security, this new "counterforce" strategy serves to put a more delicate hair trigger on the possibility of nuclear war. Each nation will be under intense pressure during situations of international crisis to pre-empt the other by launching a first strike attack. Again, the SALT II treaty will place no effective limits on these weapons.

Rapid increases in warheads, missile accuracy, space-war technology, plus the move toward a counterforce doctrine on both sides mean that we will be facing seven conspicuously dangerous years even if SALT II is ratified by the Senate. The greatest danger for those concerned about true arms control and a reduction in our dependence on nuclear arsenals is that these technological breakthroughs combined with increased numbers of warheads will outpace our ability to negotiate effective

controls and meaningful arms reductions in the years ahead under SALT III.

The SALT II treaty brings us to a crossroads in the history of mankind's efforts to deal rationally with the power to destroy itself. The great danger in accepting what limited controls exist under the SALT II treaty is that one must also accept what it, by fiat, will sanction in the way of new strategic doctrine and weapons development. It is not my intention to abandon SALT but to encourage the process to meet head-on the enormous challenge that confronts us.

The option is to move directly into SALT III negotiations. This can be accomplished either within or outside of the context of SALT II, but it should be done immediately. It is a mistake to wait until 1985 to begin to take steps toward arms reduction, if indeed we are to assume that such steps will occur. Instead, we should require both governments to begin discussions immediately on mutual comprehensive test ban treaties, stricter limitations on warheads, and other options aimed at slowing the rush toward new technologies and strategic doctrine.

We have approached a point of historical convergence and two paths confront us. One alternative is to continue the illusion of arms control which will ensure a far more dangerous future. The other is to insist that negotiators and officials of both nations be held to far stricter controls over burgeoning nuclear arsenals and changing strategic doctrine. At this crossroads, it is our obligation to choose the path of survival.

Mark O. Hatfield
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

yours

Vic strikes again

Atiyeh the Hun has struck again. This time he proposed 61,000 acres of wilderness in Oregon. This goes to show that Vic is still living in the Dark Ages. 61,000 acres of Wilderness out of an inventoried 3.5

million is ridiculous when you realize that this latter amount is only 20 percent of our national forests and only 5 percent of the total land mass of Oregon. I guess we should congratulate Vic for giving us 1.7 percent of the remaining undeveloped public forest land;

he promised us nothing during the campaign.

This move by our development — oriented Governor is the latest in a series of all-out attacks on our pristine environment. In December, he wanted to abolish the Energy Conservation Board (we changed his

mind). He announced plans to rid the state of boundary commissions (better for his realtor friends). Dr. Kelly Woods, an aging nuclear advocate, was his choice for Director of the Department of Energy (thanks to the Oregon State Senate) and he recently removed two people from the Energy Facilities Siting Council a couple months before their decision on the future of the Pebble Springs nuclear plant (they've been at it for over a year). His office released a report that 20,000 jobs would be lost if 2,4,5-T and Silvex were banned (the report forgot to include the number of jobs that would be created by using alternative methods of brush control).

Vic, when will it all stop? We are proud of Oregon the way it is. As concerned citizens we need to band together to stop this destruction of Oregon before it gets too out of hand. Vic and his band of Republican cohorts need to be driven back to the lab from which they were cloned. We want to keep Oregon Oregon.

Jim Stratton
senior, recreation and parks
management

SUAB remarks

In Sally Hodgkinson's April 4 article ("SUAB failures draw fire"), the following remark was attributed to me: "Lack of leadership from (Gary

McMahon has also contributed to SUAB's problems." This was supposed to refer to "promises the chairer made earlier this year to be a strong and active leader."

What I actually said was that McMahon had stated that the SUAB would be strong and active this year, and that we had not fulfilled that statement — a small but significant difference.

Jess Barton
senior, CSPA

ours



letters policy

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