How 5 Student Groups View Viet Nam
Editor's Note: The five statements
on this page were read by various
political groups on campus at Mon
day’s ASUO Senate Public Affairs
Committee hearing on Viet Nam. The
Senate hearings are being held as ad
vance work for an eventual Senate
position to be made on Viet Nam for
the purpose of instructing delegates
to the National Student Association
national convention. All statements
are printed in full except that of the
Facility-Student Committee to Stop the
War in Viet Nam. That group's state
ment was cut for space reasons with
the agreement of members of the
Committee. The Young Democrats'
statement is not a position on Viet
Nam but rather a statement of dis
agreement on the issue of the Senate
taking stands.
Young
Democrats
At the time of campaigns and elec
tions, ASUO senatorial candidates did
not run for office on a supra-campus
basis. Not one candidate suggested fu
ture foreign policy stands, nor gave ref
erence to the possibility of development
of such stands.
Any policy position on the part of
the ASUO Senate would necessarily favor
the viewpoint of one or more previously
formed campus political organizations.
This, in essence, would ally the ASUO
Senate with a certain group or groups
■in terms of political viewpoint. We feel
that this would be in contradiction to
the present non partisan* construction of
the Senate
In view of the extremely low percent
age of voter turnout (21 per cent), the
University of Oregon Young Democrats
do not feel that the ASUO Senate could
faithfully reflect the views of its entire
eonstituancy, namely, the ASUO, on an
issue of the gravity of the Viet Nam
conflict.
| In brief, the University of Oregon
Young Democrats feel the conflict in Viet
N'am, is not and should not be the con
cern of a non-partisan and quasi-political
organization such as the ASUO Senate
now is. Furthermore, the ultimate source
of campus government, the students of
the ASUO. AT NO TIME authorized the
ASUO Senate to take stands on partisan
issues such as the Viet Nam conflict.
■ This is why the University of Oregon
Young Democrats will not enter a policy
'stand on this matter today.
Students for a
Democratic
In the name of freedom, America is
'mutilating Viet Nam. In the name of
i peace, America turns that fertile coun
i try into a wasteland. And in the name of
: democracy, America is burying its own
i dreams and suffocating its own potential.
Americans who can understand why
the Negroes of Watts can rebel should
’ understand too why Vietnamese can
.rebel. And those who know the Ameri
j can South and the grinding poverty of
(our Northern cities should understand
; that our real problems lie not in Viet
' Nam but at home—that the fight we seek
' is not with Communism but with the
rsocial desperation that makes good men
i violent, both here and abroad,
j The war must be stopped.
Our aim in Viet Nam is the same as
i our aim in the United States: that oli
; garchic rule and privileged power be
! replaced by popular democracy where
the people make the decisions which
J affect their lives and share in the abund
i ance and opportunity that modern tech
i nology makes possible. This is the only
j solution for Viet Nam in which Ameri
cans can find honor and take pride. Per
haps the war has already so embittered
and devastated the Vietnamese that that
! ideal will require years of rebuilding.
1 But the war cannot achieve it, nor can
I American military presence, nor our
support of repressive unrepresentative
governments.
The war must be stopped. There must
be an immediate cease fire and demobi
lization in South Viet Nam. There must
be a withdrawal of American troops.
Political amnesty must be guaranteed.
All agreements must be ratified by the
partisans of the “other side”—the Na
tional Liberation Front and North Viet
Nam.
We must not deceive ourselves: a nego
tiated agreement cannot guarantee de
mocracy. Only the Vietnamese have the
right of nationhood to make their gov
ernment democratic or not, free or not,
neutral or not. It is not America's role
to deny them the chance to be what they
will make of themselves. That chance
grows more remote with every Ameri
can bomb that explodes in a Vietnamese
village.
But our hopes extend not only to Viet
Nam. Our chance is the first in a genera
tion to organize the powerless and the
voiceless at home to confront America
with its racial injustice, its apathy, and
its poverty, and with that same vision
we dream for Viet Nam: a vision of a
society in which all can control their own
destinies.
We are convinced that the only way
to stop this and future wars is to organ
ize a domestic social movement which
challenges the very legitimacy of our for
eign policy; this movement must also
fight to end racism, to end the pater
nalism of our welfare system, to guar
antee decent incomes for all, and to sup
plant the authoritarian control of our
universities with a community of schol
ars.
Republicans
We believe that war is not the proper
way to settle international disputes.
When, however, the very existence of
our friends is imperiled by outright
Communist aggression, we feel it is the
duty of the United States to come to the
aid of the victim, and defeat the aggres
sion with the swiftest and most effective
means at our disposal.
Withdrawal from South Viet Nam
would mean the loss of that nation to
the Communists, for guerrilla victories
have brought Communism to North Viet
Nam and Cuba. Withdrawal would weak
en the ability of the now free people
in Southeast Asia and then the rest of
the world to resist further expansion of
Communism. Withdrawal would indicate
that the United States cannot defend
freedom in Asia and the other nations
where freedom is threatened
South Viet Nam is not negotiable. We
cannot, as the most prominent free world
nation, allow the Communists in Hanoi
and Peking to continue their program
of piecemeal world conquest. It must be
stressed that the Communists are the
aggressors, the United States the de
fenders. Negotiation of South Viet Nam
proper would appear as surrender of
these people to an alien Communist
regime.
We feel that the United Nations can
not solve the Vietnamese question. In
order for the United Nations goal of
collective security to be effective, a sub
stantial consensus of the membership is
essential. It is obvious at this time, es
pecially in light of the position of the
Soviet bloc nations that this consensus
does not exist. Therefore, the most effi
cacious policy alternative for the United
States is continuance in union with South
Viet Nam, Korea, Nationalist China,
Australia, New Zealand, and the Philip
pines of the destruction of the Viet
Cong without meaningless gestures to
ward the involvement of the United
Nations.
We feel that the cessation of bombing
has been militarily advantageous to the
Viet Cong. Since the Viet Cong are de
pendent in large degree on men and
materiel from North Viet Nam, we feel
that the bombing of North Viet Nam
should be resumed immediately and
more strategic targets in the Hanoi
Haiphong indie trial complex should be
selected.
(Continued on page 11)
Faculty-Student Committee
Perhaps contrary to popular opinion,
the FSC includes as active and associate
members approximately 200 persons
whose reasons for opposing the war in
Viet Nam differ greatly and whose atti
tudes regarding the “most appropriate
strategies by which to mobilise opposi
tion to the war also cover a wide range
The only correct way for me to serve as
a fair spokesman for all of these people,
then, is to present to this Senate hearing,
a picture of this diversity of attitudes
and aims, and to indicate my feeling
that it is this diversity itself which is Is
perhaps the most illustrative and elo
quent statement which can be made
about the nature of the war in Viet Nam
as well as the most impressive rationale
for wholeheartedly condemning it.
This war in Viet Nam is not only
complex, but it is complexly evil. Thus
it can be viewed as terribly wrong for
any number of reasons—each of which
has considerable validity and any or all
of which might be concentrated upon by
the FSC and other organizations such as
this one At present, the job of the FSC
is not that of selecting which of these
many possible attitudes against the war
it should adopt as its own, but rather is
that of providing a voice for each At
least a few of the reasons held by mem
bers of the FSC for opposing the war in
Viet Nam, then, are the following:
• There is also the factor of what I
must call 'American Shame” which
others—and 1 believe the majority of
FSC members—cite as their reason for
opposing the war in Viet Nam. These
individuals see that the course of horror
is being willingly and enthusiastically
followed by the United States for reasons
which defy logic. Napalm is being used
by US. soldiers; destruction of rice
crops has recently been undertaken by
the U S. military in this land where rice
is the mainstay of military and also
civilian diet; the bombings both in North
and South Viet Nam have been, accord
ing to U S. military spokesmen, neces
sarily indiscriminant at times—perhaps
at times which are becoming far more
frequent than we would desire. Such
military actions seem to many members
of the FSC to have been undertaken and
expanded by the United States without
legal justification, without sufficient
moral concern, and without respect for
many principles which, within its own
boundaries at least, the United States
has always held sacred—e g. self-deter
mination, freedom from domination by
a foreign power, free elections etc.
Though the U.S. administration has re
peatedly re stated these very principles
as the motives for its actions in Viet
Nam, many members of the FSC look
for actions which are as sincere as these
statements sound.
• Other members of the FSC oppose
the war in Viet Nam for almost purely
‘pragmatic" reasons. That is, they see
the war in Viet Nam as injurious to the
U.S. imago throughout the developed
and underdeveloped world; they see it
as a war in which too many American
lives and dollars are being wasted; and
they feel the war to be totally against
national self-interest.
• Moreover, there are members of the
FSC who object to the war in Viet Nam
for all or many of the previous reasons,
but who also sec it as symptomatic of a
great number of ills which plague U.S.
foreign policy, and who want this for
eign policy to be greatly altered—who
want the basis of that foreign policy
(i.e, that there is operating throughout
the world a monolithic Communist con
spiracy and offensive which needs to be
contained at all costs and by whatever
means required) replaced by a more
realistic point of view, and who want
the government of the United States to
affirm and respect the rights of self
determination in all countries, by all
peoples, regardless of the outcomes of
their decisions and in spite of the fact
that at times their decisions will not be
those desired by this nation. Because
the war in Viet Nam seems to these
members of the FSC to be but one
outcome of a more generally diseased
foreign policy, then, they seek to mobilize
opposition to the war
• In line with this general opposition
to U S. foreign policy, but more specific
to Viet Nam, is the feeling by various
I'SC members that the National Libera
tion Front of South Viet Nam must be
recognized by the U S. government, not
only os the target against which to wage
war. but also as an Important party with
which to open peace negotiations.
Though, on the one hund, President
Johnson has indicated a certain willing
ness to deal with "anyone, anywhere,
anytime," it remains true even in the
latest "peace offensive" that he regards
llo Chi Minli and Hanoi as the real
spokesmen for the NLK, and that he will
not officially deal with the NLK be
cause Ho Chi Minh has repeatedly said
that he cannot in any way serve as
spokesman for the NLF, and because
the NLF seems to be the most powerful,
and perhaps popular, force in South
Viet Nam —and one with which this gov
ernment will have to eventually deal if
it truly wishes to negotiate a just peace
in Viet Nam these members of the FSC
desire specific recognition of the NLF
by the Johnson Administration
• Finally, there are member* of the
FSC who not only want the NLF to tx)
recognized a*, a viable force and spokes
man for the Vietnamese people, but who
are also sympathetic to the aims of the
National Liberation Front, and to other
progressive elements throughout the
world These members are probably few
in number for any variety of reasons,
but they are there.
Some attitudes are much more preva
lent than others and thus have guided
the drawing up of petitions and state
ments issued by the FSC at the teach in
and elsewhere I want to justify iny
presentation of this range of views by
the statement that the FSC is in exist
ence to give members of a minority
opinion a voice in the whole opposition
effort, as much as it is in existence to
lind a 'majority" opinion against the
war. There are already innumerable or
ganizations which exist to give expres
sion to but one of these positions, and
no new organization is necessary in that
line. Thus the FSC and other such groups
have been formed to coalesce these atti
tudes and groups, and to mobilize them
in one large, concerted effort to stop the
war in Viet Nam, and to do so by pre
senting minority as well as majority
opinions Now, with diversity in mind.
I can present the statements which have
previously been drawn up by the Fac
ulty-Student Committee to Stop the War
in Viet Nam with the permission of a
MAJORITY of its members or officials.
Whereas: The l.'nitcd States' military
involvement in Viet Nam is not directed
towards the welfare of the people of
Viet Nam.
And Whereas: We protest American
unilateral intervention in Viet Nam
And Whereas: the United States' gov
ernment is willfully mis representing the
facts concerning the war in Viet Nam
And Whereas: The conception of all
Communism as a unified monolith is a
(Continued on page 11)
Young
Americans
For Freedom
In formulating the position of Young
Americans for freedom wc reviewed
the following facts:
A. The Geneva agreements of 1954
stated that both North and South Viet
Nam were to order and enforce a com
plete end to hostilities, and that neither
zone was to be used as a military base
to resume hostilities or military equip
ment were to be introduced. These ac
cords also called for free elections to
take place not later than 1950. Neither
the United States nor free Viet Nain
was a party to the Geneva treaty, but
had we participated our military assist
ance would still have been justified duo
(Continued on page 11)