A Case for Optimism <| It’s difficult to know how ' •‘to look at this latest Russian sponsored peace offensive. .Some Are telling; us that this 'lime we’re really going to feel some changes hi Red policy, f»cthaps-the end of the Ko rean war and decreasing ten sion in Europe. Others seem to think that the opposite, if anything, will be the case; that it's only another maneu ver designer! to put us in a " t>ad light. The Reds, these (-■^people say, will offer some f*j oposals, but short of any thing we can accept. : So what are we supposed to think? We'd like to believe that something will come out •f this present flurry at" di plomacy. There is a case for thinking it. Louis Fischer, %ere last week to lecture on fvussia. made some remarks which are of special interest *10 w. • Fer one thing, lie said that one of the most dependable "tilings about Russian foreign policy was that it always seemed to be directly related to Soviet .domestic policy. 1'hat is, in the past, a tough domestic line was sure to •'tiave its counterpart in for eign affairs. A slack up at tiome, on the other hand, would also have its “soften ing” counterpart abroad. We have seen signs of an easing up in Russia ... or we think we have. The release of political prisoners, price cuts on some items and a more conciliatory propaganda line, making the West look not quite so evil to Russian people. We don't know the reason for it though, as Fischer sug gested. it could he the out ward manifestation of a fight for power w ithin the Kremlin, perhaps between the army and the secret police. The re cent release of the Soviet doc tors and the arrest of their accusers may have a bearing on the case. Fischer also said, and per haps this has a more direct application to Korea, that the Chinese must realize that they have little to gain by staying in the fight. It’s been to Russia's advantage to keep them fighting, for in that situ ation they are dependent on the USSR for supplies. And. he pointed out. perhaps Stalin had a powerful influence over Chinese Communists —- one' which Malenkov cannot match. It is possible that on Chou En-lai’s recent visit to Moscow—a Moscow minus Stalin—he told the Russions his troops were pulling out, and made it stick. This is, of course, what we’d like to believe. And, on the basis of present develop ments, the prisoner exchange offer and true talk discussion, it would be easy, too easy, for us to convince ourselves that it had happened. Of course, we might be rid ing for a big fall if we did. This hope must be tempered with the reality of Russian aims and our knowledge of their concept of foreign policy —a zigzag affair. But, with all this, there is still good rea son to promote a cautious op timism. Things are looking a little better these days . . . for a change. Not Here, Of Course -jPHOt - 5Tnjr nr £