MERICAH OCCUPATION
OF THE PHILIPPINE!
Historical Record from the Time of the Ca
pitulation of Manila to Admiral Dewey
and the United States Navy.
Ijjr with the Filipinos Has Been Fostered by the Democratic
Allies of Aguinaldo How the Enemies of Our Country
Have Toasted William Jennings Bryan.
ri. I th Dor" Pvt nti Diful A ,4 m! !-: . U
kg "fC III ..us. - - ss- u nuiniiii?iiBiiuii VI 1 11
Affairs of the Islands Law ton's Letter and
Dewey's Denial.
V-ANII-A capitulated to the
Mil United States forces, comtuand-
Ied by Admiral Dewey, on Slay
Un order to become Informed upon
A condition of affairs In the Philip-
1ft President McKlnley, on Jaq. -n.
19, appointed a commission com
Led of President J. i. jw-iiurinitn, i
rnell University; Professor iean,
fcrcester; Charles Detiby, late Mln-
Lr to China; Admiral Dewey nnu
Ineral Otis. The commission uanuon
renort to President Mclviuiey .mn.
1899, and tlie same was transmitted
Congress by the President, leu. 4,
It reads iu part as follows.
he undersigned commissioners ap-
nted by you to investigate affairs in
Philippine Islands ana to report me
tult of their investigations, together
h such recommendations as might in
!r judgment he called for by the con-
Ions which should be found to exist
khese islands, have the honor to sub-
the following preliiniuary statement
ompliance with your request.
he commission next tells briefly how
Conducted the task intrusted to it,
Irlng statements from all classes of
pie in Manna as to the capabilities of
Filipinos for self-government, the
liti and customs of the people, and
It (be establishment of municipal gov
bnrnts in many towns.
Hlstorr of Islands.
'urning to the history of the islands.
i commission attaches little importance
she divers rebellions which had pr-
led that of 1XIII. As to this niove-
llot the commissioners declare that it
In no sense an attempt to win inde
lnre, but solely to obtain relief from
la: 1.1. -i
icrsuir auuse.
o instiiin this statement they quote
n an insurgent proclamation, show-
that what was demanded was the ex
lion of the friars and the restitution
lit people of their lands, with a (li
ra of the episcopal sees between
-.ish and native priests. It was also
landed that the Filipinos have parlia-
itj representation, freedom of the
(, religions toleration, economic an
nj, and laws similar to those of
n. The abolition of the power of
ihment was demanded, with a legal
lity for all persons in Isw and equal
i pay between Spanish and native
ervants.
Treaty with Spanish,
commission declares that these de
li had good ground; that on paper
Spanish system of government was
fable, but In practice every Spanish
rrnor did what he saw fit, and the
deeds of men in the government were
l from Spain by strict press censor-
Allusion is made to the powerful
punan Society, patterned on the Ma
order, and mainly made up of !'
a powerful revolutionary force.
t war begun in 18!H5 was terminated
Im treaty of Blac na-Bate. The Kill
f' wre numerous, but possessed only
t800 small arms. The Spanish felt
'twould require 100,0(10 men to cap
th'ir stronghold, and concluded to
't to the use of money. Certain con
ins were also decided linon. inrliid
Irfprewntitinn of the Filipinos in the
fF" tne Hulinrtatian nt 111 frill-.
. . v. , .,
1 W tfiA itrineitia I miAutinn' IliA
Jd of the rixht of association and of a
press.
Promises Not Kept,
'rnnr (Soneral It irera wn willintf
ly r.'.'XKJ.isa) in Mexican money
!" Aaruiriillrlo and his cabinet anil leuil-
'i's arrived in Hong Koug. It ap-
IB,.
I however, that Pntcrno offered the
ronij .pni.(hsi, fiKMliXM) to be pnid
Aguinaldo arrived at Hong Kong
'" balance when the Kilininna Im.l
up their arms. The arrango-
nol acceptable to the people,
'promise, -fr never carried out.
'1 "buse, began afresh. In Manila
re ilnn o,) men being evrut-
sporadic rising occurred.
f-" tliey ens-eve...! il,i,.. i.b (i...
" of tlie original movement. The
I'lta lacked arms, ammunition and
baly had ended the war, which,
""exception f sn unimportant
n c '". (b". had Wen contined to
"pun's sovereignty in the other
'""yer having been questioned, and
'"'.'glit of independence never huv
'"1 entertained.
nil Aiiln.l,lA
report then tell, how (Sen. Augus
m to Manila as governor reneral
Junetilr, ,n,i w,r brok. ,().
BPin and the United States. Au-
'? "Hgllt to seen re file mnnnrt nf
'-Pino, to defend Spain against
e-rommnf them autonomy, but
yno did sot trust him.
I,,?"! hr Ut ot MT nd ht de
2 ot Spanl.h fleet by Dewey,
J""l,inf losa of preatige to
. Jtien In Jua Agulnaldo came.
" l0lnt the ..!..:
m fan "7'
svaaeraDaaai a ttia
subject has been furnished the commis
sion by Admiral Dewey:
" 'On April 24, lH'M. the following ci
pher dispatch was received at Hong
Kong from E. Spencer Pratt, I'nited
States ci.nsul general at Singapore:
" 'Aguinaldo. insurgent leader, here.
Will couie Hong Kong, arrange with
commodore for general co-operation in
surgents Manila if desired. Telegraph."
'"On the same day Commodore Dewey
telegraphed Mr. Pratt, 'Tell Aguinaldo
come soon as possible.' the necessity for
haste being due to the fact that the
squadron had been notified by the Hcng
Koug t loverniiient to leave those wafers
by the following day. The squadron left
Hong Kong on the morning of the ITith,
and Mirs Kay on the I'Tth. Aguinaldo
did not leave Singapore until the Utith,
and so did not arrive in Hong Koug
in time to have a conference with the
admiral.
"It had been reposted to the commo
dore as early as March 1, by the United
States consul at Manila and others thHt
the Filipinos had broken out into insur
rection against the Spanish authority in
the vicinity of Manila, and on March ,'!0
Mr. Williams had telegraphed: 'Fire
thousand rebels armed in camp uear city.
Loyal to us in case of war.'
No Alliance Made.
"Upon the arrival of the squadron at
Manila it was found that there was no
insurrection to speak of, and it was ac
cordingly decided to allow Aguinaldo to
come to Cavite on hoard the McCulloch.
He arrived with thirteen of his staff on
May 1!), and immediately came on board
the Olympia to call on the commander-in-chief,
after which he was allowed to
land at Cavite and organize an army.
"This was done with the purpose of
strengthening the United States forces
and weakening those of the enemy. No
alliance of any kind was entered into
with Aguinaldo, nor was any promise of
independence made to him, then or at
any other time."
The commission's report then rapidly
sketches events now historical. It tells
in substance how the Filipinos attacked
the Spanish and how tien. Anderson ar
rived, and Aguinaldo, at his request, re
moved from Cavite to Bacoor. Says the
commission:
Now for the first time rose the idea of
national independence. Aguinaldo issued
a proclamation in which he took the re
sponsibility of promising it to his people
on behalf of the American Government,
although he admitted freely in private
conversation with members of his cubinct
that neither Admiral Dewey nor any oth
er American had made him any such
promise.
Growth of Friction.
The report states that Aguinaldo
wished to attack the Americans when
they landed at Paranaque, but was de
terred by lack of arms and ammunition
From that point on there was a growing
friction between the Filipinos aDd the
American troops.
"There were no conferences," says the
report, "between the officers of the Fill
pinos ana our officers with a view to
operating against the Spaniards, nor was
there co-operation of any kind. '
There never was any preconcerted opera
tion or sny combined movement by the
I mted States and rilipinoa against the
Spaniards."
lEeference is made to Aguinaldo's de
mand that be be allowed to loot Manila
and take the arms of the Spaniards. The
latter demand is said to confirm the St s le
nient thst he intended to get possession
of the arms to attack the Americans.
Waiting for Pretext.
Further evidence of the hostile inlen
tions of the Filipinos was found in the
organisation of "popular clubs," which
later on furnished a local militia to at
tack toe Americans. The decrees of the
Filipino congress are also cited, as well
as the making of bolos (knives) in every
shop in Manila.
I'l is shown that a considerable element
in the Filipino congress wished to address
to President McKinlcy a request not to
abandon the Filipinos, (At this stage the
Paris conference was discussing the fu
ture of the Philippines.) The President
was also to he asked his desiie as to the
form of government he wished to estab
lish. But all this time Aguinaldo was
preparing f ir war and delaying these
messages, ami it was understood (lint tlie
attack would come upon the first a- by
the American forces, which would afford
a pretext.
Kitiplno Ilea In War.
A brief chapter then tells of the lack
of success attending the effort made at
this time by ticii. Merritt, through a com
mission, to arrive ot a mutual under
standing with Aguinaldo as to the inten
tions, purposes and desires of the Filipino
people. This brings the story up to the
outbreak on the evening of the 4th of
February, with the attack upon the
American troops, following the action of
the Nebraskan sentinel. The commis
sion. In concluding this chapter, aays:
"After the landing of our troops Agul-
BaMa made ap his m'nd that It would bo
Decenary to fisht the Americans, sad
after the niakiug of the treaty of peace
at Pari, this determination was tiri-ugth-ened.
He C.d uot openly declare that he
intended to fiirht the Americans, but he
excited everybody, and especijlly the mil
itary men. by claiming index'iulence, and
it is doubtful wheihrr he had the power
to ihet k or eon'rol the aruij ut the time
hostilities broke out.
.No Alternative I.rft.
"Deplorable as war is. the oue In which
we are now eugaged was una voidable
by us. We were attacked by a bold, ad
venturous and euthusiastic army. No
alternative was left to us, except igm
minions retreat. It i not to be conceived
of that any American would have sanc
tioned the surrender of Manila to I be
insurgents. Our obligations to other na
tions, to tbe friendly Filipinos and to
ourselves and our dag demanded that
force should be met by force.
"Whatever the future of the Philip
pines may be, there is no course open to
us now except the prosecution of the war
until the' insurgents are reduced to sub
mission. The commission is of the opin
ion that there has been no time since the
destruction of the Spanish squadron by
Admiral Dewey when it was possible to
Irithdraw our fon from the islands
either with honor to ourselves or with
safety to the inhabitants."
Helun of Terror.
The commissioners then take np 'the
condition of the country at the time of
their arrival, comparing it with condi
tions existing when they left a slurt time
ago. A vivid picture is given of the an
archy exisiim- unions the inhabitants iu
and about Manim (iiuing the early
spring.
"The situation in the city." says the
commission, "was bad. Incendiary tires
occurred daily. The streets were almost
deserted. Half of the native population
had fled and most of the remainder were
shut in their bouses. Business was at a
standstill. Insurgent I mops everywhere
faced our lines, and the sound of rille lire
was frequently audible in our house. A
reign of terror prevailed. Filipinos who
had favored Auiericuns feared assassina
tion, and few had the courage to come
out openly for us. Fortunately there
were among this number some of the best
men of the city."
Kcstorinit Public Confidence.
The report then speaks of the issu
ance of the commission's proclamation
and the good effects it had on public sen
timent. The natives, accustomed to Span
ish promises, urged upon the commission
that acts instead of promises should be
given them. As n result native law courts
were established and this greatly aided
in the restoration of public confidence.
The flow of population soou began to set
toward the city. Natives who had fled
from their homes returned.
As showing the limited scope of the
rebellion the commission states:
"We learned that the strong ami-American
feeling was confined to the Tagulo
provinces, namely, Manila, Cavite, I.a
guua, Hatangas, Morong, Kulacaii,
Nueva Kcija, Principe, Infanta and Zam
bales. It was strongest in the first six
named, and hardly existed iu the last
four.
Hevolt Not Popular.
"The populution of these provinces Is
estimated to be about l,riOO,0)0. but it
should not be supposed that even in the
six provinces immediately adjacent to
Manila the people were united in their
opposition to us. 10 veil here there was
a strong conservative element, consisting
of people of wealth and intelligence, op
posed to the war."
Under the head, "The Rebellion not a
National Movement," the report treats
of the rebellion outside of the provinces
of Luzon, where, it is stated, the upris
ing was viewed at first with indifference
and later with feur. Throughout the
archipelago at large there was trouble
only at those points to which armed Ta
galos bad been sent in considerable num
bers. Ask American Help,
The machinery of insurgent "govern
ment served only for plundering the
people under tne pretext or levying war
contributions, while many of the insur
gent olllcials were rapidly accumulating
wealth." It is stated that the insurgent
administration throughout the interior
was worse than in the days of Spanish
misrule. In many provinces there was
absolute anarchy, and from all sides came
petitions for protection and help.
In speaking of (Jen. MacArthur'a
movement northward the report tells of
the Insurgent method of intimidating the
natives by telling I hem fearful tales con
cerning the American soldiers. This
method of procedure, eminently success
ful at first, in the end recoiled ou its au
thors. Troops Hrlnit Peace.
As to the state of affairs when the
commission left the report says:
"Before the commission left the Philip
pines nearly all tbe inhabitants bad re
turned to those ruined villages. Many
of the houses had been rebuilt. Fields
that had lain fallow for three years were
green with growing crops. X.uiiicipal
governments were established, and the
people, protected by our troops, were en
joying peace, security and a degree o(
participation in their own government
previously unknown in the history of the
Philippines. Attempts of the iusurgenis
to raise recruits and money in the prov
ince of I'lilacan were proving abortive,
except when backed by bayonets and bul
lets, ami even in such caf-es the natives
were applying to us for help to resit
them."
The chapler devoted to "F.stsMlshmcnt
of Municipal (iovernnietits" gives in de
tail tlie efforts in that directii n. There
were ninny di lllcull ies encountered. Tlie
condition of I he people was found to be '
must pitiable. They had been lun.!c r. d
by the insurgent troops, w ho had robin -I
them of jewels, money, ch thiog and even
fond, so that, they were liicr!y st,n vin.
Peaceful citizens hsd been fired on. Wom
en had been maltreated.
Plan tit tiovrrninrnt.
There was generrl satisfaction that the
Americans had come at last, and condi
tions seemed favorable for an American
propaganda. The tonna of Bacoor and
Inius were selected for the purpose of
experiment, and frer talks with the
local "head men" a local form of govern
ment was established. i-'ncniiragd by
the resuit, the work was contlii'ied at
J'aranaque ami i.as i mas, wnu similar i
good results.
Ai the request or (ten. I. aw ton, who
had been assigned to this work by (Jen.
Otis, the commission prepared a simple
scheme of municipal government, sinili.t
enough to tbe old system to rs readily
comprehensible to tbe aatitea, bat giving
them liberties which they Bad never fea
fore er.jojed. This scheme aa adopted
aud gave general satisfaction.
In every instance enthusiasm ran high
before tue commissioners took their de
parture, and cheers were raised for tleu
Law ton and fur the country which be
repryseuied.
tH'vare Gftod Rraultw.
With a single exception the onViala
elected proved worthy of the trust impos
ed in them, and conditions very rapidly
improved in the newly orgauiicd towns,
tioveruiueuts were organized with more
satisfactory results in Pandacan. Santa
Ana, San Felipe, Meri, San Pedro and
M i. hei. while a slightly different system
was put into effect in Malalsin. Polo,
Ohando, Meycanya, Vang and Malolos,
The commission states that a large
amount of supervision over the affairs of
our new municipalities proved necessary
as the officials were timid and slow to
comprehend their new duties. At many
of the elections the voters went about
"asking who they were expected to vote
for, aud it was only with great diiU
cuity that they were persuaded to exer
cise the right of free suffrage.
8rhoola for Manila.
The commissioners sum up the situs
tion at tbe time ot their departure aa
follows:
"When we left Manila a large volume
of business was being done, and the
streets were so crowded as to be hardly
safe. The native population was quiet
and orderly and all fear of an uprising
had long since passed. An efficient corj
of native policemen was on duty.
system of fublic schools in which Knglish
was taught bad been advocated by the
commission and established by (ien. Otis
Some G.OOO scholars were in attendance.
"In the Taealo provinces of Luzon
where the anti-American feeling had been
strongest, public sentiment had greatly
changed, as evidenced by the fact that
the military governor of Bntangas had
offered to snrreuder his troops and his
province if we would only send a small
force there. The Bicols, in southern Ln
zon. had risen against their Tagalo mas'
ters. The Macabebes were clamoring for
an opportunity to fight in our ranks, and
native soldiers and scouts were already
serving under (.en. Law ton.
Krhelllon Dying; Ont.
"Stories of the corruption of insurgent
onlcers were becoming daily more com
mon. and the disintegration of the ene
my's forces was steadily progressing. The
hope of assistance from outside sources
seemed to be all that held them togeth
er.
Having given so much attention to the
Island of Luzon, the commission then
takes np in detail the conditions in the
other islands. On this point it is stated
that the rebellion is essentially Tagalo,
and when it ends in Luzon it muat end
throughout the archipelago. The situa
tion elsewhere than iu Luzon is summed
up as follows:
"The only island, apart from Luzon
where serious trouble threatens, is Pa
nsy, to which a considerable force of Ta
galo soldiers was sent before the out
break of hostilities. Many of the Visay
ans of this island are opposed to the Ta
gs los, however, and it is not believed
that the latter can make a formidable
resistance.
Oppose the Taatalns.
"In Saiiinr, Leyte and Masbate the Ta
galo invaders are numerically few and
are disliked by the natives of these isl
ands, whom they have oppressed. We
were assured that -1K1 men would suffice
to restore order in Mindoro. Kobol was
asking for troops. The Calamianes isl
sudors had sent word that they would
welcome us. There can be no resistance
iu Palawan. ' Satisfactory relations had
already been established with the war
like Moros, whose sultan had previously
been conciliated by a member of the com
mission, and in Mindanao this tribe had
even taken up our cause and attacked
the insurgents, of whom there are very
few in the island.
"In (Vbii we have only to reckon with
the lawless element, which has never
been very formidable there."
Special attention is given to the Island
nf Negros, as this seemed a field well
adapted to the extension of an American
system. Here the natives have adopted
a local form of government, including a
congress, and had raised the American
flag. They believed themselves capable
of managing their own affairs snd asked
for a battalion of troops to hold in cheek
a mountainous hand of fanatics. The
battalion was furnished, hut the people
proved unable to carry out their program
owing n ill feeling among their ow n offi
cials. The Americans remained popular.
Need American Pule.
At the request of (Sen. Otis a new snd
simplified scheme of government for the
island, giving the people a Urge voice in
their a Tail's, but placing an American in
full control, was put into operation. It
brought about satisfaction, and public or
der is better in the island to-day than at
any time during the last twenty years.
Summarising the failure of the native
form of government and the success of
the American control, the commission
says:
"The flat failhre of this attempt to es
tablish an independent native government
in Negros, conducted as it was under the
most favorable circumstances, makes it
apparent that here, as w-i as Iu the less
favored provinces, a larse amount of
American control is at present absolutely
es-eiitial to a successful administration
of public affairs."
KrTorta for Pence.
The efforts at conci'ia'ian with Agui
naldo and his various commission are
set forth in detail. These commissioner
were assureil of the bench. 'cut purposes
nf the United States ami the President's
readiness to g-ant tlie Filipino people as
targe a measure of home rule and as
ninple liberty ai n"iti'iil with the end
of government, "iljct eniy to the ror
ognilion of the .nvt.-ilmi'y of the United
States -a poii.t hting established.
I he commission iuvsi'ittj.y refused even to
(lis, MISS.
The commission add that nothing came
nf ncg.it i n ions, as Agi'.i'.al lo's emissai ies
were without power, and merely came,
and came again, for iu'ormation. Courte
ous re-'eptiou was accorded to the insur
gent commissions, and earnest appeals
mad to stop further hlnidshcd. all wit
nessing "the spirit of patient eon 'illation"
exhibited bv the Ameiican commiieinn In
endeavoring to reach an amicable adjust
ment with the insurgents, as well as the
obduracy of Aguinaldo.
On Kelf-tinyernment.
The report sums up the result of these
fruitless exchanges as follows:
"No better proof could be furnished
that the primary object of his struggle is
not, as la pretended, the liberty of ihe
Filipino peoples, bnt the eontlnnanee ef
his own arbitrary aud despotic power.
In any event, the American people may
feel routideut that no effort was omitted
by the commission to secure a peaceful
end of the struggle, but the opportuni
ties they offered aud urged were all neg
lected, if not, indeed, spurned."
The chapter devoted to "Capacity f.r
Self iSoverumeut" is the result, the re
port states, of diligent inquiry for sev
eral months, iu tbe course of which a
great number of wituesse were exam
ined, of all shades of political thought
and varieties ot occupation, tril aud lo
cality. Tribes, Not a Nation.
Tbe most striking and perhaps the most
significant fact in the entire situation is
the multiplicity of tribes inhabiting the
archipelago, the diversity of their lan
guage (which are mutually unintelligi
ble! and the multifarious phases of civ
ilization ranging all the way from the
highest to tbe lowest. Aa to this the
report says:
"The Filipinos are not a nation, bnt
a variegated assemblage of different
tribes and peoples, and their loyalty is
still of the tribal type."
Converning their intellectual capacities
the commission aays:
"Aa to the general intellectual capaci
ties of the Filipinos the commission la dia
posed to rate them high. But excepting
in a limited number of persons these ca
pacities have not been developed by edu
cation or experience. The masses of the
people are uneducated.
Need of Kducatlon.
"Thst Intelligent public opinion on
w hich popular government resta does not
exist in the Philippines. And it cannot
exist nntil education ha elevated the
masses, broadened their Intellectual hori
zon and disciplined their faculty of judg
ment. And even then the power of self
government cannot be assumed without
considerable previous training and experi
ence under the guidauce and tutelage of
an enlightened aud liberal foreign power.
For the bald fact is that the Filipinos
have never had any experience in govern
ing themselves."
The report shows that this inability for
self-government is due to the old Span
ish regime, which gave the Filipinos lit
tle or no part in governing themselves.
After reviewing this Spanish system the
commission sums up on this point:
"This is all the training in self-government
which the inhabitants of the Phil
ippine Islands have enjoyed. Their lack
of education and political experience,
combined with their racial and linguistic
diversities, disqualify them, in spite of
their mental gifts and domestic virtues,
to undertake the task of governing the
archipelago at the present time. Tbe
most that ran be expected of them is to
co-operate with the Americans in the
administration of general affairs, from
Manila a center, and to undertake,
subject to American control or guidance
(as may be found necessary), the admin
istration of provincial and municipal af
fairs. Muat Retain Rule.
"Fortunately, there are educated Fili
pinos, though they do not constitute a
large proportion of the entire population,
and their support and servlcea will be of
incalculable value in Inaugurating and
maintaining the new government. As ed
ucation advances and experience ripens,
the natives may be intrusted with a larg
er and more independent share of govern
ment, self-government, as the American
ideal, being constantly kept in view as
the goal. In this way American sover
eignty over the archipelago will prove a
great political boon to the people.
"Should our power by any fatality be
withdrawn the commission believes that
the government of the Philippines would
speedily lapse into anarchy, which would
excuse, if it did not necessitate, the in
tervention of other powers and the even
tual division of the islands among them.
"Only through American occupation,
therefore. Is the idea of a free, self -gov
erning and united Philippine common
wealth at all conceivable. And the in
dispensable need from the Filipino point
of view of maintaining American sover
eignty over the archielago is recognized
by nil intelligent Filipinos and even by
those insurgents who desire an American
protectorate. The latter, it is true, would
take the reveunes and leave us the re
sponsibilities. Nevertheless they recog
nize the indubitable fact that the Fili
pinos cannot stand alone.
I hus the welfare of the Filipinos co
incides with the dictates of national hon
or in forbidding our abandonment of the
archipelago. We cannot from any point
of view escape the responsibilities of gov
eminent which our sovereignty entails.
anil the commission is strongly persuaded
that the performance of our national duty
will prove the greatest blessing to the
peoples of the Philippine Islands."
Pralae for Trmps
One of the closing chapters of the re
port is devoted to a tribute to "our sol
diers snd sailors in the war." The com
mission says that the presence of Admiral
Dewey as a member of this body makes
it untitling to dwell on his personal
achievements, but he joins in the eulogy
of his isjuirailes. The commissioners wit
nessed some of the many brave deeds of
our soldiers, and they declare that ail that
skill, courage and a patient endurance
can do has been done in the Philippines.
They dismiss the rcjMirts of Ihe dese
crating of churches, the murdering of
prisoners and the committing of unmen
tionable crimes, and say they are glad to
express the belief that a war wms never
more humanely conducted, adding:
'If churches were occupied it was only
aa a military necessity, ami frequently
their use as forts by the iu-nindna bail
made It necessary to train our artillery
upon them.
Hrlaht Trade Future.
Prisoners were taken whenever oppor
tunity offered, often only to be set at
lineity alter iie,in uisnrmeu tci re.t p i
to the time of our departure, although i
numerous spies had been captured, not a i
sincle r ilipiuo had been execute, . Such
wrongs as w-ere casually committed
against the natives were likely to be
bruught to our attention, and in every
rase thst we investigated we found a
w illintftiess on the parr of those in amhor
ity to administer prompt justice."
The commissioners jfive a general view
of the value of the islands, their richncs
in agricultural and forest pioducis. their
mineral wealth and tbeir commanding
geographical position. They sla'e that
the Philippine Islands should soon he
roine one of the great trade centers of
the East. Manila is already connected
bv new steamship lines with Austrsiia,
India and Japan, and she will become
the mutual terminus of maay other lines
when a ship canal connects tbe Allaai.o
with the Faclfle. Tt cannot bo donntH
that commerce will greatly increase, auj
the Uuitrd States will obUiu a Ur.s
share iu this trestuo i.t.
lUnrbt to Islands.
Manils, with Ihe immunity which it ha
thus far eujcyid from thai terrible pest,
the hub.ii.ic plague. tio'.:M Weenie a di
Ir.butiug renter for China. Slam, tb
Straits Settlements, Touquiu, Auuaiu uJ
Australia.
The report concludes:
"Our control mean to the inhabitant
nf the Philippine internal cace and or
der, a guarautee against foreign aggres
sion and aga.ust the dismemberment of
their country, commercial aud industrial
prosperity and as large a share of tb
affairs of government as they shall provo
tit to take. When peace and prosperity
shall have been established throughout
the rchis-!ago, when education shall
have Wcome general, thcu. in the lan
guage of a leading Filipino, bia people
will, under our guidauce. 'Wcome tuun
American than the Americana them
selves.' "
Dewey Heard From.
On May 20. 181S, Admiral Dewey ca
bled to the Navy Department:
"Aguinaldo, the rcWI commander in
chief, was brought dowu by the McCul
loch. Organising force near Cavite, aud
may render assistance which w ill bo val
uable." On May 20 the Secretary of the Navy
telegraphed to Admiral Dewey a fol
lows: "It is desirable, as far as possible, and
consistent for your success aud aafety,
not to have political alliances with the
insurgents or any faction in the islands
that would incur liability to niaiutain
their cause in the future."
To this telegram Dewey replied:
"Ileceipt of telegram of May 2d 1 ac
knowledged, and I thank the department
for the expression of confidence.. Have
acted according to the spirit of depart
ment's instructions therein from the be
ginning, and I have entered into no alli
ance with the insurgents or with any fac
tion. This squadron cau reduce the de
fenses ot Manila at any mouient, but it
ia considered useless until the arrival of
sufficient Uuited State force to retain
possession."
Astulnaldo Conspires-
As soon as Aguinaldo discovered ho
was to have no assistance from the Unit
ed States he commenced to conspire
against our forces there, intending to
overthrow the authority of this (Jovero
nient in the islands.
Dewey's Ptrona; Denial.
In a pamphlet afterwards published
by Aguinaldo, entitled "The True Version
of the Philippine Revolution," he charged
that Admiral Dewey had assured him
that the United States would recognize
the independence of tbe Filipinos. When
this was published, the admiral wrote the
following letter to Senator Lodge:
"Dear Senator lsdge; The statement ot
Kmilio Aguinaldo, recently published in
the Springfield Republican, so far as it
relates to me is a tissue of falsehood. I
never promised him, directly or indirect
ly, independence for the Filipinos. I
never treated him as an ally, except
far as to make use of him and his sol
diers to assist me in my uperatioua
against the Spaniards. He never uttered
the word 'independence' iu any conver
aatiou with me or my officers. The state
ment that r received him with military
honors, or sainted the Filipino flag, is ab
solutely false. Sincerely vours,
"(SKOItliK DKWEY."
As-itinalflo Organizes Revolution.
On May 24 Aguinaldo issued thieo
proclamations, one containing decrees a
to the treatment of the Spanish enemy,
another announcing the establishment of
a dictatorial government with himself a
dictator, and the third containing further
decrees concerning military operations.
In the following .Inly be organized a
revolutionary government with himself
ns President. During ihat month the
several detachments of the I'nited State
Hi-niy arrived at Manila, ami on July 25
(Sen. Merritt took command, and Ad
miral Dewey sent the follow ing dispatch!
"Merritt arrived yesterday iu the New
port. The remainder of the expedition ia
expected within the next few days. Sit
uation is most critical at Manila. Tho
Spanish may surrender a I any moment.
Merritt' most difficult problem will bo
how to deal with insurgents under Agui
naldo, who lias become aggressive and
even threatening towniil our army."
Hostilities Regiin tiy Aguinahlo.
On Aug. 1,' Manila was captured, and
of this and subsequent events tbe Philip
pine commission, composed of Admiral
Dewey. (Sen. Otis, President Schiirtnan,
Prof. Worcester and (Sen. Denhy. aays:
"When the city of Manila was taken on
Aug. I.t. the Filipino took no part in the
attack, hut came follow ing iu with a view
of looting the city und were only prevent
ed from doing so hi our fons-s preventing
them from entering AKiiinalibi claimed
Ihat he had Ihe right to occupy Ihe city;
he demanded of (Sen. Merrill the palace
of Malacanan for himseif and ihe cession
of all the churches of Manila, also that
a part of the money taken from the Span
iards as spoils of war s)u,ni be jfiveu up,
and above all ihat he should be wivt-li tho
arms of the Spanish prisoners. This con
firms the statement already made that
he intended to get possession of these
arms for the purpose of attacking us. All
these demands were refused. After ihe
tal.ing of Manila Ihe feeling between the
Americans and tlie insurgents grew wotso
day by day. Aguinaldo removed
his seat of government to Malolos, w hero
the so-called Filipino cong es assembled.
Filipino Prepared for War.
On Ihe 21t of September a significant
decree passed the Filipino coiik'res im
posing military service on every male
over IM years of age, eiiept those holding
government positions. In every carriage;
fai toiy sod hlai ksinitti shop iu Manila
bi-los ikllivesi were being untile.
i.in.-.r signals new multiplied. Aitui
n.i I I . endeavored to icet the war making
: power transrerreii from congress to hiin-
self. :i ii I also urjeil a heavy bond issue
I lo secure one million dollars for the pur
j chase of arms and ammunition. a
j It is now known Ihat elaborate plans h id
I been l erfecied for a simultaneous ana, It
j by tlie force within and without Manila
I Persistent attacks weie made to
I provoke our soldiers to tire. The insur
j gents were insolent to our guaids ami
made persistent snd continuous effoi i
to push them back and advance the in
surgent I. ties further into tbe city of M -Hi
la.
To Attack American,
I'arly in January, Ist'.ltl. Aguiualdo hail
his plan perfected so as to be ready to
commence hostilities against the Allifil
csn forces.
The following order, which baa aerer