MERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

istorical Record from the Time of the Canitulation of Manila to Admiral Dewey and the United States Navy.

ar with the Filipinos Has Been Fostered by the Democratic Allies of Aguinaldo-How the Enemies of Our Country Have Toasted William Jennings Bryan.

"Fire in the Rear" Prevents a Peaceful Administration of the Affairs of the Islands-Lawton's Letter and Dewey's Denial.

'On April 24, 1898, the following ci-

'Agninaldo, insurgent leader, here.

Will come Hong Kong, arrange with

"On the same day Commodore Dewey

telegraphed Mr. Pratt, 'Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible,' the necessity for

haste being due to the fact that the

squadron had been notified by the Houg

Kong Government to leave those waters

by the following day. The squadron left

Hong Kong on the morning of the 25th, and Mirs Bay on the 27th. Aguinaldo did not leave Singapore until the 26th.

and so did not arrive in Hong Kong

in time to have a conference with the

"It had been reported to the commo

dore as early as March 1, by the United States consul at Manila and others that

the Filipinos had broken out into insur-

rection against the Spanish authority in

thousand rebels armed in camp near city.

No Alliance Made.

Manila it was found that there was no insurrection to speak of, and it was ac-

cordingly decided to allow Aguinaldo to

come to Cavite on board the McCulloch,

He arrived with thirteen of his staff on

May 19, and immediately came on board

the Olympia to call on the commander-in-chief, after which he was allowed to

"This was done with the purpose of

strengthening the United States forces

alliance of any kind was entered into

with Agninaldo, nor was any promise of

independence made to him, then or at

The commission's report then rapidly

sketches events now historical. It tells

in substance how the Filipinos attacked the Spanish and how Gen. Anderson ar-

rived, and Aguinaldo, at his request, re-

national independence. Aguinaldo issued

a proclamation in which he took the re-

sponsibility of promising it to his people

on behalf of the American Government,

although he admitted freely in private

conversation with members of his cabinet

that neither Admiral Dewey nor any oth-

er American had made him any such

The report states that Aguinaldo

wished to attack the Americans when

they landed at Paranaque, but was de-

terred by lack of arms and ammunition

From that point on there was a growing

friction between the Filipinos and the

"There were no conferences" says the

report, "between the officers of the Fili-

pinos and our officers with a view to

operating against the Spaniards, nor was there co-operation of any kind. * * *

There never was any preconcerted opera-

tion or any combined movement by the

United States and Filipinos against the

Reference is made to Aguinaldo's de-

mand that he be allowed to loot Manila

and take the arms of the Spaniards. The

latter demand is said to confirm the state

of the arms to attack the Americans.

ment that he intended to get possession

Waiting for Pretext.

Further evidence of the hostile inten

tions of the Filipinos was found in the

organization of "popular clubs," which

ater on furnished a local militia to at

tack the Americans. The decrees of the

Filipino congress are also cited, as well as the making of bolos (knives) in every

It is shown that a considerable element

in the Filipino congress wished to address

o President McKiniey a request not to

abandon the Pilipinos. (At this stage the

Paris conference was discussing the fu-

ture of the Philippines,) The President

was also to be asked his desire as to the

form of government he wished to estab

messages, and it was understood that the

attack would come upon the first act his

But all this time Aguinalda was oreparing for war and delaying these

Growth of Friction.

'Now for the first time rose the idea of

land at Cavite and organize an army.

and weakening those of the enemy.

any other time."

commission:

American troops.

Spaniards."

shop in Manila.

Halt.

"Upon the arrival of the squadron at

Williams had telegraphed:

Loyal to us in case of war.'

the vicinity of Manila, and on March 30

commodore for general co-operation in-surgents Manila if desired. Telegraph.'

States consul general at Singapore:

ANILA capitulated to the subject has been furnished the commis-United States forces, communication on May United States forces, commandsion by Admiral Dewey: pher dispatch was received at Hong Kong from E. Spencer Pratt, United

order to become informed upon condition of affairs in the Philipes, President McKinley, on Jan. 20, appointed a commission comed of President J. G. Schurman, of nell University; Professor Dean, reester: Charles Denby, late Minto China; Admiral Dewey and neral Otis. The commission canded report to President McKinley Nov. 899, and the same was transmitted Congress by the President, Feb. 2, 0. It reads in part as follows:

undersigned commissioners apted by you to investigate affairs in Philippine Islands and to report the their investigations, together h such recommendations as might in ir judgment be called for by the conns which should be found to exist bese islands, have the honor to subthe following preliminary statement ompliance with your request.

he commission next tells briefly how adjucted the task intrusted to it, ring statements from all classes of ple in Manila as to the capabilities of Filipinos for self-government, the its and customs of the people, and the establishment of municipal govments in many towns.

History of Islands.

urning to the history of the islands, mmission attaches little importance the divers rebellions which had prethat of 1896. As to this movethe commissioners declare that it in no sense an attempt to win indedence, but solely to obtain relief from

sustain this statement they quote an insurgent proclamation, showthat what was demanded was the exon of the friars and the restitution people of their lands, with a diso of the episcopal sees between ash and native priests. It was also added that the Filipinos have parliarepresentation, freedom of the religious toleration, economic au- moved from Cavite to Baccor. Says the my, and laws similar to those of The abolition of the power of ent was demanded, with a legal ty for all persons in law and equal

pay between Spanish and pative

Treaty with Spanish. mmission declares that these de

is had good ground; that on pape panish system of government was de, but in practice every Spanish nor did what he saw fit, and the deeds of men in the government were en from Spain by strict press censor Allusion is made to the powerful unan Society, patterned on the Maorder, and mainly made up of Taas a powerful revolutionary force war begun in 1896 was terminated be treaty of Blac-na-Bate. The Filiwere numerous, but possessed only 800 small arms. The Spanish felt would require 100,000 men to can their stronghold, and concluded to as were also decided upon, includesentation of the Filipinos in the s, the deportation of the friars, was the principal question; the of the right of association and of a

or General Rivers was willing \$2,000,000 in Mexican money guinaldo and his cabinet and lead ers arrived in Hong Koug. It ap er, that Paterno offered the only \$400,000, \$200,000 to be paid Aguinaido arrived at Hong Kong balance when the Filipinos had ed up their arms. The arrangewas not acceptable to the people. promises were never carried out. h abuses began afresh, in Munila

fore than 200 men being execut Hence sporadic risings occurred, they possessed nothing like the th of the original movement. The cets lacked arms, ammunition and

reary had ended the war, which, sak in Cebu, had been confined to Spain's sovereignty in the other ever having been questioned, and ight of independence never hav-

entertained bewey and Agninaldo, eport then tells how Gen. Augus

me to Manila as governor general beture and war broke out be-Spain and the United States. An sought to secure the support of has to defend Spain against promising them autonomy, but nos did not trust him.

ame the 1st of May and the deis of the Spanish fleet by Dewey, resulting loss of prestige to Then in June Aguinaldo came. point the commission says: following memorandum on this necessary to fight the Americans, and fore enjoyed. This scheme was adopted after the making of the treaty of peace and gave general satisfaction. at Paris this determination was strengthened. He did not openly declare that he intended to fight the Americans, but he excited everybody, and especially the military men, by claiming independence, and t is doubtful whether he had the power to check or control the army at the time bostilities broke out.

No Alternative Left.

"Deplorable as war is, the one in which we are now engaged was unavoidable by us. We were attacked by a bold, adventurous and enthusiastic army. alternative was left to us, except ignominious retreat. It is not to be conceived of that any American would have sanctioned the surrender of Manila to the insurgents. Our obligations to other astions, to the friendly Filipinos and to ourselves and our flag demanded that

force should be met by force. Whatever the future of the Philippines may be, there is no course open to us now except the prosecution of the war until the insurgents are reduced to submission. The commission is of the opinion that there has been no time since the destruction of the Spanish squadron by Admiral Dewey when it was possible to withdraw our forces from the islands either with honor to ourselves or with safety to the inhabitants,"

Reign of Terror.

The commissioners then take up the ondition of the country at the time of their arrival, comparing it with conditions existing when they left a short time ago. A vivid picture is given of the anareby existing among the inhabitants in and about Manine during the early

"The situation in the city," says the commission, "was bad. Incendiary fires occurred daily. The streets were almost erted. Half of the native population had fied and most of the remainder were shut in their houses. Business was at a standstill. Insurgent troops everywhere faced our lines, and the sound of rifle fire was frequently audible in our house. A reign of terror prevailed. Filipinos who had favored Americans feared assassination, and few had the courage to come out openly for us. Fortunately there were among this number some of the best men of the city."

Restoring Public Confidence.

The report then speaks of the issuance of the commission's proclamation and the good effects it had on public sentiment. The natives, accustomed to Spanish promises, urged upon the commission that acts instead of promises should be given them. As a result native law courts were established and this greatly aided in the restoration of public confidence. The flow of population soon began to se toward the city. Natives who had fled from their homes returned.

As showing the limited scope of the rebellion the commission states:

'We learned that the strong anti-American feeling was confined to the Tagalo provinces, namely, Manila, Cavite, La-Batangas, Morong, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Principe, Infanta and Zambales. It was strongest in the first six named, and hardly existed in the last

Revolt Not Popular.

"The population of these provinces is estimated to be about 1,500,000, but it should not be supposed that even in the six provinces immediately adjacent to Manila the people were united in their opposition to us. Even here there was strong conservative element, consisting of people of wealth and intelligence, opposed to the war.

Under the head, "The Rebellion not a National Movement," the report treats of the rebellion outside of the provinces of Luxon, where, it is stated, the uprising was viewed at first with indifference Throughout the and later with fear. archipelago at large there was trouble galos had been sent in considerable num-

Ask American Help.

The machinery of insurgent "govern ment" served only for plundering the people under the pretext of levying "war contributions, while many of the insurgent officials were rapidly accumulating wealth." It is stated that the insurgent administration throughout the interior was worse than in the days of Spanish misrule. In many provinces there was absolute anarchy, and from all sides came petitions for protection and belo-

In speaking of Gen. MacArthur's movement northward the report tells of the insurgent method of intimidating the natives by telling them fearful tales concerning the American soldiers. method of procedure, eminently success ful at first, in the end recoiled on its au-

Troops Bring Peace.

As to the state of affairs when the ommission left the report says: Before the commission left the Philippines nearly all the inhabitants had returned to those rained villages. Many of the houses had been rebuilt. Fields that had lain fallow for three years were green with growing crops. Municipal governments were established, and the people, protected by our troops, were enoying peace, security and a degree of participation in their own government previously unknown in the history of the Philippines. Attempts of the insurgents to raise recruits and money in the province of Bulacau were proving abortive, except when backed by bayonets and bullets, and even in such cases the natives were applying to us for help to resist

The chapter devoted to "Establishment of Municipal Governments" gives in detail the efforts in that direction. There were many difficulties encountered. condition of the people was found to be must pitiable. They had been plumlered. by the insurgent troops, who had robbed them of jewels, mancy, clething and even fond, so that they were literally starving, Peaceful citizens had been fired on, Women had been mulrreated.

Plan of Government. There was general satisfaction that the Americans had come at last, and conditions seemed favorable for an American propaganda. The towns of Barcor and Imas were selected for the purpose experiment, and after talks with the local "head men" a local form of government was established. Encouraged by the result, the work was continued at Paranaque and Las Pinas, with similar

ad results. At the request of Gen. Lawton, who had been assigned to this work by Gen. Otis, the commission prepared a simple scheme of municipal government, similar enough to the old system to be readily comprehensible to the natives, but giving

naldo made up his mind that it would be them liberties which they had never be-

In every instance enthusiasm ran high before the commissioners took their departure, and cheers were raised for Gen. Lawton and for the country which he

Secure Good Results

With a single exception the officials elected proved worthy of the trust impos ed in them, and conditions very rapidly improved in the newly organized towns. Governments were organized with more satisfactory results in Pandacan, Santa Ana, San Felipe, Meri, San Pedro and Machei, while a slightly different system was put into effect in Malabon, Polo, Obando, Meycanya, Yang and Malolos.

The commission states that a large amount of supervision over the affairs of new municipalities proved necessary, as the officials were timid and slow to comprehend their new duties. At many of the elections the voters went about "asking who they were expected to rote for," and it was only with great difficulty that they were persuaded to exercise the right of free suffrage.

Schools for Manila.

The commissioners sum up the situation at the time of their departure as

"When we left Manila a large volume of business was being done, and the streets were so crowded as to be hardly safe. The native population was quiet and orderly and all fear of an uprising had long since passed. An efficient corps of native policemen was on duty. system of public schools in which English was taught had been advocated by the commission and established by Gen. Otis.

Some 6,000 scholars were in attendance. "In the Tagalo provinces of Luzon, where the anti-American feeling had been ongest, public sentiment had greatly changed, as evidenced by the fact that the military governor of Batangas had offered to surrender his troops and his province if we would only send a small orce there. The Bicols, in southern Luzon, had risen against their Tagalo masters. The Macabebes were clamoring for an opportunity to fight in our ranks, and native soldiers and scouts were already serving under Gen. Lawton.

Rebellion Dying Out.

"Stories of the corruption of insurgent officers were becoming daily more common, and the disintegration of the enemy's forces was steadily progressing. The hope of assistance from outside sources seemed to be all that held them togeth-

Having given so much attention to the Island of Luzon, the commission then takes up in detail the conditions in the other islands. On this point it is stated that the rebellion is essentially Tagalo, and when it ends in Luzon it must end throughout the archipelago. The situa-tion elsewhere than in Luzon is summed up as follows:

The only island, apart from Luzon, where serious trouble threatens, is Panay, to which a considerable force of Tagalo soldiers was sent before the out break of hostilities. Many of the Visayans of this island are opposed to the Tagalos, however, and it is not believed that the latter can make a formidable

"In Samar, Leyte and Musbate the Tagalo invaders are numerically few and are disliked by the natives of these islands, whom they have oppressed. were assured that 200 men would suffice restore order in Mindoro, Bobol was asking for troops. The Calamianes islanders had sent word that they would ne us. There can be no resistance Palawan. Satisfactory relations had already been established with the war-Moros, whose sultan had previously been conciliated by a member of the com mission, and in Mindanao this tribe had even taken up our cause and attacked the insurgents, of whom there are very few in the island.

"In Cebu we have only to reckon with the lawiess element, which has never been very formidable there."

Special attention is given to the Island Negros, as this seemed a field well adapted to the extension of an American system. Here the natives have adopted a local form of government, including a congress, and had raised the American They believed themselves capable of managing their own affairs and asked for a battalion of troops to hold in check a mountainous band of fanatics. battation was furnished, but the people proved unable to carry out their program owing to ill feeling among their own officials. The Americans remained popular.

Need American Pule.

At the request of Gen. Otis a new simplified scheme of government for the island, giving the people a large voice in their adairs, but placing an American in full control, was put into operation. brought about satisfaction, and public order is better in the Island to-day than at any time during the last twenty years. Summarizing the failure of the native form of government and the success of the American control, the commission

The flat failure of this attempt to es tablish an independent native government In Negros, conducted as it was under the most favorable circumstances, makes it apparent that here, as well as in the less favored provinces, a large amount of American control is at present absolutely essential to a successful administration of public affairs "

Efforts for Peace.

The efforts at concillation with Aguinaldo and his various commissions are set forth in detail. These commissioners were assured of the beneficent purposes of the United States and the President's readiness to grant the Filipino people as large a measure of bome rule ample liberty as consistent with the end of government, "arkject only to the ognition of the sovereignty of the United States-a point water, being established, the commission invariably refused even to

The commission adds that nothing came of negotiations, as Agninable's emissuries were without powers, and merely came and came again, for information. Courte ous reception was accorded to the insurgent commissions, and earnest appeals made to stop further bloodshed, all witnessing "the spirit of patient conciliation exhibited by the American commission is endeavoring to reach an amicable adjustment with the insurgents, as well as the obduracy of Aguinaldo.

On Self-Government, The report sums up the result of these

fruitless exchanges as follows: No better proof could be furnished that the primary object of his struggle is Filipino peoples, but the continuance of his own arbitrary and despotic power. In any event, the American people may feel confident that no effort was omitted by the commission to secure a peaceful end of the struggle, but the opportuni ties they offered and urged were all neg-

levted, if not, indeed, spurned The chapter devoted to "Capacity for Self-Government" is the result, the report states, of diligent inquiry for several months, in the course of which a great number of witnesses were exam ined, of all shades of political thought and varieties of occupation, tribe and lo

Tribes, Not a Nation.

The most striking and perhaps the most significant fact in the entire situation is the multiplicity of tribes inhabiting the archipelago, the diversity of their languages (which are mutually unintelligi ble) and the multifarious phases of civ ilization-ranging all the way from the highest to the lowest. As to this the

"The Filipinos are not a nation, but a variegated assemblage of different tribes and peoples, and their loyalty is still of the tribal type."

Converning their intellectual capacities the commission says:

"As to the general intellectual capaci ties of the Filipinos the commission is dis posed to rate them high. But excepting in a limited number of persons these ca pacities have not been developed by edu-cation or experience. The masses of the people are uneducated,

Need of Education.

"That intelligent public opinion on which popular government rests does not exist in the Philippines. And it cannot exist until education has elevated the masses, broadened their intellectual horison and disciplined their faculty of judg ment. And even then the power of selfgovernment cannot be assumed without considerable previous training and experience under the guidance and tutelage of an enlightened and liberal foreign power. For the bald fact is that the Filipinos have never had any experience in govern-ing themselves."

The report shows that this inability for self-government is due to the old Span-ish regime, which gave the Filipinos litor no part in governing themselves. After reviewing this Spanish system the commission sums up on this point:

This is all the training in self-govern ment which the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands have enjoyed. Their lack of education and political experience combined with their racial and linguistic diversities, disqualify them, in spite of their mental gifts and domestic virtues to undertake the task of governing the archipelago at the present time. most that can be expected of them is to co-operate with the Americans in the administration of general affairs, from Manila as a center, and to undertake subject to American control or guidance (as may be found necessary), the admin istration of provincial and municipal af-

Must Retnin Rule.

"Fortunately, there are educated Fili pinos, though they do not constitute a large proportion of the entire population, and their support and services will be of incalculable value in inaugurating and maintaining the new government. As education advances and experience ripens, the natives may be intrusted with a larger and more independent share of govern ment, self-government, as the American ideal, being constantly kept in view as the goal. In this way American sovereignty over the archipelago will prove a great political boon to the people

"Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn the commission believes that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the eventual division of the islands among them.

"Only through American occupation therefore, is the idea of a free, self-gov erning and united Philippine wealth at all conceivable. And the in dispensable need from the Filipino point of view of maintaining American sover eignty over the archipelago is recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate. The latter, it is true, would take the revenues and leave us the re sponsibilities. Nevertheless they recog nize the indubitable fact that the Fili pinos cannot stand alone

"Thus the welfare of the Filipinos co-incides with the dictates of national honor in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We cannot from any point of view escape the responsibilities of govand the commission is strongly persuaded that the performance of our national data will prove the greatest blessing to the peoples of the Philippine Islands.

Praise for Troop ..

One of the closing chapters of the report is devoted to a tribute to "our soldiers and sailors in the war." The commission says that the presence of Admiral Dewey as a member of this body makes it unfitting to dwell on his personal achievements, but he joins in the eulogy of his comrades. The commissioners wit nessed some of the many brave deeds of our soldiers, and they declare that all that skill, courage and a patient endurance an do has been done in the Philippines.

They dismiss the reports of the dese crating of churches, the murdering of prisoners and the committing of an tionable crimes, and say they are glad to express the belief that a war was never more humanely conducted, adding

"If churches were occupied it was only their use as focts by the insuegents had made it necessary to train our artillers

Bright Trade Future,

"Prisaners were taken whenever opportunity offered, often only to be w therty after being disarmed and fed. I to the time of our departure, although single Filipino had been executed. Such wrongs as were casually committed brought to our attention, and in every case that we investigated we found villingness on the part of these in author. ity to administer prompt justice."

The commissioners give a general view of the value of the islands, their richness in agricultural and forest products, then mineral wealth and their commanding geographical position. They state that the Philippine Islands should soon become one of the great trade centers of the East. Manila is already connected by new steamship lines with Australia, India and Japan, and she will become the mutual terminus of many other lines not, as is pretended, the liberty of the when a ship canal connects the Atlantic

with the Pacific. It cannot be doubted that commerce will greatly increase, and the United States will obtain a large share in this treatment.

Benefit to Islands.

Manila, with the immunity which it has thus far enjoyed from that terrible pest, the bubonic plague, should become a distributing center for China, Sinm, the Straits Settlements, Tonquin, Annam and

The report concludes: "Our control means to the inhabitants of the Philippines internal peace and order, a guarantee against foreign aggres sion and against the dismemberment of their country, commercial and industrial prosperity and as large a share of the affairs of government as they shall prove fit to take. When peace and prosperity shall have been established throughout the archipelago, when education shall have become general, then, in the language of a leading Filipino, his people will, under our guidance, become more American than the Americans them-

Dewey Heard From. On May 20, 1898, Admiral Dewey cabled to the Navy Department:

"Aguinaldo, the rebel commander-inchief, was brought down by the McCulloch. Organizing forces near Cavite, and may render assistance which will be val-

On May 26 the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed to Admiral Dewey as fol-

"It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain

their cause in the future. To this telegram Dewey replied: "Receipt of telegram of May 26 is ac knowledged, and I thank the department for the expression of confidence. Have acted according to the spirit of depart-Have ment's instructions therein from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession.

Aguinaldo Conspires As soon as Aguinaido discovered he was to have no assistance from the United States he commenced to conspire against our forces there, intending to overthrow the authority of this Government in the islands.

Dewey's Strong Denial. In a pamphlet afterwards published by Aguinaldo, entitled "The True Version

of the Philippine Revolution," he charged that Admiral Dewey had assured him that the United States would recognize the independence of the Filipinos. When this was published, the admiral wrote the following letter to Senator Lodge:

"Dear Senator Lodge: The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo, recently published in the Springfield Republican, so far as it relates to me is a tissue of falsehood. I never promised him, directly or indirectly, independence for the Filipinos. never treated him as an ally, except so far as to make use of him and his soldiers to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards. He never uttered the word 'independence' in any sation with me or my officers. The statehonors, or saluted the Filipino flag, is ab-

solutely false. Sincerely yours, "GEORGE DEWEY."

Aguinaldo Organizes Revolution. On May 24 Aguinaldo issued three proclamations, one containing decrees as to the treatment of the Spanish enemy, another announcing the establishment of a dictatorial government with himself as dierator, and the third containing further decrees concerning military operations

In the following July he organized a revolutionary government with himself as President. During that month the several detachments of the United States army arrived at Manila, and on July 25 Gen. Merritt took command, and Admiral Dewey sent the following dispatch:

"Merritt arrived yesterday in the port. The remainder of the expedition is expected within the next few days. Sitnation is most critical at Manila. Spanish may surrender at any moment Merritt's most difficult problem will be how to deal with insurgents under Aguinaldo, who has become aggressive and even threatening toward our army."

Hostilities Begun by Aguinaldo. On Aug. 13 Manils was captured, and of this and subsequent events the Phillippine commission, composed of Admiral Gen. Otis, President Schurman, Prof. Worcester and Gen. Denby, says: "When the city of Manila was taken on Aug. 13, the Filipinos took no part in the attack, but came following in with a view of looting the city and were only prevented from doing so by our forces preventing them from entering. Againside claimed that he had the right to occupy the city; he demanded of Gen. Merritt the palace of Malacanan for himself and the cession of all the churches of Manila, also that a part of the money taken from the Spanand above all that he should be given the arms of the Spanish prisoners. This confirms the statement already made that he intended to get possession of these arms for the purpose of attacking us. All these demands were refused. After the taking of Manils the feeling between the Americans and the insurgents grew worse * * * Agminaldo removed his seat of government to Majolos, where the so-called Filipino congress assembled

Filipinos Prepared for War, On the 21st of September a significant

decree passed the Filipino congress immoving a military service on every male over 18 years of age, except those holding setory and blacksmith shop in Manife. bolos fknives; were being made. * Danger signals now multiplied. Agninaldo endeavozed to get the war making power transferred from congress to him seif, and also urged a heavy bond issue to secure one million dollars for the purchase of arms and ammunition. * It is now known that elaborate plans had been perfected for a simultaneons by the force within and without Monila . Persistent attacks were made to provoke our saidiers to are. The many gents were insolent to our grands and made persistent and continuous efforts to push them back and advance the surgent lines further into the city of Mu-

To Attack Americans,

Early in January, 1899, Agninaldo had his plans perfected so as to be ready to commence hostilities against the Ameri-

The following order, which has never

exception of an unimportant

"After the landing of our troops Agul-

A brief chapter then tells of the lack success attending the effort made at this time by Gen. Merritt, through a commission, to arrive at a mutual under standing with Agninaldo as to the intentions, purposes and desires of the Filipino This brings the story up to outbreak on the evening of the 4th of February, with the attack upon the American troops, following the action of the Nebraskan sentinel. The commisin concluding this chapter, says:

the American forces, which would afford Filipinos Begin War.