Supplement

TO

THE DALLES CHRONICLE.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1898.

THE ANNUAL MESSAGE

The President's Address to Congress.

OUR LATE WAR A FEATURE

No Suggestions Made Regarding the Government of Our New Territories—Foreign Relations Generally Satisfactory—Hawaiian Annexation.

To the Senate and House of Representatives: Notwithstanding the added burdens rendered necessary by the war, our people rejoice in a very satisfactory and steadily increasing degree of prosperity, evidenced by the largest volume of business ever recorded. Every manufacture has been productive, agricultural pursuits have yielded abundant returns, labor in the fields of industry is better rewarded, revenue legislation passed by the present congress has increased the treasury's receipts to the amount estimated by its authors, the finances of the government have been successfully administered and its credit advanced to the first rank; while its currency has been maintained at the world's highest standard. Military service under a common flag and for a righteous cause has strengthened the national spirit and served to cement more closely than ever the fraternal bonds between every section of the country.

A review of the relations of the United States to other powers, always appropriate, is this year of primary importance, in view of the momentous issues which have risen, demanding in one instance the ultimate determination by arms and involving far-reaching consequences which will require the earnest attention of the congress.

In my last annual message, very full consideration was given to the question of the duty of the government of the United States toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection, as being by far the most important problem with which we were called upon to deal. The considerations then advanced, and the exposition of the views therein expressed, disclosed my sense of the extreme gravity of the situation.

Setting aside, as logically unfounded or practically inadmissible, recognition of the Cuban insurgents as belligerents, recognition of the independence of Cuba, neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, intervention in favor of one or the other party and the forcible annexation of the island, I concluded it was honestly due to our friendly relations with Spain that she should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations of reform to which she had become irrevocably committed.

Within a few weeks previously she had announced comprehensive plans which it was confidently asserted would be efficacious to remedy the evils so deeply affecting our own country, so injurious to the true interests of the mother country, as well as to those of Cuba, and so repugnant to the universal sentiment of humanity.

Failure of Autonomy.

The ensuing months brought little sign of real progress toward the pacification of Cuba. The autonomous administration set up in the capital and some of the principal cities appeared not to gain the favor of the inhabitants nor to be able to extend their influence to the large extent of territory held by the insurgents, while the military army, obviously unable to cope with the still active rebellion, continued many of the most objectionable and offensive policies of the government that had preceded it. No tangible relief was afforded the vast numbers of unhappy reconcentrados, despite the reiterated professions made in that regard and the amount appropriated by Spain to that end. The proffered expedient of zones of cultivation proved illusory; indeed, no less practical nor more delusive promises of succor could well have been tendered to the exhausted and destitute people, stripped of all that made life and home dear, and herded in a strange region, among unsympathetic strangers hardly less necessitous than themselves.

By the end of December the mortality among them had frightfully increased. Conservative estimates from Spanish sources placed the deaths among these distressed people at over 40 per cent from the time General Weyler's decree of reconcentration was enforced. With the acquiescence of the Spanish authorities, a scheme was adopted for relief by charitable contributions raised in this country and distributed, under the direction of the consul-general and the several consuls, by noble and earnest individual effort through the organized agencies of the American Red Cross. Thousands of lives were thus saved, but many thousands more were inaccessible to such forms of aid.

The war continued on the old footing without comprehensive plan, developing only the same spasmodic encounters, barren of strategic result, that had marked the course of the earlier 10 years' rebellion, as well as the present insurrection from its start. No alternative save physical exhaustion of either combatant, and therewithal the practical ruin of the island, lay in sight, but how far distant no one could venture to conjecture.

Destruction of the Maine.

At this juncture, on the 15th of February last, occurred the destruction of the battle-ship Maine, while rightfully lying in the harbor of Havana on a mission of international courtesy and good will, a catastrophe the suspicious nature and horror of which stirred the nation's heart profoundly. It is a striking evidence of the poise and sturdy good sense distinguishing our national character that this shocking blow, falling upon a generous people already deeply touched by preceding events in Cuba, did not move them to desperate resolve to tolerate no longer the existence of a condition of danger and disorder at our doors that made possible such a deed by whomsoever wrought. Yet the instinct of justice prevailed, and the nation anxiously awaited the result of the searching investigation at once set on foot. The finding of the naval board of inquiry established that the origin of the explosion was external by a submarine mine, and only halted, through lack of positive testimony, to fix the responsibility of its authorship.

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.

Congress' Appropriation of Fifty Millions for National Defense.

All those things carried conviction to the most thoughtful, even before the finding of the naval court, that a crisis in our relations with Spain and toward Cuba was at hand. So strong was this belief that it needed but a brief executive suggestion to congress to receive immediate answer to the duty of making instant provision for the possible and perhaps speedily probable emergency of war, and the remarkable, almost unique, spectacle was presented of a unanimous vote of both houses on the 9th of March appropriating $50,000,000 "for the national defense and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discretion of the president."

That this act of provision came none too soon was disclosed when the application of the fund was undertaken. Our ports were practically undefended; our navy needed large provision for increased ammunition and supplies, and even numbers to cope with any sudden attack from the navy of Spain, which comprised modern vessels of the highest type of continental perfection. Our army also required enlargement of men and munitions. The details of the hurried preparations for the decided contingency is told in the reports of the secretaries of war and of the navy, and need not be repeated here.

It is sufficient to say that the outbreak of war, when it did come, found our nation not unprepared to meet the conflict, nor was the apprehension of coming strife confined to our own country. It was felt by the continental powers, which, on April 6, through their ambassadors and envoys, addressed to the executive an expression of hope that humanity and moderation might mark the course of this government and people, and that further negotiations would lead to an attempt, which, while securing the maintenance of peace, would affirm all necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in Cuba.

In responding to that presentation I also shared the hope which the envoys had expressed, that peace might be preserved in a manner to terminate the chronic condition of disturbance in Cuba, so injurious and menacing to our interests and tranquillity, as well as shocking to our sentiments of humanity; and, while appreciating the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication they had adopted on behalf of the powers, I stated the confidence of this government on its part that equal appreciation would be shown for its earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty of humanity by ending a situation, the indefinite prolongation of which had become insufferable.

Proposal of an Armistice.

Still animated by the hope of a peaceful solution and obeying the dictates of duty, no effort was relaxed to bring about a speedy ending of the Cuban struggle. Negotiations to this effect continued actively with the government of Spain looking to the immediate conclusion of a six months' armistice in Cuba with a view to effect the recognition of her people's right to independence. Besides this, the instant revocation of the order of reconcentration was asked, so that the sufferers, returning to their homes and aided by united American and Spanish effort, might be put in a way to support themselves, and by orderly resumption of the well-nigh destroyed productive energies of the island contribute to the restoration of its tranquillity and well-being.

Negotiations continued for some little time at Madrid, resulting in offers by the Spanish government which could not but be regarded as inadequate. It was proposed to confide the preparations of peace to the insular parliament, yet to be convened under the autonomous decrees of November, 1897, but without impairment in anywise of the constitutional powers of the Madrid government, which to that end would grant an armistice, if solicited by the insurgents, for such time as the general-in-chief might see fit to fix. How and with what scope of discretionary powers the insular parliament was expected to set about the "preparation of peace" did not appear. If it was to be by negotiation with the insurgents, the issue seemed to rest on the one side with a body chosen by that faction of the electors in the districts under Spanish control, and on the other, with the insurgent population holding the interior country, unrepresented in the so-called parliament, and defiant at the suggestion of suing for peace.

Authority to Intervene.

Grieved and disappointed at this barren outcome of my sincere endeavors to reach a practicable solution, I felt it my duty to remit the whole question to congress. In the message of April 11, 1898, I announced that with this last overture in the direction of immediate peace in Cuba and its disappointing reception by Spain the effort of the executive was brought to an end. I again reviewed the alternative course of action which I had prepared, concluding that the only course consonant with international policy and compatible with our firmly set historical traditions was intervention as a neutral to stop the war and check the hopeless sacrifice of life, even though that resort involved "hostile constraint upon both parties to the contest, as well to enforce a truce as to provide for eventual settlement."

The grounds justifying that step were the interests of humanity; the duty to protect the life and property of our citizens in Cuba; the right to check injury to our commerce and people through the devastation of the island, and, most important, the need of removing at once and forever the constant menace and the burdens entailed upon our government by the uncertainties and perils of the situation caused by the unendurable disturbance in Cuba. I said: "The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by the present method. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop."

In view of all this congress was asked to authorize and empower the president to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between Spain and the people of Cuba and to secure to the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, in securing peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and for the accomplishment of those ends to use the military and naval forces of the United States as might be necessary, with added authority to continue generous relief to the starving people of Cuba.

The response of congress, after nine days of earnest deliberation, during which the almost unanimous sentiment of your body was developed on every point, save as to the expediency of coupling the proposed action with a formal recognition of the republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of that island—a proposition which failed of adoption—the congress, after a conference on the 19th of April, by a vote of 42 to 34 in the senate and 311 to 6 in the house, passed the memorable joint resolution declaring:

"First—That the people of the island of Cuba are, and by right ought to be, free and independent.

"Second—That it is the duty of the United States and the government of the United States hereby demands that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third—That the president of the United States be and is hereby directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States and the militia of the several states to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

"Fourth—That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

Rupture of Negotiations.

This resolution was approved by the executive on the next day, April 20. A copy was at once communicated to the Spanish minister at this capital, who forthwith announced that his continuance in Washington had thereby become impossible, and asked for his passports, which were given him. He thereupon withdrew from Washington, leaving the protection of Spanish interests in the United States to the French ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian minister.

Simultaneously with its communication to the Spanish minister, General Woodford, the American minister at Madrid, was telegraphed confirmation of the text of the joint resolution and directed to communicate it to the government of Spain with the formal demand that it at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its forces therefrom, coupling this demand with announcements of the intentions of this government as to the future of the island, in conformity with the fourth clause of the resolution, and giving Spain until noon of April 23 to reply.

The demand, although, as above shown, officially made known to the Spanish envoy here, was not delivered at Madrid. After the instructions reached General Woodford on the morning of April 21, but before he could present them, the Spanish minister of state notified him that upon the president's approval of the joint resolution the Madrid government, regarding the act as "equivalent to an evident declaration of war," had ordered its minister in Washington to withdraw, thereby breaking off diplomatic relations between the two countries and ceasing all official communication between their respective countries. General Woodford thereupon demanded his passports and quitted Madrid on the same day.

Spain, having thus denied the demand of the United States, and initiated that complete form of rupture of relations which attends a state of war, the executive powers authorized by the resolution were used by me to meet the enlarged contingency of actual war between Spain and the United States.

On April 22 I proclaimed a blockade of the northern coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba; and on the 23d I called for volunteers to execute the purpose of the resolution.

The Declaration of War.

By my message of April 25, congress was informed of the situation, and I recommended formal declaration of the existence of a state of war between the United States and Spain. Congress accordingly voted on the same day the act approved April 25, 1898, declaring the existence of such war from and including the 21st day of April, and re-enacted the provision of the resolution of April 20, directing the president to use all the armed forces of the nation to carry that act into effect.

Due notification of the existence of war as aforesaid was given April 25 by telegraph to all the governments with which the United States maintained relations, in order that their neutrality might be assured during the war. The various governments responded with proclamations of neutrality, each after its own method. It is not among the least gratifying incidents of the struggle that the obligations of neutrality were impartially discharged by all, often under delicate and difficult circumstances.

In further fulfillment of international duty, I issued, April 26, a proclamation announcing the treatment proposed to be accorded to vessels and their cargoes as to blockade, contraband, the exercise of the right of subjects and the immunity of neutral flags and neutral goods under the enemy's flag. A similar proclamation was made by the Spanish government. In the conduct of hostilities, the rules of the declaration of Paris, including abstention from resort to privateering, have accordingly been observed by both belligerents, although neither was a party to that declaration.

Meeting the Emergency.

Our country thus, after an interval of half a century of peace with all nations, found itself engaged in deadly conflict with a foreign enemy. Every nerve was strained to meet the emergency. The response to the initial call for 125,000 volunteers was instant and complete, as was also the result of the second call, of May 5, for 75,000 additional volunteers. The ranks of the regular army were increased to the limit provided by the act of April 23. The enlisted force of the navy on the 15th of August, when it reached its maximum, numbered 24,123 men and apprentices. One hundred and three vessels were added to the navy by purchase, one was presented to the government, one leased and four vessels of the International Navigation Company, the St. Paul, St. Louis, New York and Paris, were chartered. In addition to these, the revenue cutters and lighthouse tenders were turned over to the navy department and became temporarily a part of the auxiliary navy. The maximum effective fighting force of the navy during the war, separated into classes, was as follows:

Four battle-ships of the first class, 1 battle-ship of the second class, 2 armored cruisers, 6 coast-defense monitors, 1 armored ram, 12 protected cruisers, 3 unprotected cruisers, 18 gunboats, 1 dynamite cruiser, 11 torpedo-boats, 14 old vessels of the old navy, including monitors.

Auxiliary cruisers—28 converted yachts, 27 converted tugs, 19 converted colliers, 4 revenue cutters, 4 lighthouse tenders and 19 miscellaneous vessels.

Much alarm was felt along the entire Atlantic seaboard lest an attack might be made by the enemy. Every precaution was taken to prevent possible injury to our great cities lying along the coast. Temporary garrisons were provided, drawn from the state militia and infantry, and light batteries were drawn from the volunteer force. About 12,000 troops were thus employed. The coast signal service was established for observing the approach of an enemy's ships to the coast of the United States and the lighthouse service cooperated, which enabled the navy department to have all portions of the Atlantic coast from Maine to Texas under observation.

The auxiliary navy was created under the authority of congress, and was officered and manned by the naval militia of the several states. This organization patrolled the coast and performed the duty of a second arm of defense.

Defense of the Coast Line.

Under the direction of the chief engineer, submarine mines were placed at the most exposed points. Before the war permanent mining casemates and cable galleries had been placed in all important harbors. Most of the torpedo material was not to be found in the market, and had to be specially manufactured. Under date of April 1, district officers were directed to take all preliminary measures, short of the actual attaching of the loaded mines to the cable, and on April 22 telegraphic orders were issued to place the loaded mines in position. The aggregate number of mines placed was 1335, at the principal harbors from Maine to California. Preparations were also made for the planting of mines at certain other harbors, but owing to the early destruction of the Spanish fleet the mines were not placed.

The signal corps was promptly organized and performed service of the most difficult and important character. Its operations during the war covered the electrical connection of all coast fortifications, the establishment of telephonic and telegraphic facilities at camps at Manila, at Santiago and in Porto Rico. There were constructed 300 miles of line at 10 great camps, thus facilitating military movements from those points in a manner heretofore unknown in military administration. Field telegraph lines were established and maintained under the enemy's fire at Manila and later the Manila-Hong Kong cable was reopened.

In Porto Rico, cable communication was opened over a discontinued route, and on land the purposes of commanding officers were kept in telegraphic and telephonic communication with the division commanders on four different lines of operations. There was placed in Cuban waters a completely outfitted cable ship with war cables and cable gear suitable both for the destruction of communications belonging to the enemy and the establishment of our own. Two ocean cables were destroyed under the enemy's batteries at Santiago. The day previous to the landing of General Shafter's corps at Caimanera, within 20 miles of the landing place, cable communication was established and a cable station opened, giving direct communication with the government at Washington. This service was invaluable to the executive in directing the operations of the army and navy. With a total force of over 1300, the loss was by disease in camp and field, officers and men included, only five.

The national defense fund of $50,000,000 was expended in large part by the army and the navy, and the objects for which it was used are fully shown in the reports of the several secretaries. It was a most timely appropriation, enabling the government to strengthen its defenses and to make preparations greatly needed in case of war. This fund being inadequate to the requirements of equipment and for the conduct of the war, the patriotism of congress provided the means in the war revenue act of June 13 by authorizing a 3 per cent popular loan, not to exceed $400,000,000, and by levying additional imposts and taxes. Of the authorized loan, $200,000,000 was offered and promptly taken, the subscriptions so far exceeding the call as to cover it many times over. While preference was given to the smaller bids, no single allotment exceeded $5000. This was a most encouraging and significant result, showing the vast resources of the nation and the determination of the people to uphold their country's honor.

PROGRESS OF THE CONFLICT.

Brilliant Series of Victories for American Arms.

It is not within the province of this message to narrate the history of the extraordinary war that followed the Spanish declaration of April 21, but a brief recital of its more salient features is appropriate. The first encounter of the war in point of date took place April 27, when a detachment of the blockading squadron made a reconnoissance in force at Matanzas, shelled the harbor fortifications and demolished several new works in construction.

Dewey at Manila.

The next engagement was destined to mark a memorable epoch in maritime warfare. The Pacific fleet, under Commodore George Dewey, had lain for some weeks at Hong Kong. Upon the colonial proclamation of neutrality being issued and the customary 24 hours' notice being given, it repaired to Mirs bay, near Hong Kong, whence it proceeded to the Philippine islands under telegraphic orders to capture or destroy the formidable Spanish fleet then assembled at Manila. At daybreak on May 1 the American force entered Manila bay, and after a few hours' engagement effected the total destruction of the Spanish fleet, consisting of 10 warships and a transport, besides capturing the naval station and forts at Cavite, thus annihilating the Spanish naval power in the Pacific ocean and completely controlling the bay of Manila, with the ability to take the city at will. Not a life was lost on our ships, the wounded numbering only seven, while not a vessel was materially injured. For this gallant achievement congress, upon my recommendation, fitly bestowed upon the actors preferment and substantial reward.

The effect of this remarkable victory upon the spirit of our people and upon the fortunes of the war was instant. A prestige of invincibility thereby attached to our arms which continued throughout the struggle. Reinforcements were hurried to Manila under the command of Major-General Merritt and firmly established within sight of the capital which lay helpless before our guns. On the 7th day of May the government was advised officially of the victory at Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of our fleet what troops were required. The information was received on the 15th day of May, and the first army expedition sailed May 25 and arrived at Manila June 30. Other expeditions soon followed, the total force consisting of 641 officers and 15,058 men.

No Divided Victory.

Only reluctance to cause needless loss of life and property prevented the early storming and capture of the city, and therewith the absolute military occupation of the whole group. The insurgents, meanwhile, had resumed the active hostilities suspended by the uncompleted truce of December, 1897. Their forces invested Manila on the northern and eastern side, but were constrained by Admiral Dewey and General Merritt from attempting an assault. It was fitting that whatever was to be done in the way of decisive operations in that quarter should be accomplished by the strong arm of the United States alone.

Obeying the stern precept of war, which enjoins the overcoming of the adversary and the extinction of his power wherever assailable as the speedy and sure means to win a peace, divided victory was not permissible, for no partition of the rights and responsibilities attending the enforcement of a just and advantageous peace could be thought of.

Following the adoption of a comprehensive scheme of general attack, powerful forces were assembled at various points on our coast to invade Cuba and Porto Rico. Meanwhile, naval demonstrations were made at several exposed points. May 11 the cruiser Wilmington and torpedo-boat Winslow were unsuccessful in an attempt to silence the batteries at Cardenas, in Matanzas, Ensign Worth Bagley and four seamen falling. These grievous fatalities were strangely enough among the very few which occurred during our naval operations in this extraordinary conflict.

Meanwhile, the Spanish naval preparations had been pushed with great vigor. A powerful squadron under Admiral Cervera, which had assembled at the Cape Verde islands before the beginning of hostilities, had crossed the Atlantic ocean and by its erratic movements in the Caribbean sea delayed our military operations, while baffling the pursuit of our fleets. For a time fears were felt lest the Oregon and Marietta, then nearing home after their long voyage from San Francisco of over 15,000 miles, might be surprised by Admiral Cervera's fleet, but their fortunate arrival dispelled the apprehensions and lent much needed reinforcements. Not until Admiral Cervera took refuge in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, about May 9, was it practicable to plan a systematic military attack upon the Antillean possessions of Spain.

Several demonstrations occurred on the coast of Cuba and Porto Rico in preparation for the larger event. On May 13 the North Atlantic squadron shelled San Juan de Porto Rico. On May 30 Commodore Schley's squadron bombarded the forts guarding the mouth of Santiago harbor. Neither attack had any material result. It was evident that well-ordered land operations were indispensable to achieve a decided advantage.

Hobson's Heroism.

The next act in the war thrilled not alone the hearts of our countrymen, but the world, by its exceptional heroism. On the night of June 3 Lieutenant Hobson, aided by seven devoted volunteers, blocked the narrow outlet from Santiago harbor by sinking the collier Merrimac in the channel under a fierce fire from the shore batteries, escaping with their lives as by a miracle, but falling into the hands of the Spaniards. It is a most gratifying incident of the war that the bravery of this little band of heroes was cordially appreciated by the Spaniards, who sent a flag of truce to notify Admiral Sampson of their safety and to compliment them upon their daring act. They were subsequently exchanged, July 7.

By June 7 the cutting of the last Cuban cable isolated the island. Thereafter the invasion was vigorously prosecuted. June 10, under a heavy protecting fire, a landing force of 600 marines from the Oregon, Marblehead and Yankee was effected at Guantanamo bay, where it had been determined to establish a cable station. This important and essential port was taken from the enemy after severe fighting by the marines, who were the first organized force of the United States to land in Cuba. The position so won was held, despite the desperate attempts to dislodge our forces. By June 16 additional forces were landed and strongly intrenched.

June 22 the advance of the invading army under Major-General Shafter landed at Daiquiri, about 15 miles east of Santiago. This was accomplished under great difficulties, but with marvelous dispatch. On June 23 the movement against Santiago was begun.

On the 24th the first serious engagement took place in which the First and Tenth cavalry and the First volunteer cavalry, General Young's brigade of General Wheeler's division, participated, losing heavily. By nightfall, however, ground within five miles of Santiago was won. The advantage was steadily increased. On July 1 a severe battle took place, our forces gaining the outer works of Santiago, and El Caney and San Juan were taken after a desperate charge and the investment of the city was completed. The navy co-operated by shelling the town and the coast forts.

Destruction of the Armada.

On the day following this brilliant achievement of our land forces, July 3, occurred the decisive naval combat of the war. The Spanish fleet, attempting to leave the harbor, was met by the American squadron under command of Commodore Sampson. In less than three hours all the Spanish ships were destroyed. Two torpedo-boats were sunk and the Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo, Vizcaya and Cristobal Colon were driven ashore. The Spanish admiral and over 1300 men were taken prisoners. While the enemy's loss of life was deplorably large, some 200 perishing, on our side but one man was killed and one man seriously wounded. Although our ships were repeatedly struck, not one was seriously injured. The men also conspicuously distinguished themselves, from the commanders to the gunners and the unnamed heroes in the boiler-rooms, each and all contributing toward the achievement of this astounding victory, for which neither ancient nor modern history affords a parallel in the completeness of the event and the marvelous disproportion of casualties. It would be invidious to single out any for special honor. Deserved promotion has rewarded the more conspicuous actors—the nation's profoundest gratitude is due to all of those brave men who by their skill and devotion in a few short hours crushed the sea power of Spain and wrought a triumph whose decisiveness and far-reaching effects can scarcely be measured. Nor can we be unmindful of the achievements of our builders, mechanics and artisans for their skill in the construction of our warships.

With the catastrophe of Santiago, Spain's effort upon the ocean virtually ceased. A spasmodic effort toward the end of June to send her Mediterranean fleet, under Admiral Camara, to relieve Manila was abandoned, the expedition being recalled after it had passed through the Suez canal.

Surrender of Santiago.

The capitulation of Santiago followed. The city was closely besieged by land, while the entrance of our ships into the harbor cut off all relief on that side. After a truce to allow of the removal of the noncombatants, protracted negotiations continued from July 3 until July 15, when, under menace of immediate assault, the preliminaries of surrender were agreed upon. On the 17th General Shafter occupied the city. The capitulation embraced the entire eastern end of Cuba. The number of Spanish soldiers surrendered was 22,000, all of whom were subsequently conveyed to Spain at the charge of the United States. The story of this successful campaign is told in the report of the secretary of war which will be laid before you.

The individual valor of officers and soldiers was never more strikingly shown than in the several engagements leading to the surrender of Santiago, while the prompt movements and successive victories won instant and universal applause. To those who gained this complete triumph which established the ascendency of the United States upon land as the fight off Santiago had fixed our supremacy on the seas, the earnest and lasting gratitude of the nation is unsparingly due. Nor should we alone remember the gallantry of the living; the dead claim our tears, and our losses by battle and disease must cloud any exultation at the result and teach us to weigh the awful cost of war, however rightful the cause or however signal the victory.

Invasion of Porto Rico.

With the fall of Santiago, the occupation of Porto Rico became the next strategic necessity. General Miles had previously been assigned to organize an expedition for that purpose. Fortunately, he was already at Santiago, where he had arrived on the 11th of July with reinforcements for General Shafter's army. With these troops, consisting of 3415 infantry and artillery, two companies of engineers and one company of the signal corps, General Miles left Guantanamo July 21, having nine transports convoyed by the fleet under Captain Higginson, with the Massachusetts (flagship), Dixie, Gloucester, Columbia and Yale, the two latter carrying troops. The expedition landed at Guanica, July 25, which port was entered with little opposition. Here the fleet was joined by the Annapolis and Wasp, while the Puritan and Amphitrite went to San Juan and joined the New Orleans, which was engaged in blockading that port. The major-general commanding was subsequently reinforced by General Schwann's brigade of the Third army corps, by General Wilson with a part of his division, and also by General Brooke, with a part of his corps, numbering in all 16,973 officers and men. On July 27 he entered Ponce, one of the most important points in the island, from which he thereafter directed operations for the capture of the island.

With the exception of encounters with the enemy at Guayama, Hermigueres, Coamo and Yauco, and an attack on a force landed at Cape San Juan, there was no serious resistance. The campaign was prosecuted with great vigor, and by the 12th of August much of the island was in our possession, and the acquisition of the remainder was only a matter of a short time.

At most of the points in the island our troops were enthusiastically welcomed. Protestations of loyalty to the flag and gratitude for delivery from Spanish rule met our commanders at every stage.

As a potent influence toward peace, the outcome of the Porto Rican expedition is due to those who participated in it.

Last Battle of the War.

The last scene of the war was enacted at Manila, its starting place. On August 15, after a brief assault upon the works by the land forces, in which the squadron assisted, the capital surrendered unconditionally. The casualties were comparatively few. By this conquest of the Philippine islands, virtually accomplished when the Spanish capacity for resistance was destroyed by Admiral Dewey's victory of the first of May, the result of the war was formally sealed. To General Merritt, his officers and men, for their uncomplaining and devoted services, for their gallantry in action, the nation is sincerely grateful. Their long voyage was made with singular success, and the soldierly conduct of the men, of whom many were without previous experience in the military service, deserves unmeasured praise.

Total Casualties.

The total casualties in killed and wounded in the army during the war was as follows:

Officers killed, 23; enlisted men killed, 257; total, 280; officers wounded, 113; enlisted men wounded, 1464; total, 1577.

Of the navy, killed, 17; wounded, 67; died as result of wounds, 1; invalided from service, 6; total, 91.

It will be observed that while our navy was engaged in two great battles and in numerous perilous undertakings in the blockaded and bombardments, and more than 50,000 of our troops were transported to distant lands and engaged in assault and siege and battle and many skirmishes in unfamiliar territory, we lost in both arms of the service a total of 1668 killed and wounded, and in the entire campaign by land and sea we did not lose a gun or a flag, or a transport or a ship, and, with the exception of the crew of the Merrimac, not a soldier or sailor was taken prisoner.

On August 7, 46 days from the date of landing of General Shafter's army in Cuba, and 21 days from the surrender of Santiago, the United States troops commenced embarkation for home, and our entire force was returned to the United States as early as August 24. They were absent from the United States only two months.

The Red Cross.

In this connection it is a pleasure for me to mention in terms of cordial approbation the timely and useful work of the American National Red Cross, both in relief measures preparatory to the campaigns, in sanitary assistance at several of the camps of assemblage, and, later, under the able and experienced leadership of the president of the society, Miss Clara Barton, on the fields of battle and in the hospitals at the front in Cuba. Working in conjunction with the government authorities and under their sanction and approval, and with the enthusiastic cooperation of many patriotic women and societies in the various states, the Red Cross has fully maintained its already high reputation for intense earnestness and ability to exercise the noble purposes of its organization, thus justifying the confidence and support which it has received at the hands of the American people. To the members and officers of this society, and all who aided them in their philanthropic work, the sincere and lasting gratitude of the soldiers and the public is due and is freely accorded.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

Spain's Overtures for a Cessation of Hostilities.

The annihilation of Admiral Cervera's fleet, followed by the capitulation of Santiago, having brought to the Spanish government a realizing sense of the hopelessness of continuing a struggle now becoming wholly unequal, it made overtures of peace through the French ambassador, who, with the assent of his government, had acted as the friendly representative of Spain's interests during the war. On the 26th of July, M. Cambon presented a communication, signed by the Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish minister of state, inviting the United States to state the terms upon which it would be willing to make peace. July 30, by a communication addressed to the Duke of Almodovar, and handed by M. Cambon, the terms of this government were announced substantially in the protocol, afterwards signed. On August 10, the Spanish reply dated August 7 was handed by M. Cambon to the secretary of state. It accepted unconditionally the terms imposed as to Cuba, Porto Rico, and an island of the Ladrone group, but appeared to seek to introduce inadmissible reservations in regard to our demand as to the Philippines.

Conceiving that discussion on this point could neither be practicable nor profitable, I directed that, in order to avoid misunderstanding, the matter should be forthwith closed by proposing the embodiment in a formal protocol of the terms in which the negotiations for peace were undertaken. The vague and inexplicit suggestions of the Spanish note could not be accepted, the only reply being to present as a virtual ultimatum a draft of the protocol, embodying the precise terms tendered to Spain in our note of July 30, which added stipulations of details as to the appointment of commissioners to arrange for the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles. On August 12, M. Cambon announced his receipt of full powers to sign the protocol as submitted.

Terms of the Protocol.

Accordingly, on the afternoon of August 12, M. Cambon as the plenipotentiary of Spain and the secretary of state, as the plenipotentiary of the United States, signed the protocol providing:

"Article 1. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

"Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.

"Article 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."

The fourth article provided for the appointment of joint commissions on the part of the United States and Spain to meet in Havana and San Juan, respectively, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the stipulated evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies.

The fifth article provided for the appointment of not more than five commissioners on each side to meet at Paris not later than October 1, and to proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.

The sixth and last article provides that upon the signing of the protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and that notice to that effect should be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its naval forces.

Immediately upon the conclusion of the protocol, I issued the proclamation of August 12, suspending hostilities on the part of the United States. The necessary orders to that end were at once given by telegraph. The blockade of the ports of Cuba and of San Juan de Porto Rico was in like manner raised. On August 18, the muster-out of 100,000 volunteers, or as near that number as was found to be practicable, was ordered. On December 1, 101,055 officers and men had been mustered out and discharged from the service; 9002 more will be mustered out by the 10th of the month; also a corresponding number of generals and general staff officers have been honorably discharged from the service.

The military commissions to superintend the evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and the adjacent islands were forthwith appointed:

For Cuba—Major-General James F. Wade, Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson,