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The Astorian guarantees to its subscribers the largest circulation of any newspaper published on the Columbia river.

SENATORS AND THE CONSTITUTION.

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but in contradiction to the purpose of the constitution. This is the most striking example we have of the way in which the organic law may be manipulated by common consent to meet changed conditions or desires. It is not unreasonable to believe that if a radically different method of choosing United States senators ever comes to prevail, it will be brought about through a gradual subversion of the constitution, not by an amendment constitutionally adopted.

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For Mr. Schwab to have gambled at Monte Carlo would have, in great measure, destroyed the confidence people have in him. That he has not been at that resort has not prevented a cynical account of his gains and losses. Not all foreign correspondents are liars, but those who are seem to get the most space.

Cold-Blades has gone into the cold storage for the purpose of freezing out an enemy.

Stop the Cough and Walk the Colds Off.

Laxative Bromo Quinine Tablets cure a cold in one day. No cure, No Pay.

Price 25 cents.

A Minneapolis doctor would have victims of smallpox cured and then sent to jail for ninety days for having had the disease. In this case persons would be far better than cure.

NIGHT WAS HER TEEROR.

"I would cough nearly all night," writes Mrs. Chase, of Alexandria, Ind., "and could hardly get any sleep. I had consumption so bad that if I walked a block I would cough frightfully and spit blood, but, when all other medicines failed, three \$1.00 bottles of the King's New Discovery wholly cured me and I gained 30 pounds." It's absolutely guaranteed to cure Coughs, Colds, La Grippe, Bronchitis and all Throat and Lung Troubles. Price 25c and 50c. Trial-bottles free at Hart's Drugstore.

It is stated that no rich men are contributing to the McKinley memorial. They ought to contribute, or the plan is dropped.

DON'T LIVE TOGETHER.

Constitution and health never go together. DeWitt's Little Early Ringers promote easy action of the bowels without distress. "I have been troubled with constipation nine years," says J. O. Greene, Terre Haute, Ind. "I have tried many remedies but Little Early Ringers give best results." CHAS. ROGERS.

After Best Admited Drives has been

the welcome to Prince Henry. He will have to add a chapter to his book telling how nobly was charmed by his presence.

WORKING 24 HOURS A DAY.

There's no rest for those tireless British workers—Dr. King's New Life Pills. Millions are always busy, cutting Tropic Liver, Jaundice, Biliousness, Fever and Aches. They vanish Sick-headache and drive out Malaria. Never gripe or weaken. Small, taste nice, work wonders. Try them. 25 cents at Hart's Drugstore.

Emily Tom's Celery played in the South because who did not begin to eat it.

Nothing to do with the South.

REPORT NOT CREDIBLE.

Sovereign Agents Dispute They Know Nothing of Negotiations.

NEW YORK, Jan. 20.—Sovereign Agents, especially the agents of the firms thus affected, are not inclined to credit the recent reports of actual combination of the freight service of the White Star and Cunard lines, whatever arrangements J. P. Morgan may have been able to effect among the American, the Leyland and the Atlantic Transport lines over the last few days. The agents of Cunard, John Lee, agree with the White Star line in this country, who insist that he has absolutely no knowledge, or for that matter deal, of any negotiations are being pursued.

During the absence of Mr. Lee, the Cunard line has taken the position that any deal must necessarily be one of agreement and not purchase. Members of the firm of J. P. Morgan & Company, when questioned, denied that the banking house had under way